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I. INTRODUCTION

Food Law and Policy (FL&P) is a quickly growing field of legal
practice that offers many exciting career opportunities for law students. As
national awareness of food and agricultural issues increases, particularly
the way laws and policies influence our food system, more law students are
demanding that their law schools offer courses, internships, and clinical
experiences in this field. Law schools across the country have an
opportunity to satisfy this student demand, while at the same time
providing students with skills and knowledge that will equip them to
engage with the many complex, dynamic, and important issues related to
the practice of FL&P. This article seeks to explain to curious and
interested legal educators the types of career paths a student might take in
the field of FL&P and the ways law schools can provide students the
necessary skills and education in order to prepare them for a career in
FL&P.
In some ways, this article is an incredibly personal one, drawing on
my own experience forging a career in FL&P in the early years of the
field's development. Although I am now in the first installment of a career
in FL&P (as the first Clinical Fellow in the first clinical program dedicated
to FL&P1), my career path was not always clear. Growing up in Southern
California, I was interested in food and health, but had no real connection
to agriculture or understanding of the ways in which our food and
agricultural laws influence our food system so significantly. With no
specific link to the world of agriculture, law, or the existing field of food
studies, I was unaware of any career options related to food beyond the

1. HARVARD FOOD LAW & POLICY CLINIC,

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/

foodpolicyinitiative/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
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medical world-dieticians and doctors-or the retail food world--chefs
and other food service positions.
After graduating from college in 2006, I discovered an entire world of
other careers in food-food sociology, food writing, food anthropology,
and food politics-at the joint conference of the Agriculture, Food, and
Human Values Society and the Association for the Study of Food and
Society.2 I decided that pursuing a master's degree in food policy was the
advanced degree I needed in order to have the career I wanted, improving
the policies around food and health. When the idea of pursuing a law
degree was suggested to me in the fall of 2007, I initially dismissed it. I
understood lawyers to be those people who argued in court-something in
which I was wholly uninterested-and I had no reason to believe food law
existed as a field of study. A short Google search later proved me wrong.
As of the fall of 2007, Drake University Law School and the University of
Arkansas School of Law were the only law schools that had programs in
food and agricultural law. Drake and Arkansas' food and agricultural law
programs have been around for nearly thirty years.3
I decided to see what each had to offer. After completing my J.D.
with a Certificate in Food and Agricultural Law at Drake University Law
School 4 and my LL.M. in Agricultural and Food Law at the University of
Arkansas School of Law,5 I began my search for a job in food and
agricultural law and policy. In my first week of searching, I came across a
listing for a Clinical Fellow position at the Harvard Food Law and Policy
Clinic (FLPC).6 The FLPC was established in 2010 and, in the summer of
2012, was looking for their first Clinical Fellow. I pursued the opportunity
and have been at the FLPC ever since.
2.

AGRIC., FOOD

&

HUMAN VALUES

Soc'Y,

HOME,

http://affivs.org/ (last visited

May 9, 2014); ASS'N FOR THE STUDY OF FOOD & SOC'Y, CONFERENCE,
http://www.food-culture.org/conference/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
3. Drake University Law School has a Certificate Program in Food and
Agricultural Law. DRAKE UNIV. LAW SCHOOL, FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL LAW
CERTIFICATE, http://www.law.drake.edu/academics/?pagelD = foodAgLawCert (last
visited May 9, 2014). The University of Arkansas School of Law has the only LL.M.
Program in Agricultural and Food Law. UNIV. OF ARK. SCHOOL OF LAW, LL.M IN
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD LAW, http://law. uark.edu/academics/llm/ (last visited May
9,

2014);

see also THE

LL.M.

PROGRAM

IN

AGRICULTURAL

&

FOOD LAW,

http://www.agfoodllm.com/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
4. DRAKE UNIV. LAW SCHOOL, supra note 3.
5. UNIV. OF ARK. SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 3; see also THE LL.M. PROGRAM IN
AGRICULTURAL & FOOD LAW, supra note 3.
6. HARVARD FOOD LAW & POLICY CLINIC, APPLY TO BE A CLINICAL FELLOW IN THE
FOOD LAW AND POLICY CLINIC, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/foodpolicyinitiative/ 2012
/06/1 8/apply-to-be-a-clinical-fellow-in-the-food-law-and-policy-clinic/
(last visited
May 9, 2014) [hereinafter FoodLaw & Policy Clinic].
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This story is relevant because it not only parallels the growth and
development of FL&P as a field of study, but it also illustrates the rapid
increase in job opportunities within the field. When I began law school in
the fall of 2008, the Clinical Fellowship position at the FLPC did not exist;
when I completed my LL.M. program in May 2012, the position was in the
process of being created, but was not yet official. Mine was the first
position of its kind, yet in the year and a half that I have been at the FLPC,
job opportunities within FL&P have expanded at a remarkable pace--other
law schools have started fellowship programs; more non-profits are
entering into the FL&P world; non-profits that were already engaged in
food work are recognizing the importance of policy advocacy to their work.
Opportunities are cropping up everywhere (pun intended).
If we operate under the safe assumption that the field of FL&P will
continue to mature and that the job opportunities in FL&P for lawyers will
expand, how do we, as legal educators, help interested law students
understand what FL&P is and what their career opportunities are? How do
we help prepare law students for a career in FL&P? This article begins
with an introduction to the field of FL&P to help legal educators
understand the breadth and depth of the field as well as to set up the
discussion of the various career opportunities within the field. The article
then provides a discussion of the ways law schools can educate and equip
law students to enter a career in FL&P. Finally, the article concludes with
a series of questions law schools should consider when deciding how to
best prepare their students for a career in FL&P.

II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO FOOD LAW AND POLICY7
People often assume that FL&P is a small and limited area of law in
which to practice and study. The reality is quite to the contrary. It brings
together a wide variety of areas of law with a focus on the food system as
the common theme. Food law and policy:
includes the study of the laws and regulations that govern
the animals, crops, food, and beverages we grow, raise,
produce, transport, buy, sell, distribute, share, cook, eat,
and drink. It considers federal, state, and local "rules to
govern common behavior and shared experiences
regarding the available food supply."
Its "policy"
component focuses on innumerable food and agricultural

7. See Baylen J. Linnekin & Emily M. Broad Leib, Food Law and Policy: The
Fertile Field's Origins and First Decade (forthcoming) (on file with author).
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issues that illustrate the relationship between the law and
its intended and unintended consequences on health, the
environment, the economy, and other areas.
It is made up of: agricultural law; food and drug law; constitutional
law; property law; land use law; local government law; international trade
law; environmental law; contract law; labor law; intellectual property and
trademark law; health law; business law; marketing and advertising law;
animal law; administrative law; and tribal law, among many others. To
illustrate, some of the projects the FLPC works on include: food trucks and
mobile vending; urban agriculture; food safety; nutrition assistance
programs; technical assistance for food policy councils (including at the
local, state, tribal, and international levels); food waste; institutional
purchasing of local food; labor laws and the definition of agriculture; and
financing opportunities for farmers. 9 Because FL&P touches on so many
topics, a law student interested in any of the types of law listed above
would likely find FL&P an exciting and dynamic area of law to study and
in which to work. Further, FL&P is an industry-based area of legal study
(similar to health law), rather than a discipline-based area of study. As
such, the study of FL&P lines up more with the actual practice of law
(which tends to be industry-based), rather than most legal disciplines
(which are narrower, in some ways).
III.

CAREER OPPORTUNITIES IN FOOD LAW AND POLICY

As the field of FL&P develops, so do the number and type of career
opportunities within FL&P. The FLPC, in collaboration with the Harvard
Food Law Society, publishes an annual career guide which provides an indepth listing of various career opportunities within FL&P. The second
edition of the guide, which added a new section and numerous new entries,
was published in the summer of 2013 and can be found on the FLPC
website.10 For purposes of this article, I have focused on seven main
categories of career opportunities: fellowships; government; non-profits;

8. Baylen J. Linnekin, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF FOOD LAW & POLICY: THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS IN THE ACADEMY AND BEYOND, YALE FOOD SYSTEMS

SYMPOSIUM 1-2 (2013) (on file with author) (internal citations omitted).
9.

HARVARD FOOD LAW & POL'Y CLINIC, PROJECTS, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/

foodpolicy initiative/food-policy-initiative-projects/ (last visited May 9, 2014)
[hereinafter Projects].
10. See generally HARVARD FOOD LAW & POL'Y CLINIC, FOOD LAW AND POLICY
CAREER GUIDE (2d ed. 2013), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/foodpolicy
initiative/files/2013/07/Career-Guide_2013.pdf.
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law firms; academia; private business; and other. Within those seven
categories are various sub-categories, each of which will be discussed
below.
A. Fellowships
A fellowship is a time-bound position that is generally intended to
help launch the fellow into a more permanent position." Some institutions
that offer fellowships provide a salary or stipend to the fellow; others
require the fellow to secure outside funding for their position. Fellowships
are traditionally one to two years in length.' 2 Although fellowships exist
for already practicing attorneys and professors seeking funding to support
their research, this discussion focuses on fellowships for recent law school
3
graduates.'
We begin with a discussion of fellowships for a few reasons. First, as
the field of FL&P is still developing and opportunities in FL&P are not as
widespread as other areas of law, participating in a fellowship gives the
fellow a secure way to temporarily delay the job search process and wait
for more job opportunities within the field to develop. Second, because
there are still relatively few law schools that offer FL&P coursework,
fellowships offer recent graduates an opportunity to acquire the skills and
substantive knowledge about FL&P that they may not have gained during
law school.
Third, fellowships are generally restricted to recently
graduated law students and, therefore, are a great starting place for a career
in FL&P.
Recent graduates should take advantage of fellowship
opportunities because they may not be available to them later in their
careers.
There are four main sub-categories of fellowships that FL&P law
students can pursue: clinical fellowships at a law school; teaching
fellowships at a law school; LL.M fellowships at a law school; and,
fellowships at non-profits.
11.

See Bryan L. Adamson et al., The Status of Clinical Faculty in the Legal

Academy: Report of the Task Force on the Status of Cliniciansand the Legal Academy,

36 J. LEGAL PROF. 353, 378-79 (2012).
12.

See.YALE LAW SCHOOL CAREER DEV. OFFICE, PUBLIC INTEREST FELLOWSHIPS

VOL. 1 5 (2011), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/CDOPublic/
FinalPublicFellowships Voll .pdf.
13. These fellowships and visiting assistant professorships (VAPs) are not addressed
here because it is not apparent that these fellowships and VAPs exist in the field of
FL&P; it is entirely possible that at some future date, these types of fellowships and
VAPs could focus on FL&P.

See COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, FELLOWSHIPS AND VAPs,

http://web.law.columbia.edu/law-teaching/services-current-candidates/fellowships-vaps
(last visited May 9, 2014).
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1. Law School - Clinical Fellowship
Clinical fellowships offer the fellow an opportunity to gain both
practical experience in FL&P, as well as teaching and supervisory skills.
The FLPC, the first FL&P clinical program in the country, offers clinical
fellowship positions.14 The mission of the FLPC is "to increase access to
healthy foods, prevent diet-related diseases such as obesity and type 2
diabetes, and assist small and sustainable farmers in breaking into new
commercial markets."' 5 To that end, clinical fellows work on a range of
projects in the FL&P field that provide exposure to a variety of topicsincluding food safety,' 6 local food procurement, 17 urban agriculture, 18 and
food waste.' 9 FLPC clinical fellows supervise clinical students on these
projects, helping students develop important skills-such as problemsolving, policy analysis, research and writing, oral communication, and
20
leadership skills.
Note that there are also fellowships in other types of non-FL&P
specific clinics-such as transactional clinics 2' and clinics doing other
public interest law 22 -that engage in some food system work. Potential

14. Food Law & Policy Clinic, supra note 6.
15.

HARVARD FOOD LAW & POL'Y CLINIC, ABOUT Us http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/

food policyinitiative/about/about-us/ (last visited May 9, 2014) [hereinafter About Us].
16.

HARVARD FOOD LAW & POL'Y CLINIC, FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT,

COMMENTS

ON

PROPOSED

RULES,

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/foodpolicyinitiative/

food-policy-initiative-proj ects/current-projects/food-safety-modemization-actcomments-on-proposed-rules/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
17.

HARVARD

FOOD

LAW

&

MASSACHUSETTS STATE AGENCIES,

POL'Y

CLINIC,

LOCAL

PROCUREMENT

COLLEGES, AND UNIVERSITIES,

BY

http://blogs.law.

harvard.edu/foodpolicyinitiative/food-policy-initiative-projects/current-projects/localprocurement-by-massachusetts-state-agencies-colleges-and-universities/ (last visited
May 9, 2014).
18. HARVARD FOOD LAW & POL'Y CLINIC, BOSTON URBAN AGRICULTURE
INITIATIVE, http://blogs. law.harvard.edu/foodpolicyinitiative/food-policy-initiative-

projects/current-projects/boston-urban-agriculture-initiative/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
19.

HARVARD

FOOD

LAW

&

POL'Y

CLINIC,

REDUCING

FOOD

WASTE,

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/foodpolicyinitiative/food-policy-initiative-projects
/current-projects/reducing-food-waste/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
20. About Us, supra note 15.
21.

See, e.g., STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, ORGANIZATIONS & TRANSACTIONS CLINIC:

ORRICK

HERRINGTON

&

SUTCLIFFE

CLINICAL

TEACHING

FELLOWSHIP,

http://www.law.stanford.edu/scholarlylife/fellowships/otc (last visited May 9, 2014).
22. Prior to her teaching fellowship at UCLA (see discussion below), Margot
Pollans held a clinical teaching fellowship in the environmental section of the Institute
for Public Representation (IPR) at Georgetown Law School. GEORGETOWN LAW,
INSTITUTE

FOR

PUBLIC

REPRESENTATION

GRADUATE

TEACHING

FELLOWSHIPS,
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fellows may be able to propose that food systems projects be incorporated
into the existing clinical project framework.23
2. Law School - Teaching Fellowship
Students interested in FL&P can also pursue a teaching fellowship.
The first teaching fellowship in FL&P was founded at UCLA School of
Law in their newly-established Resnick Program for Food Law and
Policy. 24

Unlike the clinical fellowship where fellows work on FL&P

projects for clients, "[t]he fellowship provides law school graduates who
are committed to pursuing a career in legal academia an opportunity to
teach, and do research and writing at UCLA Law School in preparation for
a law teaching career. '25 The teaching fellow is expected to complete at
least one scholarly publication and teach at least one course per academic
year of the fellowship.2 6 The fellowship is one year with an option to
renew for a second year. 27 During the teaching fellowship, the fellow will
also prepare to enter the legal academic market upon completion of the
fellowship.28

Other schools have general teaching fellowships that allow the fellow
to research and/or teach in the field of his or her choice. For example,
University of Pennsylvania Law School's Sharswood Fellowship is a two-

https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinicalprograms/our-clinics/IPR/ipr-fellowships.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). Margot
supervised a variety of litigation and administrative matters arising under local, state,
and federal law, most of which were not focused on the food system. However, at her
request, she was able to take on a food systems project that fit the overall goals and
criteria of IPR. Email from Margot Pollans, UCLA Fellow, to author (Feb. 10, 2014)
(on file with author).
23. In an email explaining her work at IPR, Margot noted that if a future "fellow had
a strong interest in the area, he or she may be able to propose new food systems
projects." Id.
24.

UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, RESNICK PROGRAM FOR FOOD LAW AND POLICY,

http://www.law.ucla.edu/centers-programs/resnick-program-for-food-law-andpolicy/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 9, 2014) [hereinafter Resnick Program];
UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, RESNICK PROGRAM FOR FOOD LAW AND POLICY TEACHING
FELLOWSHIP, https://recruit.apo.ucla.edu/apply/JPFOOO 10 (last visited May 9, 2014).
25. UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, BIOGRAPHY - MARGOT POLLANS, http://www.law.

ucla.edu/faculty/all-faculty-profiles/Pages/Margot-Pollans.aspx (last visited May 9,
2014) [hereinafter Pollans].
26. Resnick Program,supra note 24; Pollans, supra note 25.
27. Resnick Program,supra note 24
28. Id.
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year research, writing, and teaching fellowship which requires the fellow to
teach two courses and publish at least one scholarly article.29
3. Law School - LL.M. Fellowship

A third fellowship opportunity in FL&P is somewhat of a hybrid
fellowship and is illustrated by the LL.M. fellowship offered by Vermont
Law School's Center for Agriculture and Food Systems. 30 The mission of
the Center for Agriculture and Food Systems is two-fold: "(1) [t]o train the
next generation of sustainable food and agriculture law and policy
advocates and practitioners in support of robust local and regional food
systems; [and] (2) [t]o develop legal tools, disseminate information, and
advocate for sustainable agriculture and food systems.",3' The fellow
supports this mission by teaching, helping develop curriculum, and
engaging in advocacy work. Further, as part of this two-year LL.M.
fellowship, the fellow takes courses in pursuit of an LL.M. in
Environmental Law.32

4. Non-Profit Fellowship
Students interested in fellowships are not limited to an academic
setting. Various non-profits around the country-both law-focused and
non law-focused non-profits-accept fellows to participate in the work of
the non-profit. The specific projects and skills associated with the
fellowship will depend in large part on the type of non-profit in which the
student is interested.
First, law students can seek fellowships at non-profit law firms. For
example, the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), which uses "the law,
science, policymaking, and the business market to find pragmatic,
innovative solutions -to New England's toughest environmental
problems, 3 3 recently founded a "Farm and Food Initiative. 34 The Farm
29. UNIV. OF PA. LAW SCHOOL, ACADEMIC FELLOWSHIPS, https://www.law.
upenn.edu/faculty/fellowships.php (last visited May 9, 2014).
30. VT. LAW SCHOOL, CENTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEMS LLM
FELLOWSHIP,
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Admissions/Tuition and Financial Aid
/Fellowships/Center for Agriculture andFoodSystems_LLMFellowship.htm (last
visited May 9, 2014).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. CONSERVATION LAW FOUND., ABOUT CLF, http://www.clf.org/about-clf/ (last
visited May 9, 2014).
34. CONSERVATION LAW FOUND., FARM AND FOOD INITIATIVE, http://www.clf.org
/our-work/healthy-communities/farm-and-food-initiative/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
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and Food Initiative works on issues of urban and peri-urban agriculture in
greater Boston as well as creating innovative ways to promote the New
England regional food system. 35 Elena Mihaly, a recent Vermont Law
School graduate, is a CLF fellow working in the Farm and Food Initiative.
Her primary work includes developing and launching a network of
attorneys providing pro bono services to farmers and food entrepreneurs
and identifying and addressing legal and regulatory hurdles to urban
agriculture throughout New England.3 6 Elena's position is funded through
the Betsy and Jesse Fink Foundation. 37 Elena's story provides an example
of ways recent law school graduates can work at non-profits doing FL&P:
I first learned about the Fink Foundation because it
provided funding for an internship I had during law school
at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to work
on food policy. After an invitation to meet other funded
food policy interns from across the Northeast at the Fink's
family farm in Connecticut, I began discussing the
possibility of the Fink Foundation funding a Food Law
Fellowship position for me to continue working on food
policy in New England after law school. CLF agreed to
host me as a Legal Fellow, and I presented a fellowship
proposal to the Fink Foundation. Both Betsy and Jesse
Fink see great value in investing in human capital, and they
have already awarded funding to a second Food Law
Fellow slated to start work at NRDC's New York office in
the spring.38
Another example of a law-focused non-profit that hires legal fellows
is the Center for Food Safety-"a national non-profit public interest and
environmental advocacy organization working to protect human health and
the environment by curbing the use of harmful food production
technologies and by promoting organic and other forms of sustainable
agriculture."

39

35. Id.
36. Email from Elena Mihaly, CLF Fellow, Farm & Food Initiative, to author (Jan.
13, 2014) (on file with author).
37.

JOAN BRIGGS, BETSY & JESSE FINK FOUND., SAFSF JUNE 2013: INVESTING IN

HUMAN CAPITAL 16, available at http://www.safsf.org/wp-content/uploads /2013/
07/InvestinginHumanCapitalSAFSF2013_web.pdf.
38. Email from Elena Mihaly, supra note 36.
39. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, ABOUT CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.center
forfoodsafety.org/about-us (last visited May 9, 2014).
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Second, law students can seek fellowships at non-profits whose work
is not primarily law and policy. For example, the NRDC focuses some of
its work on the food system, specifically on keeping contaminants out of
food, cutting back on toxic pesticides, making sustainable, healthy eating
easy, and promoting sustainable food production. 40 Most recently the
NRDC incorporated food and agriculture issues into its environmental
work and, with the FLPC, published a comprehensive policy report on food
waste caused by date labeling. 4' Nathan Rosenberg, former FLPC clinic
student and former joint Harvard Law School and Mississippi State
University Delta Fellow, recently secured a legal fellowship at the NRDC.
As a Legal Fellow with NRDC, his work "focuses on promoting regional
and sustainable food in the greater New York City area and in other parts
of the country.... [and] includes increasing access to healthy food,
particularly among low-income and historically disadvantaged
communities. ' The food fellowship at NRDC is a new fellowship and is
also funded by the Betsy and Jesse Fink Foundation.43 According to
Nathan, "NRDC hopes to continue [the fellowship] in the future, giving
more young
lawyers the opportunity to gain experience in food law and
'4 4
policy.

A Fulbright Fellowship is another way recent graduates can work in
FL&P. Emilie Aguirre, a former FLPC clinical student, was awarded a
Fulbright Fellowship for 2013-14 to research the impact of EU agricultural
laws on small-scale farming and obesity in the UK and Ireland.45 These
examples show that if law students can secure post-graduation fellowship
money, they are in a good position to approach a FL&P organization for a
fellowship whether it has an established fellowship position or not.
B. Government

There are many opportunities to engage in FL&P work at the various
levels and branches of government. One benefit of working in state and
federal government is the opportunity to engage in policy formation in the
40.

NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, SAFE, SUSTAINABLE FOOD, http://www.nrdc.org

/food/default.asp (last visited May 9, 2014).
41.

NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE DATING GAME: How CONFUSING FOOD

DATE LABELS

LEAD TO FOOD WASTE IN AMERICA,

http://www.nrdc.org/food

/expiration-dates.asp (last visited May 9, 2014).
42. Email from Nathan Rosenberg, NRDC Legal Fellow, to author (Jan. 28, 2014)
(on file with author).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. FULBRIGHT COMM'N, EMILIE AGUIRRE, http://www.fulbright.org.uk/about/meetour-fulbrighters/emilie-aguirre/660 (last visited May 9, 2014).
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most fundamental way; government staffers are often on the frontlines of
policy formation. Along with this exciting and dynamic aspect of working
in state and federal government are some drawbacks-government
employees engaged in law and policy formation, enforcement, and
compliance must also struggle with the political wrangling and bureaucracy
that sometimes results in change happening at a very slow pace. Working
on a local level, on the other hand, may come with more flexibility, as local
governments often experiment with new ideas and policies more easily.
While it is not necessary to have a lawyer fill some of these positions, the
skills lawyers bring to a FL&P position can be very beneficial.
1. Legislatures
There are FL&P employment opportunities in legislatures at both the
state and federal level. In Congress, the following committees are the main
ones that work on food and agricultural law and policy issues:
*
*
"
*

46
Agriculture (Senate and House)
47
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (Senate)
48
Energy and Commerce (House)
49
Appropriations (Senate and House)

Further, many members of Congress have staffers that work primarily
on food and agricultural issues, often called "Ag LAs" (agriculture
legislative assistants). 50
A legislative assistant becomes a Congress

46. U.S.
SENATE
COMM.
ON
AGRIC.,
NUTRITION
&
FORESTRY,
http://www.ag.senate.gov/ (last visited May 9, 2014); U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON AGRIC.

http://agriculture.house.gov/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
47.

U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, http://www.help.

senate.gov/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
48.

U.S. HOUSE

COMM.

ON ENERGY &

house.gov/ (last visited May 9, 2014).
49. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON

COMMERCE,

APPROPRIATIONS,

http://energycommerce.

http://www.appropriations.

senate.gov/ (last visited May 9, 2014); U.S. HOUSE COMM. ON

APPROPRIATIONS,

http://appropriations.house.gov/ (last visited May 9, 2014). Students may be interested
in the following subcommittees, which are same in both the Senate and the House:
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies; Energy and Water Development; Interior, Environment, and Related
Agencies; Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies; and
Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies.
50. For example, Benjamin Thomas (an alumni of the Arkansas LL.M. program) is
the Agriculture LA for Senator Max Baucus. Susan Schneider, LL.M. Alums Take the
Lead at USDA Risk Management Agency, LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG
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member's go-to person for issues involving food and agriculture. The
issues an Ag LA will engage with depend largely on where the member of
Congress is from and on which committees the member of Congress sits.
State legislatures also have committees that deal with food and
agricultural issues. For example, the California State Assembly Committee
on Agriculture has primary jurisdiction over areas such as agriculture, the
Department of Food and Agriculture, food labeling, marketing law, and
milk and milk products, among many other topics. 5' The California State
Assembly Committee on Higher Education has authority over FL&P issues
such as student health and nutrition.52 The California State Assembly
Committee on Health oversees some issues that are at the intersection of
health and food, for example, health care, health insurance, and public
health programs. 53 At the state level, there may be more committees and
opportunities to engage in FL&P work outside of the traditional agriculture
and education committees. For example, the California State Assembly has
Select Committees whose work may touch on FL&P issues; some of those
Select Committees include: agriculture and the environment; community
and neighborhood development; job creation for the new economy;
protecting California's food safety systems; regional transportation
solutions; small business financing and development opportunities; and
sustainable and organic agriculture, among others.54 The California
Legislature also has joint committees, including a Joint Committee on
Fisheries and Aquaculture. 55 As in Congress, there are state level
representatives that hire staff to work on food and agriculture issues, which
provides another opportunity for law students seeking a career in FL&P.
2. Agencies
A handful of state and federal level agencies have jurisdiction over
FL&P issues. At the federal level, the two primary agencies that engage in

(Mar. 21, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.agfoodllm.com/2013/03/llm-alums-take-lead-atusda-risk.html.
51.

CA. STATE ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON AGRIC., WELCOME TO THE COMMITTEE ON

AGRICULTURE,

52.

http://agri.assembly. ca.gov/ (last visited May 10, 2014).

CA. STATE ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON HIGHER EDUC., 2008 LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY

36-39
(2008),
available at
http://aedn.assembly.ca.gov/sites/aedn.assembly.
ca.gov/files/publications/2008 DraftFINALREPORT.pdf
53. CA. STATE ASSEMBLY, COMM. ON HEALTH, WELCOME TO THE COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH, http://ahea.assembly. ca.gov/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
54. CA. STATE ASSEMBLY, COMMITTEES, http://assembly.ca.gov/committees#Select

Committees (last visited May 9, 2014).
55.

CA. STATE ASSEMBLY, JOINT COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE,

http://assembly.ca.gov/fisheries (last visited May 10, 2014).
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FL&P work are the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).56 The USDA's jurisdiction is expansive,
covering topics from crop insurance and meat slaughter and processing, to
beginning farmer programs and school meal programs.57 Secretary of
Agriculture Tom Vilsack has made a concerted effort during his tenure to
increase support for local and regional agriculture, for beginning farmers,
and for farm-to-institution programs, among other topics that FL&P
students may find interesting. 58 The FDA's work involves a significant
amount of traditional food and drug legal work (what some refer to as
"FDA Law"), which focuses on drugs, medical devices, radiation-emitting
products, animal and veterinary issues, cosmetics, tobacco products, and
food (as it relates to food facility safety and food product labeling).59
However, with its recent jurisdiction expansion into the regulation of onfarm food safety and an increased expectation to improve the food safety of
food facilities domestically and internationally, the FDA's involvement in
FL&P issues is now more established. 60 Further, with FDA's jurisdiction
over food labeling (but not for meat products, which is the USDA's
territory) and the rise in debate over food labels (e.g., nutrition labeling,
organic, GMO, natural, etc.), there will likely be an increased demand for
employees that understand the intricacies of FL&P at the FDA.
As with work in legislatures, state-level agencies also provide an
option for students to seek employment in FL&P (e.g., in state-level
departments of agriculture). Further, state-level attorneys general offices
might have opportunities for work in FL&P. For example, the Washington
State Office of the Attorney General has an agriculture and health
61
division.

56.

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT WE DO, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/

default.htm (last visited May 10, 2014); U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., ABOUT USDA,
http://www.usda. gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome (last visited May 10, 2014).
57.
58.

U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., supra note 56.
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC.,
FARM

TO
SCHOOL,
http://www.fns.usda.
gov/farmtoschool/farm-school (last visited May 10, 2014); U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC.,

KNOW YOUR FARMER, KNOW YOUR FOOD, http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/

knowyourfarmer?navid=KNOWYOURFARMER (last visited May 10, 2014); U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Posts Tagged: Beginning Farmers, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. BLOG,
http://blogs.usda.gov/tag/beginning-farmers/.
59. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 56.
60.
61.

FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011).
WASH.

STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GEN.,

AGRICULTURE

& HEALTH

http://www.atg.wa.gov/ Divisions/AgricultureHealth.aspx#.UvkOEmJdV8E
(last visited May 10, 2014).
DIVISION,
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3. Tribal Governments
There is much FL&P work to be done in Indian country across the
United States (US). 62 Within the last five years, the USDA established an

Office of Tribal Relations, the purpose of which is to engage with tribal
leaders on issues of food and agricultural law and policy. 63 Tribal
governments, such as the government of the Navajo Nation, are increasing
their engagement with the food policy issues that face their nations. 64 For
example, the Navajo Nation Council recently "approved an additional 2percent sales tax on so-called 'junk foods,' including all sugary beverages"
and eliminated the "5-percent sales tax on fresh fruits and vegetables and
nutritious snacks such as seeds and nuts." 65 As with other levels of
government, tribal governments across the country provide another
opportunity for law students to engage in FL&P.
4. Local Government
As indicated by the rise of government sponsored food policy
councils and food policy directors or advisors, state and local governments
are increasingly recognizing the value of having staff that focus on food
policy issues. 66 As of 2013, thirteen cities in the US have a paid local food

policy director.67 For example, New York City (NYC) has a Mayor's

62. See also UNIV. OF ARK. SCHOOL OF LAW, THE INDIGENOUS FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE INITIATIVE, http://law.uark. edu/ifai/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
63. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF TRIBAL RELATIONS, ABOUT THE OFFICE OF
TRIBAL RELATIONS, http://usda.gov/ wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=OTR (last

visited May 10, 2014).
64. HARVARD FOOD LAW & POL'Y CLINIC, NAVAJO NATION FOOD POLICY
LEGISLATION, http://blogs.law.harvard. edu/foodpolicyinitiative/food-policy-initiativeprojects/current-projects/navajo-nation-food-policy-legislation/ (last visited May 10,
2014); see also NAVAJO NATION TRADITIONAL AGRIC. OUTREACH, ABOUT NNTAO,

http://nntao.org/ about-us.html (last visited May 10, 2014).
65. Dan Flynn, Navajo Nation Hikes Sales Taxes on "Junk Foods," Makes Healthy
Food Choices Tax-Free, FOODSAFETYNEWS.COM, Feb. 3, 2014, http://www.foodsafety
news.com/2014/02/navajo-nation-increases-sales-taxes-on-junk-food-and-makeshealthy-choices-tax-free.
66. See MOLLY HATFIELD, OR. BUREAU OF PLANNING & SUSTAINABILITY, CITY
FOOD POLICY AND PROGRAMS: LESSONS HARVESTED FROM AN EMERGING FIELD app.

A

(2012), available at http://www.portlandoregon.gov /bps/article/416389; Emily Broad
Leib, All (Food)Politicsis Local: Increasing FoodAccess through Local Government
Action, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 322 (2013).
67.

A.

HATFIELD, OR. BUREAU OF PLANNING

&

SUSTAINABILITY,

supra note 66, at app.
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69
Office of Food Policy; 68 Boston has a Mayor's Office of Food Initiatives;

Los Angeles (LA) has a Mayor's Senior Advisor on Food Policy;70 Seattle
has an Office of Sustainability and Environment that focuses part of its
work on food issues and food policy;

71

and Baltimore has a Baltimore City

Director.72

Food Policy
The NYC Mayor's Office of Food Policy director
position and the LA Mayor's Senior Advisor on Food Policy position have
both been held by lawyers at one point in time. 73 As more local
governments come to recognize the value of addressing food policy issues
on a local level, law students with experience in FL&P may find numerous
opportunities in local governments across the country.
C. Non-Profits
With every year that passes, there are more non-profits that are
working to improve the food system-from the local level all the way up to
the international level and on a wide variety of topics. FL&P students may
consider seeking employment at a non-profit; the critical thinking, research,
and writing skills that lawyers bring to non-profit work are great assets.
Some non-profits working in the food world focus on providing legal
services or working on law-related projects; other non-profits are not
specifically focused on law and policy, but could benefit from having a
lawyer on staff in some capacity (such as the Executive Director).
1. Law-Focused
There are a few different categories of law-focused non-profits that
might be of interest to students seeking a career in FL&P. First, there are
non-profits that work on a specific topic within the food and agriculture

68. NYC FOOD, ABOUT NYC FOOD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycfood/htmI/
about/about.shtmI (last visited May 10, 2014).
69. CITY OF Bos., OFFICE OF FOOD INITIATIVES, http://www.cityofboston.gov/food/
(last visited May 10, 2014).
70. L.A. Mayor Appoints Senior Advisor for Food Policy, L.A. TIMES DAILY DISH
BLOG (July 1, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://latimesbIogs.latimes.com/dailydish/2011/07/lamayor-appoints-senior-advisor-for-food-policy.html [hereinafter L.A. TIMES].
71. CITY OF SEATTLE, OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND ENVIRONMENT, http://www.
seattle.gov/environment/food.htm (last visited May 10, 2014).
72. CITY OF BALT., PLANNING/BALTIMORE FOOD POLICY INITIATIVE, http:I/www.
baltimorecity.gov/Govemment/AgenciesDepartments/Planning/BaltimoreFoodPolicyln
itiative.aspx (last visited May 10, 2014).
73. Ed Yowell, Q&A with Kim Kessler, the City's New Food Policy Coordinator,
FOOD SYSTEMS NETWORK NYC, Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.foodsystems
nyc.org/articles/kim-kessler-interview; L.A. TIMES supra note 70.
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system. Second, there are non-profits that provide legal services to specific
players within the food and agriculture system. Finally, there are nonprofits whose work touches on food and agriculture issues, but which
primarily focus on another issue or area of law.
The Fisheries Law Centre (FLC) is an example of a law-focused nonprofit whose work is dedicated to a specific topic within the food system.
The FLC was started by an Arkansas LL.M. alumnus and seeks "to conduct
research in the field of fisheries, aquaculture, and seafood laws and
regulations; to build capacity by educating law students, lawyers, and other
stakeholders in the area of fisheries law; and to facilitate legal
representation to underprivileged small-scale fishers and NGOs wherever
possible. ' '74 Although the FLC specifically focuses on fisheries and
seafood law, this should not suggest that their work is limited; there are
numerous legal issues that fall under the umbrella of fisheries and seafood
law.75 The Center for Food Safety (CFS) is another example of a nonprofit working on a specific food and agriculture topic. 76

The CFS,

however, defines food safety broadly-their work includes: genetic
engineering; seeds; pollinators and pesticides; food and climate;
aquaculture; factory farms; organics; nanotechnology; irradiation; and mad
cow disease, among other topics. 77

If law students are interested in a

specific FL&P topic, they may want to research whether a law-focused
non-profit exists that specializes in their area of interest. If not, the law
student may consider starting his own non-profit to engage in their area of
interest.
The Farmers Legal Action Group (FLAG) and Farm Commons (FC)
are examples of non-profit organizations that provide low-cost legal
services to a specific category of people-in this case, farmers. FLAG was
established in the 1980s as a response to the farm credit crisis in which
hundreds of thousands of farmers were forced off their land, and has
become a leader in representing the concerns of farmers to lawmakers.78
The attorneys at FLAG represent farmers on a variety of topics-including

74.

THE FISHERIES LAW CTR., WELCOME TO FLC,

http://fishlaw.org/ (last visited

May 10, 2014).
75. Id.
76. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, ABOUT CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.center
forfoodsafety.org/about-us (last visited May 10, 2014).
77. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, ISSUES, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues (last
visited May 10, 2014)
78.

FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GRP., ABOUT US, http://www.flaginc.org/aboutl (last

visited May 10, 2014).
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issues of farm credit,7 9 discrimination, 80 and farmland preservation 8'-and
have extensive experience representing farmers through the administrative
appeal process associated with USDA farm programs. 82 FC describes itself
as a "nonprofit legal services organization dedicated to providing farmers
with the proactive legal counsel they need to become the stable, resilient
foundation of a community-based food system." 83 FC was started by
Rachel Armstrong, a young lawyer whose purpose for going to law school
was to create a non-profit that provided affordable legal services to farmers
in the local food system. 84 FC provides education and training on legal
issues facing small-scale and sustainable farmers as well as transactional
legal services.85
Finally, there are law-focused non-profits that work on a broad set of
issues that include food and agricultural issues. For example, the
Sustainable Economies Law Center (SELC) "charts the changing legal
territory of the new economy, educating communities and individuals about
the possibilities and limits of creative economic structures, and advocating
' 86
for laws that clear the way for more sustainable economic development."
The SELC focuses their work on topics such as cooperatives, community
currencies, community enterprise, local investing, cohousing, urban
agriculture, and other food topics. 87 California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.
79. FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GRP., Topic: CREDIT, http://www.flaginc.org
/topic/credit/ (last visited May 10, 2014) (FLAG's services include advising and
assisting farmers who believe they were wrongly denied credit).
80. FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GRP., Topic: CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.flaginc.org/
topic/civil-fights/ (last visited May 10, 2014) (FLAG dedicates between one-third and
one-half of its work to providing legal assistance and education to immigrant and
minority farmers and ranchers to help address the discrimination many of these farmers
face).
81. FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GRP., Topic: FARMLAND PRESERVATION, http://www.
flaginc.org/topic/farmland-preservation/ (last visited May 10, 2014) (FLAG's services
include informing farmers about existing farmland preservation programs in Minnesota
and advising farmers about their eligibility for those programs).
82. FARMERS
LEGAL
ACTION
GRP.,
TOPIC:
APPEALS,
http://www.flag
inc.org/topic/appeals/ (last visited May 10, 2014) (noting that "FLAG attorneys have a
deep and thorough knowledge of USDA's National Appeals Division (NAD)
regulations and have literally 'written the book' about the program. FLAG is able to
inform and advise farmers about how to navigate through the NAD appeals system").
83. FARM COMMONS, OUR VALUES, http://farmcommons.org/about/ (last visited
May 10, 2014).

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. THE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CTR., WHAT WE DO, http://www.theselc.
org/what-we-do/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
87. Id.; THE SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CENTER, FOOD, http://www.theselc.
org/food/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
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and the Watsonville Law Center both provide legal services and education
to low-income individuals in rural communities in California. 88 These two
non-profits aim to address issues of economic inequality and to help
individuals "understand, exercise, and enforce their rights." 89 Because of
their locations and focus on low-income communities, much of the work of
these two non-profits is with farm worker and migrant communities. 90 Law
students should not overlook these types of non-profits, particularly if the
non-profit's overall mission is in line with the values of the law student. It
is not difficult to find a connection to FL&P in other types of non-profit
work, which opens up the number of career opportunities law students can
seek.
2. Not Law-Focused
Non-profits that work on food issues but are not specifically focused
on legal issues are also a great place for a FL&P student to seek
employment. Some of these non-profits are not engaged in law or policy
work at all. There are quite a few, however, that do some work that is law
related (e.g., policy work91 or work that addresses legal needs of farmers,
such as land transactions and access to credit).92 For example, there are
non-profits that focus on food and agricultural education in primary
schools, 93 purchasing of local food products by institutions, 94 improving

88. CAL. RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INC., ABOUT Us, http://www.crla.org/about-us
(last visited May 10, 2014); WATSONVILLE LAW CTR., ABOUT US, http://watsonville
lawcenter.org/about-us/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
89. CAL. RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INC., SERVICES & PROGRAMS, http://www.
crla.org/services-and-programs (last visited May 10, 2014); WATSONVILLE LAW CTR.,
supra note 88.
90. CAL. RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INC., supra note 89; WATSONVILLE LAW CTR.,
supra note 88.
91. See, e.g., NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., ABOUT US, http://sustainable
agriculture.net/about-us/ (last visited May 10, 2014) (engaging in policy advocacy on a
national level and building capacity within member organizations to engage in policy
advocacy).
92. See CAL. FARMLINK, ABOUT Us, http://www.califomiafarmlink.org/about-us
(last visited May 10, 2014) (helping farmers access land, loans, and other financial
resources).
93. See, e.g., FOOD CORPS, ABOUT Us, https://foodcorps.org/about (last visited May
10, 2014); THE EDIBLE SCHOOLYARD PROJECT, OUR HISTORY, http://edibleschool
yard.org/our-story (last visited May 10, 2014).
94.

See FARM TO INST. NEW ENG., ABOUT Us, http://www.farntoinstitution.org/

about-us.html (last visited May 10, 2014); MASS. FARM TO SCHOOL PROJECT, ABOUT,
http://www.massfarmtoschool.org/about-us (last visited May 10, 2014); NAT'L FARM
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school food,95 urban agriculture,9 6 domestic agriculture,9 7 international
agriculture, 98 local and regional food systems, 99 rural issues,' 00 animal
03
02
agriculture,' 0' anti-hunger and nutrition assistance, land conservation,'

TO SCHOOL NETWORK, ABOUT, http://www.farmtoschool.org/about

(last visited May
10, 2014).
95. ORFALEA FOUND., SCHOOL FOOD INITIATIVE, http://www.orfaleafoundation.org/
focus-areas/education/school-food (last visited May 10, 2014).
96. See
COLUMBIA
CTR.
FOR
URBAN
AGRIC.,
ABOUT
Us,
http://www.columbiaurbanag.org/about-us/ (last visited May 10, 2014); REVISION
INT'L, PURPOSE, http://www.revisioninternational.org/purpose/ (last visited May 10,
2014); THE CTR. FOR URBAN AGRIC. AT FAIRVIEW GARDENS, MISSION & VISION,
http://www.fairviewgardens.org/who-we-are/mission-vision/
(last visited May 10,

2014);

URBAN

FARMING

INST. OF

Bos.,

ABOUT,

http://urbanfarming institute.

wordpress.com/urban-farning-institute-at-a-glance/ (last visited May 10, 2014).

97.

FARMERS

FEEDING

THE

WORLD,

http://www.agweb.com/farmersfeeding

theworld/about us.aspx (last visited May 10, 2014); Lauren Bernadett, LL.M. Alumna
Margie Alsbrook Joins Farm Journal Foundation as Director of Operations, LL.M.
PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2013, 9:53 PM), http://www.agfoodllm.
com/2013/10/llm-alumna-margie-alsbrook-joins-farm.html.
Farm Journal Foundation
recently posted a job announcement seeking a Senior Advisor for Policy and
Advocacy.

SENIOR ADVISOR FOR POLICY AND ADVOCACY FOR FARM JOURNAL

FOUNDATION, http://www.agweb.com/assets/1/6/020414 Senior%20Advisor%20for/o
20Policy/o20and%20Advocacy%20for/ 2OFarm%2OJoumal%20Foundation.pdf. (last
visited May 10, 2014).
98. See, e.g., ONE ACRE FUND,
JOB OPENINGS, http://www.oneacre
fund.org/careers/job-openings (last visited May 10, 2014). The One Acre Fund
"invests in farmers [in Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi] to generate a permanent gain in
farm income ... [by] provid[ing] a 'market bundle' that includes education, finance,
seed and fertilizer, and market access." In January, the One Acre Fund posted a job
listing for a Policy and Communications Analyst, noting that a potential project might
include "an analysis of a new draft of U.S. global food security act, with a
recommendation on an official OAF position on the Act." ONE ACRE FUND, ANALYST
TO U.S. DIRECTOR, http://www.mojalink.com/ job/show/786 (last visited May 10,
2014).
99. See NEW ENG. FARMERS UNION, ABOUT US, http://www.newenglandfarmers
union.org/about-us/ (last visited May 10, 2014); TEN RIVERS FOOD WEB, ABOUT
TRFW, http://www.tenriversfoodweb.org/about-trfw/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
100.

See, e.g., CTR. FOR RURAL AFFAIRS, OUR MISSION AND OUR VALUES, http://

www.cfra.org/about/valuesmission (last visited May 10, 2014).
101. See, e.g., FARM FORWARD, WELCOME TO FARM FORWARD, http://www.
farmforward.com/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
102. See, e.g., BREAD FOR THE WORLD, WHAT WE Do, http://www.bread.org/what-

we-do

(last

visited

May

10,

2014);

CONG.

HUNGER

CTR.,

ABOUT

US,

http://www.hungercenter.org/about/ (last visited May 10, 2014); GREATER BOS. FOOD
BANK, OUR MISSION, http://gbfb.org/our-mission/about-gbfb.php (last visited May 10,
2014); HEIFER INT'L, ABOUT HEIFER INTERNATIONAL, http://www.heifer.org/aboutheifer/index.html (last visited May 10, 2014).
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young and beginning farmers,'0 4. native American agriculture,' 0 5 veterans
involved in agriculture,10 6 and small-farm financing.' 0 7
University
extension programs also provide an interesting opportunity for research,
education, and community engagement on a variety of food and agriculture
topics. 108 The issues that these non-profits work on certainly have legal and
policy implications, and as non-profits recognize the benefits of engaging
in policy discussions, there may be more job opportunities for lawyers.
D. Law Firms

Law students interested in FL&P can also seek employment in law
firms. There are larger law firms that do more traditional agricultural and
FDA law.' 0 9 There are also smaller law firms that work with smaller-scale
farmers and food entrepreneurs on FL&P issues. For example, the Food
Law Firm is a small law firm out of New York City that was founded in
2011 by Jason Foscolo, also an Arkansas LL.M. alumnus. 110 The Food
103. See QUIVIRA COAL., ABOUT Us, http://quiviracoalition.org/index.html (last
visited May 10, 2014); AM. FARMLAND TRUST, OUR WORK, http://www.farm
land.org//programs/default.asp (last visited May 10, 2014).
104. See BEGINNING FARMER NETWORK OF MASS., ABOUT, http://www.bfn
mass.org/about (last visited May 10, 2014); NAT'L YOUNG FARMERS COAL., OUR
MISSION, VISION AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES,

http://www.young farmers.org/about/our-

work/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
105. See, e.g., INTERTRIBAL AGRIC. COUNCIL, http://www.indianaglink.com/who-weare/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
106. See, e.g., FARMER VETERAN COAL., ABOUT US, http://www.farmvetco.org/
about-us (last visited May 10, 2014).
107. See, e.g., THE CARROT PROJECT, ABOUT Us, http://thecarrotproject.org/ (last
visited May 10, 2014).
108.

See IOWA STATE UNIV. EXTENSION & OUTREACH - BEGINNING FARMER CTR.,

OBJECTIVES http://www.extension.iastate.edulbfc/objectives

(last visited May 10,

2014); OR. STATE UNIV. EXTENSION SERV., WHO WE ARE, http://extension.oregon

state.edu/about/who-we-are (last visited May 10, 2014); S.D. STATE UNIV., SDSU
EXTENSION, http://www.sdstate.edu/sdsuextension/index.cfm (last visited May 10,
2014). In January, SDSU Extension posted a job listing for a Community Food Policy
Extension

Field

Specialist.

COMMUNITY

FOOD

POLICY

FIELD

SPECIALIST

I,

HIGHEREDJOBS,
http://www.higheredjobs.com/m/details.cfm?JobCode= 175850891 &
Title=Community/o20Food%2OPolicy/o2OExtension%2OField%2OSpecialist%201 (last
visited May 10, 2014). The purpose of the position is to "bring policy-informing
research together with outreach and engagement activities to further foster community
food councils as an important factor in healthy communities and families." Id.
109. See FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS, FOOD & AGRICULTURE, http://www.faegrebd.com/
foodag (last visited May 10, 2014); STOEL RIVES LLP, FOOD AND AGRIBUSINESS,
http://www.stoel.com/showindustry.aspx?show-634 (last visited May 10, 2014)
110. THE FOOD LAW FIRM, ABOUT, www.foodlawfirm.com/about (last visited May
10, 2014). The Food Law Firm now has a second attorney on staff, Lauren Handel,
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Law Firm provides a variety of business services to their clients, including
on issues such as food labeling, food product liability, farm leasing, land
use and zoning, and corporate formation."'
Additionally, Fare Grange Law is a small law firm out of Minneapolis
that describes itself as a boutique public-interest law firm that focuses on
2
helping small and mid-size farm and food businesses grow and thrive."
Formed in 2013, Fare Grange Law provides legal services, such as business
entity formation, CSA agreement drafting, and labor and employment
compliance for farmers and food entrepreneurs;" 3 policy consulting for
advocacy organizations; 1 4 and assistance for lawyers seeking to provide
legal services to these farm and food clients.5
Finally, Law for Food LLC, founded in 2010' 16 and based out of
Vermont, "hope[s] to bring about nothing short of a revolution in American
agriculture" by supporting small farmers, food producers, and the local
food economy. 117 These three law firms are all very small-with two or
three attorneys on staff-but are creating a model for other law firms that
seek to work in FL&P.
E. Academia
Law students interested in a career in FL&P should also consider a
career in academia. As more law schools incorporate food law (and other
FL&P courses) into their course offerings, there will be a greater demand
for professors that can fill the need. Further, as law schools create food law
clinics or centers, they will need directors and faculty to run and staff those
programs.

who is also an Arkansas LL.M. alumna. THE FOOD LAW FIRM, ATTORNEYS,
http://www.foodlawfirm.com/attomeys/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
111.

THE FOOD LAW FIRM, SERVICES, http://www.foodlawfirm.com/services/ (last

visited May 10, 2014).
112. FARE GRANGE
May 10, 2014).
113.

LAW, ABOUT

FARE GRANGE LAW,

Us, http://faregrange.com/about-us (last visited

LEGAL SERVICES

FOR FARMERS, http://faregrange.com

/farmers/ (last visited May 10, 2014); FARE GRANGE LAW, LEGAL SERVICES FOR FOOD
BUSINESSES, http://faregrange.com/food-businesses/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
114. FARE GRANGE LAW, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR ADVOCATES, http://faregrange.com/
advocacy-organizations/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
115. FARE GRANGE LAW, LEGAL CONSULTING FOR ATTORNEYS, http://faregrange.
com/attorney-consulting/ (last visited May 10, 2014).
116. LAW FOR FOOD FACEBOOK PAGE, https://www.facebook.com/pages/Law-forFood/316700191396?id= 316700191396&sk=info (last visited May 10, 2014).
117. LAW FOR FOOD L.L.C., PHILOSOPHY, http://www.lawforfood.com/Law for
Food/Philosophy.html (last visited May 10, 2014).
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1. Doctrinal Faculty
Over the last few years, more law schools have started offering FL&P
courses." 8 Some of these courses are survey courses (e.g., introduction to
food law) and others are more specific (e.g., selected issues in food law).' 19
There are many topics that can be covered in a course in FL&P and there
are many ways a course could be taught. As of the publication of this
article, no casebook or textbook exists for FL&P. This means that teaching
a course in FL&P requires a certain level of creativity and dedication on the
part of the professor to create a course on his or her own. Luckily, with the
increase in FL&P courses being taught around the country, there will be a
library of resources that new FL&P professors can access when crafting
their own course.
2. Clinical Faculty
There are a handful of law schools that offer clinical programs
specifically in FL&P or do food work as part of an already existing clinic.
For example, the FLPC at Harvard is currently the only clinical program
specifically dedicated to FL&P;120 the Organizations and Transactions
Clinic at Stanford Law School dedicates a significant portion of its work to
food and sustainable agriculture issues;1 21 and the University of New
Hampshire School of Law's Administrative Agency Clinic places students
in the New Hampshire Department of Agriculture, Markets, and Food to
get hands-on experience in FL&P.122 If current trends continue-both in
terms of the interest in FL&P and the need for law schools to provide more
practical experience to their students-in the coming years, more law
schools will be starting clinics that focus on food and agricultural issues or
will be incorporating food work into clinics that already exist at their
schools. 123 Either way, there will be a need for staff and faculty that have
backgrounds in FL&P to fill those slots.

118. Linnekin & Broad Leib, supra note 7.
119. Id.
120. HARVARD FOOD LAW & POLICY CLINIC, supra note 1.
121. STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, ORGANIZATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS CLINIC, http://
www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/clinics/organizations-and-transactions-clinic (last
visited May 10, 2014) [hereinafter Org. & Transactions Clinic].
122. UNIV. OF N.H. SCHOOL OF LAW, CLINICS: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY,
http://law.unh.edu/academics/clinics/ administrative-agency (last visited May 11, 2014)
[hereinafter Clinics].
123. See Jay A. Mitchell, Getting into the Field, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 69, 81-86
(2011).
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F. PrivateBusiness
Law students might also consider seeking employment with a private
business within the food and agriculture industry-for example, with
producers, processors, distributors, and retailers. Most large private food
businesses have in-house counsel. The food and agriculture industry plays
a significant role in FL&P, and law students should not overlook industry
as a source of employment.
G. Other
The previous sections have briefly discussed a handful of career
options for law students interested in FL&P. However, there is an almost
endless number of ways a law student can have a career in FL&P. A few
other options that deserve mentioning include: consulting work;
international work (in government, non-profits, or academia); and
academic work at an undergraduate institution (e.g., teaching food policy).
The common theme among almost all of these career options is the
need for law students and law schools to think creatively about the kind of
career the law student may want. When I started law school, the job I
currently hold did not exist. I had to trust that by the time I completed my
studies a job that fit my skills and interests would then exist. In the coming
years, job opportunities will be created that law students now may not be
able to imagine. Further, if a law student does not find a career opportunity
in FL&P that seems to fit his or her desires and skills, he or she may have
to take the initiative to create the job they want. Many of the current career
opportunities within the field of FL&P are the result of that entrepreneurial
drive and commitment to the field.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR LAW SCHOOLS TO EDUCATE AND EQUIP
STUDENTS FOR CAREERS IN FOOD LAW AND POLICY

A growing number of law students want careers in FL&P. This is
illustrated, in part, by the rapid rise in FL&P student groups across the
country, 124 including Harvard, 125 Wisconsin, 126 UCLA, 127 Texas, 128 and

124.

Linnekin & Broad Leib, supra note 7.

125.

HARVARD FOOD LAW SOC'Y, http://www3.law.harvard.edu/orgs/foodlaw

(last

visited May 11, 2014).
126.

Wis. AGRIC. & FOOD LAW SoC'Y, http://hosted.law.wisc.edu/wordpress/wafls/

(last visited May 11, 2014).
127.

UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW,

FOOD

LAW SOCIETY, http://orgs.law.ucla.edu/fls/

Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 11, 2014).
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Washington. 29 Law schools have the chance to meet that student demand
in a number of ways, including through coursework, clinics, internships,
career development workshops, and further study. Not all law schools will
be able to use all of these methods to equip their students, but all law
schools should be able to use at least one of these ways to help prepare
their students for a career in FL&P.
Many of the skills needed for a career in FL&P are not very different
from the skills law students need to be competent lawyers-for example,
strong legal and policy research and writing skills; written and oral
advocacy skills; litigation, transaction, and negotiation skills; basic
business skills; client and community interaction skills (e.g., active
listening and interviewing); and time and project management skills.
Students interested in a career in FL&P also need to focus intensely on
learning how to communicate in plain and simple terms (i.e., non-legalese
that is accessible to those outside of the field of law). Finally, whether in a
course or experiential learning experience, students seeking a career in
FL&P need to learn the substantive law that informs FL&P work (e.g.,
environmental law, FDA law, real property law, administrative law, and
constitutional law).
A. Classroom
Incorporating FL&P into coursework is the first way law schools can
help prepare law students for a career in FL&P. Teaching FL&P in the
classroom is a fairly simple first step for law schools to begin engaging
with FL&P. There are three categories of coursework into which law
schools can incorporate FL&P: survey courses; practice-based courses; and
other existing courses.
1. Survey Courses
Survey courses on FL&P are an important and relatively easy way for
law schools to enter the FL&P field. A survey course on food law and
policy, as well as agricultural law, will give interested law students a good
foundation for a future career in FL&P. So far in my career, I have taken
two food law courses and helped teach one food law course. The three
courses were each structured and taught in a distinct way, illustrating the

128.

TEX. FOOD LAW

SOC'Y, http://www.texasfoodlawsociety.com/home.html (last

visited May 11, 2014).
129.

UNIV.

OF

ORGANIZATIONS,

2014).

WASH.

SCHOOL

OF

LAW,

UWLAw:

STUDENT

JOURNALS

AND

http://www.law. washington.edu/students/orgs/ (last visited May 11,
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flexibility a law professor has in creating his or her own FL&P course.
One course provided an introduction to some of the major food policy
issues of the time and engaged with more traditional FDA law material
(e.g., rules and regulations about the nutrition fact panel, health claims, and
ingredient lists). The second FL&P course took a broader, 30,000-foot
view on a wide variety food policy issues and provided an overview of the
history of FL&P. Finally, the third FL&P course was a seminar style
course with extensive reading and a closer connection to health law and
policy. All of these course-styles provide students with an introduction
into many of the issues faced in the practice of FL&P. A survey course is
important because it gives students a foundation upon which to build
further study-whether independent study, in an advanced course, or other
experience.
2. Practice-Based Courses
Practice-based courses provide students with practical skills within a
classroom setting. There is an environmental law practice course at Drake
University Law School which teaches students how to write a client memo,
to negotiate a settlement, to take a deposition with a hired court reporter, to
write a motion for summary judgment, and to argue that motion as if in
front of an appellate court.' 3 To my knowledge, there are not yet any
FL&P practice courses at any law schools. For law schools that do not
have a clinical program in which students can participate (either a
dedicated FL&P clinic or a clinic that does FL&P work), creating a
practice-based course that teaches students skills they will need to have a
career in FL&P is a great option.
3. Other Courses
As mentioned in Section II, FL&P touches on many areas of lawconstitutional law, administrative law, environmental law, products
liability, and state and local government, to name a few. Law schools need
to recognize that many courses already taught at their schools can prepare
law students for a career in FL&P. It is important for law schools to
convey to students interested in FL&P that many courses will help prepare
them. Other courses that will help prepare students for a career in FL&P
include (in addition to the ones mentioned earlier): legislation, Native
American law, wind law, tax law, international law, business associations,
and land use.

130. JERRY L. ANDERSON & DENNIS D. HIRSCH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE:
PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES FOR SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 95 (2nd ed. 2003).
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B. Clinic
Another way law schools can prepare students for a career in FL&P is
to provide opportunities for clinical experience in FL&P. Law schools can
create a clinic dedicated
to FL&P, or can integrate food work into already
3
existing clinics.' 1
1. Food Law and Policy Clinics
Founded in 2010, Harvard's FLPC was the first law school clinic to
focus on FL&P issues.1 32 The FLPC works with clients on a variety of
projects that span the food system, including providing technical assistance
to food policy councils; researching and writing comments on proposed
food safety regulations; and creating a guide to help urban farmers navigate33
the permits and approvals required to operate an urban farm in Boston.'
The FLPC works with a variety of clients-including food policy councils,
non-profits, individuals, and governments-and aims to provide students
with a range of skills-including legal and policy research and
writing,
34
public speaking, policy advocacy, and community engagement. 1
Michigan State University College of Law (MSU) also has a
dedicated FL&P clinic, called the Urban Food, Farm and Agricultural Law
Clinic.' 35 MSU Urban Food, Farm and Agricultural Law Clinic "provides
services-involving such things as legal research, policy development,
client counseling, and the provision of transactional legal services-to
nonprofits and low-income individuals working with urban agriculture in
' 36
Detroit, Michigan, and other urban settings."'
2. Other Types of Clinics Doing Food Law and Policy Work
A number of law schools have incorporated FL&P work into already
existing clinics, such as transactional law clinics and administrative law
clinics. 37 For example, Stanford's Organizations and Transactions Clinic
works with clients that are involved in "sustainable agriculture, food

131.
132.
133.
134.

See generally Mitchell, supra note 123.
See About Us, supra note 15.
See Projects, supra note 9.

Id.

135. MICH. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, URBAN FOOD, FARM & AGRICULTURE LAW
PRACTiCUM, http://www.law. msu.edu/clinics/food/ (last visited May 11, 2014).

136.
137.

Id.
Linnekin & Broad Leib, supra note 7.
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security, small-scale farming and agricultural education. ' 38 Penn State's
Dickinson School of Law launched a Rural Economic Development Clinic
in 2010, which seeks to "encourag[e] sustainable economic development
by representing clients in agricultural, food, and energy sectors.' 13 9 As
mentioned earlier, the University of New Hampshire has an administrative
law clinic that places students in the New Hampshire Department of
40
Agriculture, Markets, and Food to get hands-on experience in FL&P.1
Law schools can consider whether any of their established clinics
could integrate FL&P work into their practice.
For example, an
environmental law clinic could write comments on the environmental
impact statement associated with the Produce Safety Rule, which is part of
the Food Safety Modernization Act that regulates on-farm food safety
practices.' 41 In 2013, staff attorneys and clinical students at the Institute for
Public Representation at Georgetown University Law Center conducted an
analysis of the proposed Produce Safety Rule and Preventive Controls Rule
of the Food Safety Modernization act on behalf of Future Harvest-A
Chesapeake Alliance for Sustainable Agriculture.142 Additionally, staff
attorneys and clinical students at the Turner Environmental Law Clinic at
Emory University School of Law wrote comments to the proposed Produce
Safety Rule in 2013; as a result of these comments, the FDA has agreed to
conduct an environmental impact statement, which it had initially refused
to do. 14 3 An international or trade law clinic might consider working on the

138. See Org. & TransactionsClinic, supra note 121.
139. Penn State Law to Launch New Rural Economic Development Clinic, PENN
STATE NEWS, July 30, 2010, http://news.psu.edu /story/ 165918/2010/07/30/penn-statelaw-launch-new-rural-economic-development-clinic; PENN STATE: THE DICKINSON
SCHOOL OF LAW, RURAL ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

CLINIC,

https://law.psu.edu/

practice-skills/clinics/rural-economic-development-clinic (last visited May 11, 2014).
140. See Clinics, supra note 122.
141. Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Rule, Standards for Growing,
Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption; Extension of

Comment Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 69,006, 69,006 (Nov. 18, 2013).
142. Email from Margot Pollans, UCLA Fellow, to author (Feb. 11, 2014) (on file
with author).
143.

EMORY LAW, TURNER ENVTL. LAW CLINIC, SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE, http://

www.law.emory.edu/academics/academic-programs/environmental-law/tumerclinic/our-work.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (noting that "[i]n an effort to promote
sustainable agriculture, on behalf of Georgia Organics and the National Sustainable
Agriculture Coalition, the Clinic has: worked closely with the City of Atlanta in
amending its zoning ordinances to permit urban agriculture; published a
comprehensive, sixteen-city survey of urban agriculture practices across the country;
and prepared comments on the Food and Drug Administration's proposed regulations
governing the growing and harvesting of produce").
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upcoming Transatlantic Trade and Investment 44Partnership
negotiations, which addresses local procurement issues.

trade

C. Internships and Externships
Internships and externships are another great way for law students to
be exposed to the practice of FL&P and are an easy way for law schools to
help equip students for a career in FL&P. One opportunity for law students
is to seek an internship in one of the already existing law clinics or centers
that do this work. For example, the Harvard FLPC 145 and the UCLA
Resnick Program for Food Law and Policy 46 hire summer interns. Law
schools can encourage law students to seek internship opportunities at a
non-profit that does FL&P work; for example, FC hired summer interns in
2013.1'4 The National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, which engages in
direct and grassroots advocacy as well as public education around issues of
48
sustainable food production, hires policy interns throughout the year.
Law schools can also encourage law students to seek internships at a
federal or state agency. For example, I spent my 2L summer interning at
the Iowa State Farm Services Agency of USDA, during which time I wrote
a policy paper on existing crop insurance policies for fruit and vegetable
producers and proposing ways to improve crop insurance for those
externship in
producers. Finally, law students might consider seeking 4an
9
the legal division of a private business, such as Wal-Mart.1
Law schools should be prepared to help law students think creatively
about the places they could get an internship or externship; if the law
student is able to secure funding to support an otherwise unpaid position or
144. See generally INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y, PROMISES AND PERILS OF THE
TTIP: NEGOTIATING A TRANSATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL MARKET (2013), available at
http://www.iatp.org/files/2013 10 25 TTIP KH K.pdf.
145. HARVARD FOOD LAW & POL'Y CLINIC, FOOD LAW AND POLICY CLINIC SUMMER
2014 INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/foodpolicyinitiative/
2014/01/14/summer-2014-intemship-opportunities-at-flpc-2/ (last visited May 11,
2014).
146. INST. FOR FOOD LAWS & REGULATIONS, FOOD LAW AND POLICY SUMMER
POSITION, http://iflr.foodlaw.org/ 2013/10/food-law-and-policy-summer-student.html
(last visited May 11, 2014).
147. FARM COMMONS FACEBOOK PAGE, SUMMER 2013 INTERNS WANTED!,
https://www.facebook.com/Farm Commons/posts/412550438843909 (last visited May
11,2014).
148. NAT'L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., JOBS, http://sustainableagriculture.net/
about-us/jobs/ (last visited May 11, 2014).
149. Lauren Bernadett, Experiential Learning: Externships with Walmart's Legal
Division, LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:06 PM),
http://www.agfoodllm.com/2014/02/student-spring-externships-walmarts.html.
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can get credit for an internship or externship, the possibilities are almost
endless.
D. CareerDevelopment Workshops
Law schools also have the ability to help equip law students for a
career in FL&P by providing career development workshops that give
students the skills they will need to embark on their careers that the
students would not otherwise get through class work or internships. For
example, a workshop on how to start a non-profit or a small law firm might
be useful for a law student seeking to work in FL&P. Many of the
workshops that teach project management skills, time management skills,
and other skills important in legal practice will also help law students
seeking a career in FL&P.
E. FurtherStudy
There are a number of advanced degree programs that law schools can
encourage students to pursue as a next step in their FL&P career. The
University of Arkansas School of Law and the Vermont Law School both
have LL.M. programs that students interested in FL&P might consider.
The University of Arkansas School of Law has the only LL.M. program in
Agricultural and Food Law.150 Courses include: Introduction to the Law of
Food and Agriculture; Food Law and Policy; Federal Nutrition Law and
Policy; Federal Regulation of Food Safety; and International Agricultural
Trade, among many others. 1 5 1 Vermont Law School offers an LL.M. in
Environmental Law, and given the new Center for Agriculture and Food
Systems, there may be numerous
opportunities to incorporate FL&P into
52
the LL.M. course of study. 1
Law schools can also encourage their students to look abroad for
LL.M. opportunities. For example, the University of Edinburgh School of
Law offers an LL.M. in Global Environment and Climate Change Law,

150. THE LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD LAW, http://www.agfoodllm.com/ (last
visited May 9, 2014).
151. Susan Schneider, Updated LL.M. Curriculum, LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRIC. &
FOOD L. BLOG (Sept. 22, 2013, 12:38 PM), http://www.agfoodllm.com/2013/09/
updated-llm-curriculum.html.
152. VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, LLM IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, http:l/vermont
law.edu/Academics/Degrees/Master of Laws (LLM)/LLM in Environmental
_Law.htm (last visited May 11, 2014).
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which in part focuses on agricultural issues. 153 There may be other LL.M.
programs, or other masters programs, that law students might decide will
prepare them for a career in FL&P.
F. ProfessionalAssociations
There are a handful of professional associations that provide
important networking, educational, and publication opportunities for law
students interested in FL&P. For example, the American Agricultural Law
Association (AALA) is a professional association that focuses on the legal
needs of the agricultural community. 5 4 AALA members are practitioners,
academics, government officials, and law students. Each fall, AALA hosts
155
a conference that addresses current issues in food and agricultural law.
The AALA conference is a great opportunity for law students to network
with established FL&P attorneys. The Food and Drug Law Institute
(FDLI) is another professional association that law students should
consider joining. 156 In addition to offering publication opportunities, FDLI
hosts conferences and networking events, and offers discounts on various
food law publications.157
V. CONCLUSION

Law schools have an incredible opportunity to help launch their law
students into a career in the exciting and developing area of FL&P. As
discussed above, there are numerous opportunities for law students to have
careers in FL&P with more opportunities developing each year. Many of
the job opportunities mentioned above, however, do not offer the same
level of compensation that private law firms do. For some students
interested in FL&P, taking a job in the public sector may not be financially

153.

LLM IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/teaching/postgraduate/llm-msc/
global_environment and climate change law (last visited May 11, 2014).
UNIV. OF EDINBURGH SCHOOL OF LAW,

CLIMATE

154. AM.

CHANGE

LAW,

AGRIC. LAW ASS'N, WELCOME TO

AALA, http://aglaw-assn.org/ (last

visited May 11, 2014).
155. AM. AGRIC. LAW ASS'N, ANNUAL AGRICULTURAL LAW CONFERENCE - 2014
ALBUQUERQUE, NM, http://aglaw-assn.org/annual-conference/ (last visited May 11,
2014).
156. THE FOOD & DRUG LAW INST., WHO WE ARE, http://www.fdli.org/ (last visited
May 11,2014).
157. THE FOOD & DRUG LAW INST., MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS, http://www.fdli.org/
membership/membership-benefits (last visited May 11, 2014); THE FOOD & DRUG LAW
INST., YOUR INVITATION TO GET INVOLVED IN FDLI, http://www.fdli.org/docs/defaultdocument-library/fdli-gathering-invite-3v2.pd'?sfvrsn=2 (last visited May 11, 2014).
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possible. Further, although jobs within this field are increasing in number,
there are still relatively few jobs in FL&P. In these situations, students
interested in FL&P should consider other ways to stay involved in the field,
such as board service, pro bono, and volunteer work with food system
nonprofits and clinics. By serving on the board of a food system nonprofit, an early-career attorney can establish and develop relationships and
contribute meaningfully to the non-profit, all of which may start paving the
way for a future career move into FL&P.
Many law schools are already equipped to give their students some of
the skills they will need to succeed in a FL&P career. Law schools should
consider a few questions before they get started incorporating FL&P
courses, programs, and other skill-building experiences.
First, law schools need to assess both their current capacity as well as
their aspirations to educate and equip students for careers in FL&P. Of the
options discussed above, which ones fit the character and capacity of your
individual law school? What resources already exist at the law school?
What could your law school do now? Can any of the existing programs be
tailored to include FL&P? What kinds of collaborations might be possible
between the law school and other schools within the university (e.g.,
schools of public health) or other universities? What does your law school
aspire to do? Does the law school have hopes of starting a dedicated FL&P
clinic? Does the law school want to establish courses focused on FL&P?
These questions will help law schools start to discern how they can best
serve the law students that seek to have a career in FL&P.
Second, law schools should consider the role of social media and
technology in their FL&P endeavors. Social media and technology have
dramatically changed the way individuals and schools within the legal
profession interact with one another. It is much easier to have guest FL&P
speakers from all over the country (even the world) teach law students
about their FL&P expertise. It is also much easier for law students to stay
in touch with FL&P activities happening around the country and the world.
Law schools that may not be able to add new FL&P courses to their
curriculum or are unable to add a new clinic, for example, can provide their
students with exposure to FL&P through guest speakers (either in person or
over Skype), webinars, and by connecting law students with existing FL&P
resources.
It is an exciting time to be studying and working in FL&P. The field
is growing rapidly and more job opportunities will arise in the coming
years that will demand employees well-versed in FL&P and equipped to
make positive change in the food system. Law schools have the chance to
be proactive to help prepare students for this field in a number of ways,
whether through course work, practical experiences, or internships. This
article is not meant to be an exhaustive list of career opportunities in FL&P
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nor an exhaustive list of how law schools can help prepare students. It is
meant to be a starting point in a discussion around how law schools can
meet student demand for a new field of study, while at the same time
ensuring law students are well-prepared to enter this dynamic field.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) released an
undercover video filmed at the Hallmark Meat Packing Company and
Westland Meat Company (Hallmark/Westland) in Chino, California.1 "The
footage depicted nonambulatory cows being kicked, dragged, electrocuted,
jammed with forklifts and sprayed in the nostrils with water to simulate
drowning - in an effort to get them to stand up and walk to their
slaughter. ' ,2 At least five inspectors from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) - the federal agency tasked with ensuring that food
safety and animal welfare guidelines are followed - were present at the
time.3 The video led to the shutdown of the plant and the largest meat
recall in United States (US) history.4 It also led to increased awareness
about the reality of our food supply. Americans were particularly outraged
to learn that not only were animals too sick or injured to walk on their own
being violently abused, but the facility involved was the second largest
producer of beef for government food programs, including the national
school lunch program, and programs for senior citizens and low-income
families.5 Moreover, Westland had received the USDA award for supplier
of the year in 2004-05. 6
Such incidents (which as described below are far from isolated)
would seem to provide evidence of USDA's inability to protect the food
supply or the animals that are part of it. Moreover, regulating public health
and animal welfare has traditionally fallen within the purview of the states.
However, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court, in National Meat
Association v. Harris, overturned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and
struck down a California law passed in response to the Hallmark/Westland
video that prohibited the slaughter for human consumption of animals who
1. See generally GINA TOMASELLI & PETER A. BRANDT, HUMANE SOC'Y OF THE
U.S., PETITION TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (2010) (on file

with author) [hereinafter HSUS Petition].
2. Brief for the Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19, Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S.Ct. 965
(2012) (No. 10-224) [hereinafter ASPCA BrieJ].
3. HSUS Petition,supra note 1, at 17
4. See David Cassuto, Meat Animals, Humane Standards, & Other Legal Fictions,
L., CULTURE, & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=2111455.
5. Pamela Vesilind, Preempting Humanity: Why National Meat Ass 'n v. Harris
Answered the Wrong Question, 65 ME. L. REV. 685, 691 (2013).
6. Shelley Barron, Comment, California's Continued Struggle Against
Nonambulatory Animal Slaughter and the Limits of Federal Preemption: National

Meat Association v. Brown, 4 N.E.U.L.J. 259, 261 n. 10 (2012).
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could not walk under their own power and required that they be
immediately humanely euthanized. 7
This Supreme Court opinion threatens to undermine animal welfare
and public health in states that wish to enact greater protections than are
available under federal law. Moreover, USDA's perpetual failure to protect
animals or public health is apparent from the frequent incidents that
continue to occur. In October of 2013, for example, Mercy for Animals, an
animal advocacy nonprofit, released an undercover video showing "graphic
footage of workers killing piglets by slamming them into the ground,
castrating piglets and docking their tails with no painkillers" at a facility in
Minnesota used to supply Walmart and other US retailers. 8 In November
of 2013, an animal advocacy organization, Compassion Over Killing,
released an undercover video from Colorado showing dairy calves who
were only a few days old "being violently dragged by their ears and legs,
lifted by their tails, kicked, thrown, slammed, and flipped." 9 Such
incidents occur with alarming regularity and undercover
videos obviously
0
only document a small number of such abuses.'
This apparent disregard for the law not only impacts animals being
raised for food, but the people who eat those animals. The results are
evident in the occurrence of frequent foodbome illness outbreaks. During
the government shutdown in October of 2013, the media drew attention to a
major salmonella outbreak associated with Foster Farms chickens which
sickened hundreds of people across the country." Much of the attention
concentrated on the fact that this outbreak occurred during a time when
federal agencies responsible for keeping our food supply safe were
significantly understaffed due to employee furloughs. 12 However, this

7. See Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S.Ct. 965, 968-75 (2012).
8. Alicia Graef, The True Cost of Walmart 's Cheap Meat Exposed, CARE2CAUSES
(Nov. 5, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.care2.com/causes/the-true-cost-of-walmartscheap-meat-exposed.html.
9. Chris Time Steele, Colorado Dairy Calf Facility May Face Animal Cruelty
Charges, EXAMINER, Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/colorado -dairycalf-facility-may-face-animal-cruelty-charges.
10. See, e.g., Paul Walsh, Undercover Video Alleges Abuse, Filth at Western Minn.
Turkey Farm, MINN. STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 26, 2013; Tracy Reiman, Lobsters Deserve
Our

Consideration, Too,

HUFFINGTON

POST

(Nov.

8,

2013,

12:25

PM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tracy-reiman/lobsters-deserve-our-cons-b_417
4720.html.
11. See Michael Hiltzik, Salmonella and the Shutdown: CDC Furloughs Harm
Public Health, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2013, http:Harticles/latimes.com/2013/oct/
10/business/la-fi-mh-salmonella-20131010.
12. See id.; see also Connor Simpson, There's a MajorSalmonella Outbreak During
a Government Shutdown, THE WIRE, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.thewire.
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focus largely ignored the fact that such incidents
occur with regularity even
3
when government agencies are fully staffed.
While the federal government has legitimate interests in promulgating
laws and regulations to ensure food safety and animal welfare, federal law
should create a floor under which states may not fall, but federal law
should not serve as an impediment to states acting within their jurisdictions
to protect their inhabitants in areas that have historically been reserved to
them. The Supreme Court decision in Harris upsets this fundamental
balance and places misplaced reliance on federal agencies that have proven
time and again that they are not up to the task. Moreover, the decision
limits the ability of states to develop their own conceptions of justice and
moral evolution.
The first section of this article will detail the traditional roles of the
states and the federal government in regulating animal welfare and public
health, detailing how the issues at stake in Harris have traditionally been
areas of state control. Part II will describe the California law and explain
the decisions of the lower courts and the Supreme Court in the case. Part
III will detail stakeholder attempts to have their positions advanced by
USDA in the years before and after Harris and how the agency has failed
to enforce and interpret federal laws in a way that protects public health or
animal welfare. Finally, Part IV will discuss how Congress, while it could

com/national/2013/1 0/theres-major-salmonella-outbreak-during-fovemmentshutdown/70286/; Tarini Parti & Helena Bottemiller Evich, Government Shutdown
Worst-Case Scenario Realized: Salmonella Outbreak, POLITICO (Oct. 8, 2013, 7:58
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/1 0/government-shutdown-salmonella-out
break-98024.html.
13. See, e.g., Ryan Arciero, Trader Joe's Recalls: 26 Sick Prompts Recalls, E. coli
Link to Packaged Wraps, EXAMINER, Nov. 11, 2013, http://www.examiner.
com/article/trader-joe-s-recalls-26-sick-prompts-recalls-e-coli-ink-to-packaged-wraps;
Laurent Belsie, Beef Recall: E. coli Detected in Kansas Firm's Ground Beef,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2013/
0801 /Beef-recall-E.coli-detected-in-Kansas-firm-s-ground-beef-video;
Kent Garber,
Just How Safe Is Our Meat?, U.S. NEWS, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.us
news.com/news/national/articles/ 2008/02/22/just-how-safe-si-our-meat; Associated
Press, Ground Beef Recall: 34,000 Pounds of Contaminated Beef in Six States,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 31, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/LatestNews-Wires/2010/123 1/Ground-beef-recall-34-000-pounds-of-contaminated-beef-insix-states; Mike Stobbe, Ground Beef Recall Linked to Illness in Five States,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 28, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/LatestNews-Wires/2013/0128/Ground-beef-recall-linked-to-illness-in-five-states;
see also
Kat Kinsman, Check Your Freezer: 22,737 lbs of Beef Recalled, CNN EATOCRACY
(Jun. 18, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://eatocracy.cnn.com/2013/06/18/22737-pounds-of-beefrecalled-on-e-coli- fears/.
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remedy the situation to ensure that the state role is respected, has failed to
do so and is instead taking steps that could move in the opposite direction.
II.

BALANCING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE STATES

The balance of federalism established in our constitutional system
leaves to the states areas that cannot be or traditionally are not regulated by
the federal government. For most of the nation's history, responsibility for
public health and morality, including morality related to animal welfare,
has rested with the states. The federal interest in animal welfare is much
more recent, and efforts at the federal level are far from comprehensive.
This section first lays out the traditional state role in regulating animal
welfare and public health. Then, it discusses the more recent and limited
role that Congress and federal agencies have played in protecting food
safety and particularly animal welfare.
A. State Regulation ofAnimal Welfare from the Early 1800s to PresentDay

Throughout the history of the US, states have had the legal authority
to pass (or not) a large swath of laws dealing with humans' treatment of
other animals. 14 The first modern animal cruelty statute was passed in
Maine in 1821, with New York passing a law in 1828.15 It was not until the
1990s and early twenty-first century, however, that most states adopted
such provisions. 16 With North Dakota passing a law in 2013, only one state
lacks a felony animal cruelty provision." That state, South Dakota, is
considering a provision in 2014.18 Nevertheless, these provisions continue
to vary greatly and states continue to make differing decisions regarding
what is right for their citizens. Despite this variation, courts have

14. See, e.g., Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920); Sentell v. New
Orleans & C. R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 704 (1897); DeHart v. Town of Austin, 39 F.3d
718 (7th Cir. 1994).
15.

GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS AS PERSONS: ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITION OF

ANIMAL EXPLOITATION 33 (2008); Maneesha Deckha, Welfarist and Imperial: The
Contributions of Anticruelty Laws to CivilizationalDiscourse, 65 AM. Q. 515, 518-19
(2013).
16. See BRUCE A. WAGMAN, SONIA WAISMAN & PAMELA D. FRASCH, ANIMAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed. 2010); ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, U.S. JURISDICTIONS
WITH AND WITHOUT FELONY ANIMAL CRUELTY PROVISIONS, http://aldf.org/resources/

advocating-for-animals/u-s-jurisdictions-with-and-without-felony-animal-crueltyprovisions/ (last visited May 13, 2014).
17. ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 16.
18. Chet Brokaw, Animal Cruelty Could Become Felony in South Dakota, KSL, Jan.
7, 2014,http://www.ksl.com/?nid= 157&sid=28278493.
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continually recognized the authority of states to make these determinations.
"For more than 100 years, across an eclectic landscape of state anti-cruelty
provisions covering virtually every animal species, the courts have
reaffirmed" the basic principle that "laws preventing cruel and inhumane
treatment9 of animals fall squarely within the state's inherent police
'1
power."
Animal protection laws are evidence of a changing moral landscape
that differs state by state but that allows each state the freedom to
determine the morality of its residents. While cockfighting and dogfighting,
for example, were nearly universally accepted early in our history, today
every state outlaws both, and these practices are nearly universally
condemned. 20 At present, states and local jurisdictions are experimenting
with broader and more specific laws related to animal welfare. In 2003, for
example, Hollywood, California outlawed cat declawing. 21 In 2013, the
Los Angeles City Council voted to outlaw the use of bull hooks for
elephants forced to perform in circuses.22 Certain state laws govern which
animals are deemed acceptable to eat. For example, while Americans
consumed horses until the 1970s,23 a number of states have moved in recent
years to prohibit the slaughter of horses for human consumption.24 Certain
states have also passed laws prohibiting the consumption of domestic cat
and dog flesh.2 5 More recently, five states have banned the use of shark fins
for food.26

19. ASPCA Brief,supra note 2, at 8
20. Id. at 18.

21. W. Hollywood Mun. Code, § 9.49.020 (2003); see also Cal. Veterinary Med.
Ass'n. v. City of West Hollywood, 152 Cal. App. 4th 536, 542 (Cal. App. 2d 2007)
(holding that the Hollywood ban was not preempted by state law).
22. LA City Council Bans Use Of Bullhooks On Circus Elephants, CBS Los
ANGELES, Oct. 23, 2013, http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2013/10/23/la-city-council-todebate-use-of-elephant-hooks-at-circuses/.
23. Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2007).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 598c (2011); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/1.5
(2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-33-3 (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 6-192 (West
2013); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 149-001 (1991).
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1325A (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:22-25.3
(2000); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 379 (McKinney 2003); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §
399-aa (McKinney 2003).

26.

CAL. FISH & GAME CODE

§ 2021(b) (2012);

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 188-40.7

(West 2010); 515 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-30 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
498.257 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 509.160 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 77.15.770 (West 2011); see also Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Brown,

531 Fed.Appx. 761 (9th Cir. 2013) (not reported) (upholding the CA shark fin ban
against a religious liberty challenge).

2014]

HEALTH AND WELFARE PREEMPTED

While laws protecting those animals that society continues to view as
suitable mainly for food have been less prevalent (and most animal cruelty
provisions exempt farmed animals), in recent years a number of states have
taken steps to address some of the appalling practices that are a regular
aspect of animal agriculture. 27 Many laws have taken aim at intensive
confinement systems which make it impossible for animals to move,
stretch, or turn around throughout their entire lives. 28 Nine states have
passed bans on gestation crates for pregnant and nursing pigs. 29 Three
states have prohibited battery cages for egg-laying hens. 30 And veal crates
for calves have been outlawed in six states. 3' Additionally, California and
Rhode Island have prohibited the practice of tail docking - painful removal
of animals' tails 32 - and California has a law prohibiting the sale of foie
gras, which requires force-feeding birds to abnormally enlarge their
livers.33 Moreover, state humane slaughter requirements often extend to
species not covered by federal law.34 According to Wayne Pacelle of

27. David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: Animals,
Agribusiness and the Law: A Modern Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 206 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2005); see
also Stephanie J. Engelsman, "World Leader" - At What Price? A Look at Lagging
American Animal Protection Laws, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 329, 332 (2005); Craig A.
Wenner, Judicial Review and the Humane Treatment of Animals, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1630, 1631 (2011).
28. See, e.g., Amy Mosel, What About Wilbur? Proposing a Federal Statute to
Provide Minimum Humane Living Conditions for Farm Animals Raised for Food
Production, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 146-49 (2001); Marya Torrez, Combatting
Reproductive Oppression: Why Reproductive Justice Cannot Stop at the Species
Border, 20 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 265, 265 (2014).
29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2910.07 to 13-2910.08 (2006); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 25990-25994 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 35-50.5-101 to 103
(2008); FLA. STAT. § 10.21 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 4020, 1039 (2009);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 287.746 (2010); OH. ADMIN. CODE 901:12-8-01 (2011); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.150 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1.1-3 (2013).

30. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 25990-25994 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
287.746 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1.1-3 (2013).
31. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2910.07 to 13-2910.08 (2006); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25990-25994 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 35-50.5-101 to 103
(2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 4020, 1039 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§287.746 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1.1-3 (2012).
32. See JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE, INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL
PRODUCTION IN AMERICA:

EXAMINING

THE

IMPACT OF THE PEW COMMISSION'S

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (2013) [hereinafter JOHNS HOPKINS].
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (2012); see also Ass'n

des Eleveurs de

Canards et D'oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a
challenge from producers against enforcement of the law).
34. Jeff Welty, Humane Slaughter Laws, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 190-91

(2007).
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HSUS, in the first six months of 2013, states passed more than seventy-five
new laws aimed at governing our treatment of animals. 35 "As state anticruelty laws have evolved to meet changing community standards, the
courts have kept pace by affirming that these
expanded statutory
36
protections are valid exercises of the police power."
B. State Responsibilitiesfor ProtectingPublic Health and the Food Supply

While the federal role in regulating food safety has been more
extensive and comprehensive than that governing animal welfare, food
safety responsibilities have similarly fallen mostly to the states. As stated
in a report published by the George Washington School of Public Health
and written by Stephanie David and leading food safety expert Michael
Taylor:
[t]he starting point and most fundamental principle is that
food safety falls squarely within the traditional and broad
"police powers" to protect public health that are reserved
to the states by the Constitution. There is thus no question
that states, and in turn their local governments, are
empowered and expected to protect the safety of the food
supply within their boundaries. This includes the power to
set and enforce their own food safety standards, even, as a
general rule, if the standard is different from
and more
37
standard.
federal
applicable
an
than
stringent
State and local agencies "investigate and contain illness outbreaks;
conduct illness surveillance and monitor the food supply for contamination;
inspect restaurants, grocery stores, and food processing plants; provide
food worker and consumer education; and take regulatory action to remove
unsafe or unsanitary products from the market., 38 That does not mean that
the federal role is not important or that concerns about uniformity across
the states are irrelevant, and clearly Congress has the authority to preempt

35.

Wayne Pacelle, 75 New Animal Welfare Laws, and Counting (Op-Ed),

LIVESCIENCE.COM, Aug. 2, 2013, http://www.livescience.com/38632-75-new-animal-

welfare-laws.html.
36. ASPCA Brief supra note 2, at 13.
37. MICHAEL R. TAYLOR & STEPHANIE D.

DAVID, STRONGER PARTNERSHIPS FOR
SAFER FOOD: AN AGENDA FOR STRENGTHENING STATE AND LOCAL ROLES IN THE

NATION'S FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM 22 (George Washington Univ. Dep't. of Health Policy

ed., 2009).

38.

id. at 6.
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state law when necessary to achieve important national objectives.
However, it does mean that courts should be reticent to overturn state laws
that do not clearly serve as obstacles to the federal scheme. Given that our
system of federalism preserves the rights of both states and the federal
government, as explored in more detail below, courts should only find a
state law preempted when there is a clear indication from Congress or a
clear showing that the state and federal schemes cannot coexist.
Moreover, the treatment of animals intended for food and food safety
issues are inexorably linked because the consumption of sick or injured
animals is much more likely to be dangerous for humans. Animals that are
too ill to walk or stand are more likely to be diseased. 39 Numerous diseases
cannot be identified through the existing processes used to inspect
animals. 40 Therefore, using inability to stand as a proxy for disease makes
sense and states should be permitted to prohibit consumption of these
animals.4 1 Moreover, disabled animals are more likely to track fecal matter
and other contaminants into the food supply because they are laying in all
the muck that healthier animals are simply walking through.4 2 As explained
below, USDA has recognized these dangers, but getting the agency to
invoke its enforcement authority has been a struggle.
C. CongressionalRegulation of FarmedAnimal Welfare

Contrary to the situation in the states where, as detailed above,
legislation regarding the appropriate treatment of nonhuman animals has
been extensive and goes back nearly two centuries, Congress' attention to
animal welfare issues has been sporadic and recent. The Animal Welfare
Act, which is the only federal law aimed at providing minimum welfare
standards for animals, completely exempts farmed animals from its
coverage.43 There are only two federal laws focused on animals destined
for slaughter for human consumption. As other commentators have

39. See Andrea M. Repphun, Pigs-in-a-Blanket: How Current Meat Inspection
Regulations Wrap America in False Security, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 183, 187 (2011);
Greg Kaufmann, Safe Meat Requires Humane Slaughter, THE NATION, Mar. 5, 2010,
http://www.thenation.com/article/safe-meat-requires-humane-slaughter.
40.

See FOOD

& NUTRITION

BD., NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, CATTLE INSPECTION 2-

4 (1991) [hereinafter CATTLE INSPECTION]; Justine Hinderliter, From Farm to Table:
How This Little Piggy Was Dragged through the Market, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 739, 742
(2006).
41. Repphun, supra note 39, at 187.
42. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, No. CV-F-08-1963, 2009 WL 426213 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 19, 2009); Repphun, supra note 39, at 187.
43. 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2013).
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explained in detail, these laws are woefully deficient. 44 "Congress has
addressed humane slaughter three times in [more than] fifty years. '
The first law regulating animal slaughter is the so-called "TwentyEight-Hour Law," enacted in 1877, which prohibits confining animals "in a
vehicle or vessel for more than 28 consecutive hours without unloading the
animals for feeding, water, and rest. ' A6 Even these provisions are avoidable
in certain circumstances.47 Moreover, the law exempts birds from its
protections 48 and, until 2006, was not interpreted to apply to trucks, the
49
primary modem method of animal transportation.
The only other federal law governing the treatment of animals used
for food is the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA). HMSA was
passed in 1958 "following intense and broad-based public concerns about
cruelty and abuse of livestock in meat-packing plants,"5 ° over significant
opposition from the animal agriculture industry and USDA. 5' Congress'
primary concern in passing the law was treatment of slaughterhouse
employees, not animals.52
The HMSA requires that "in the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules,
sheep, swine, and other livestock, all animals are rendered insensible to
pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means
that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or
cut. ' 53 The law also provides that ritual slaughter carried out as part of the
Jewish or Muslim faith is ipso facto considered humane. 4 Despite
consistent efforts by animal advocacy organizations for an alternative
interpretation, the HMSA has been interpreted not to apply to birds despite
the fact that they represent more than ninety percent of the animals

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See, e.g., Cassuto, supra note 4, at 2; Vesilind, supra note 5, at 691.
Welty, supra note 34, at 188.
49 U.S.C. § 80502 (1994).
49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2), (c) (1994).
See 9 C.F.R. §§ 89.1-89.5 (2006); Wenner, supra note 27, at 1643.

49.

See generally

ANIMAL

WELFARE

INST.,

ANIMALS DURING TRANSPORT (2010).
50. LISA SHAMES, GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY

LEGAL

OFFICE,

PROTECTIONS

GAO-08-686T,

FOR

FARM

HUMANE

METHODS OF HANDLING AND SLAUGHTER: PUBLIC REPORTING ON VIOLATIONS CAN
IDENTIFY ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES AND ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY

51.
52.

Welty, supra note 34, at 185.
Cassuto, supra note 4, at 4.

53. 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (1958).
54. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1902(b) - 1906 (1958).

4 (2008).
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slaughtered for food in the US.55 USDA is tasked with issuing regulations
implementing the Act.56
Though passed in 1958, there was no requirement providing for
HMSA enforcement until it was incorporated into the Federal Meat
Inspection Act in 1978. 57 Since that time, federal meat inspectors have had
responsibility and authority for enforcing the HMSA. However, as
explained more thoroughly below, this responsibility remains secondary.
Therefore, unlike at the state level, where animal protection laws are
extensive, there is no comprehensive federal scheme regulating treatment
of animals, particularly those intended for food.
D. Public Outcry and the History of the FederalMeat Inspection Act

The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) was enacted in 1907
following a public awakening not unlike the one resulting from the
Hallmark/Westland video. At the turn of the twentieth century, Upton
Sinclair aimed to draw attention to the evils of capitalism and the appalling
work conditions in the animal agriculture industry. While employment
conditions were and continue to be a significant problem in animal
agriculture, 58 Sinclair's book, The Jungle, instead caught the public's
attention to the appalling food safety issues. 59 Although The Jungle is
fictional, it highlighted what was happening in the nation's slaughterhouses
and led to nationwide responses.
Congress reacted by passing the FMIA. The FMIA's stated purpose is
to protect public health and welfare by "assuring that meat and meat food
products distributed to them are wholesome, not adulterated, and properly
marked, labeled, and packaged., 60 The FMIA requires federal inspectors to
be placed in slaughterhouses and other animal processing plants across the
country. 6 1 Slaughterhouses are not permitted to operate without federal

55. See generally Levine v. Conner, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see
also Cassuto, supra note 4, at 4; Welty, supra note 34, at 198.
56. 7 U.S.C. § 1904(b) (1958).
57. Vesilind, supra note 5, at 690.
58. See, e.g., PATRICIA A. CURTIS, GUIDE TO US FOOD LAWS AND REGULATIONS 147
(2013);

DAVID

NIBERT,

ANIMAL

RIGHTS/HUMAN

RIGHTS:

ENTANGLEMENTS

OF

OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION 112 (2002); ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 173-

76 (2002); Torrez, supra note 28.
59. See Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S.Ct. 965, 968 (2012); Roger Roots, A
Muckraker's Aftermath: The Jungle of Meat-Packing Regulation after a Century, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413 (2000); Vesilind, supra note 5, at 689.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 602 (1967).
61. 9 C.F.R. § 302.3 (2010).
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inspectors present. 62 The FMIA has been amended on a number of
occasions. 63 In 1957, Congress passed the Poultry Product Inspection Act
to extend the law to bird slaughter and processing. 64 In 1967, Congress
passed the Wholesome Meat Act and in 1968, the Wholesome Poultry Act,
to ensure that the same standards applied to intrastate and foreign animal
65
processing as applied to interstate facilities.
The FMIA does contain express preemption language. Specifically it
states that "[r]equirements within the scope of this chapter with respect to
premises, facilities and operations of any establishment [covered by the
act] which are in addition to, or different than those made under this
chapter may not be imposed by any State." 66 However, the law also
includes a savings clause, stating that "[t]his chapter shall not preclude any
State ... from making requirements or taking other action, consistent with

this chapter, with respect to any other matters regulated under this
67
chapter."
Moreover, the FMIA contains an entire provision specifying that
states may create their own animal slaughter regimes for intrastate meat as
long as they provide at least as much protection as federal law.
Additionally, the "legislative history of the 1967 amendments indicates a
strong emphasis on the baseline nature of the federal program's
requirements (and] the congressional reports to the 1967 amendments
discuss at length the important cooperative relationship between the federal
government and state governments in the field of meat inspection.,, 68 Taken
together, these provisions, along with the traditional state role in regulating
animal treatment and public health, seem to make clear that Congress
wanted to create a federal floor under which states could not fall, but not a
federal ceiling above which states were prohibited from acting.
Under the law, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) within
USDA has responsibility for inspecting animals before and after slaughter,
monitoring slaughter, and processing operations for cleanliness, and
enforcing related food safety regulations. 69 "FSIS is mandated to visually
examine every carcass passing through slaughter plants - including over 8
billion chickens and 125 million head of livestock - and to inspect the

62.

Id.

63. CURTIS, supra note 58, at 76.
64. Id. at 77.

65. Id.
66.
67.
68.
69.

21 U.S.C. § 678 (1967) (emphasis added).
Id.
Barron, supra note 6, at 266.
See CURTIS, supra note 58, at 75-76.
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several thousand processing plants daily., 70 FSIS regulations regarding
most nonambulatory animals require that they be separated from other
animals. 71 After slaughter, they are to be inspected for a determination
regarding whether their flesh is safe to eat. 72 "[F]ederal regulations allow
disabled livestock to be subjected to electric prodding, and they may be
pulled or dragged on the ground with
'forklift or bobcat-type vehicles' so
73
long as they have been 'stunned.'
Therefore, while states have legislated extensively in these areas over
a period of nearly two centuries, federal legislation has been more recent
and less comprehensive. This history was the legal backdrop that the
courts confronted in addressing the challenge to the California law
governing treatment of nonambulatory animals.
III. THE ROAD TO NA TIONAL MEA TASSOCIA TION V. HARRIS
Food safety and animal welfare laws and regulations have often been
responses to incidents that provide small windows into the reality of our
food supply and, in particular, how animals are turned into food. The
release of the Hallmark/Westland video was one of these moments. This
section provides a brief overview of the California legislature's attempt to
respond to the Hallmark/Westland video, the industry challenge to that
response, and an overview of preemption challenges under the FMIA at the
time. Secondly, it discusses the treatment by the courts of that challenge
and demonstrates how the Supreme Court decision striking down the law
undermines traditional preemption law and the state role in legislating in
the areas of animal welfare and public health.
A. California Versus the NationalMeat Association: UnderminingAttempts to
ProtectPublic Health andAnimal Welfare

In response to the Hallmark/Westland video and the subsequent
revelations described in the introduction, California legislators decided to
strengthen an existing state law regulating the treatment of animals
designated for slaughter. 74 "[Animals] that become downed before or upon

70.
71.
72.
73.

TAYLOR & DAVID, supra note 37, at 12.

9 C.F.R. § 309.2 (2007).

Id.

Vesilind, supra note 5, at 691; see also 9 C.F.R. § 313.2(d)(2) (2012); FOOD
& INSPECTION SERV., HUMANE HANDLING OF DEAD LIVESTOCK, FSIS
DIRECTIVE 6900.2 (1992), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/ connect/
2375f4d5-0e24-4213-902d-d94ee4ed9394/6900.2.pdf? MOD=AJPE RES.
74. See Hearing on A.B. 2098 Before the Assembly Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2007-08
Regular Session (Cal.) (statement of Paul Krekorian, Member, Assembly Comm. on
SAFETY
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arrival at the slaughterhouse are denied medical care, food, and water, and
they are left to suffer for hours or days until they make it to slaughter or
ultimately die." 75 As explained by the American Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Harris:
[b]y preventing the well documented and grossly inhumane
handling of animals that are too sick or disabled to stand
and walk to their deaths, [the California law] is an integral
element of California's anti-cruelty penal scheme, which
like other state anti-cruelty laws, has expanded to better
reflect evolving community sensibilities and to adapt to a
growing social and scientific awareness of animals'
capacity for pain and suffering.76
When the law was scheduled to go into effect, however, the National
Meat Association (NMA), an industry trade association, challenged the
constitutionality of the law as applied to pig processors.7 7 The challenged
provisions included the following:
(a) No slaughterhouse, stockyard, auction, market agency, or dealer
shall buy, sell, or receive a nonambulatory animal.
(b) No slaughterhouse shall process, butcher, or sell meat or
products of nonambulatory animals for human consumption.
(c) No slaughterhouse shall hold a nonambulatory animal without
taking immediate action to humanely euthanize the animal.78
NMA argued that the law was preempted by federal law, violated the
Commerce Clause of the US Constitution, and was unconstitutionally
vague. 79 The courts only addressed NMA's preemption argument in
deciding its motion for a preliminary injunction. Several animal advocacy
organizations - HSUS, Farm Sanctuary, the Humane Farming Association

Pub. Safety), available at ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/

2100/ab 2098 cfa 20080328 144343 asm comm.html.
75. Repphun, supra note 39, at 202.
76. ASPCA Brief,supra note 2, at 2.

77.

Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 599f (2008).
79. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097.
78.

asm/ab_2051-
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and the Animal Legal Defense Fund - intervened in the case on behalf of
the state.8 °
Although, under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution,
Congress may supersede state law through any act it is constitutionally
permitted to pass, courts are generally reticent to find that state law has
been preempted without a clear mandate from Congress. The:
enumeration of powers in Article I, reinforced by the Tenth
Amendment, make clear the intent to preserve the authority
of States, thereby "assur[ing] a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society; increas[ing] opportunity for citizen
for
involvement in democratic processes; [and] allow[ing]
' 81
more innovation and experimentation in government.
The value of not carelessly overriding state law is particularly at play
in areas where states have traditionally governed and where the federal role
has been minimal, and numerous Supreme Court and lower court cases
have preserved state prerogatives in the face of federal preemption claims
in these areas. 82 As the Supreme Court has explained:
because the States are independent sovereigns in our
federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does
not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. In all
pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has "legislated . . . in a field which the States
we "start with the
have traditionally occupied," ...
assumption that the historic police powers of the States
that
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
', 83
Congress.
of
purposes
was the clear and manifest
This is particularly the case when federal laws include a savings clause,
specifically retaining an amount of state jurisdiction over the issue. "Many
federal public health and environmental statutes include savings clauses.

80. Id.
81. Brief for Professors of Preemption Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 16, Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) (No. 10-224)
[hereinafter Professors'Brie] (internal citations omitted).
82. Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1660 (2009).
83. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
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intended to leave ample room for state
law to provide increased protection
84
above the federal regulatory floor."
There are two types of preemption:
[t]here is express preemption where federal law explicitly
preempts state law. There is implied preemption where
federal law was intended to occupy the legislative field or
where state law conflicts with federal law, either because
it's impossible to comply with both laws or because state
law stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the purposes of
federal law. In either case, there's a strong presumption
against preemption, especially when the state law deals
with matters like health and animal welfare, which have
85
historically been regulated by states.
Whether the presumption against preemption must always be applied,
particularly in situations where a law has an express preemption provision,
however, has been at matter of debate at the Supreme Court in recent
years. 86
Courts hearing cases under the provision of the FMIA at stake in
Harris have been generally unwilling to find state laws preempted. The
cases most analogous to Harris have been those dealing with prohibitions
on horse slaughter. In Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo v. Curry,
slaughterhouse owners challenged a Texas law outlawing the slaughter of
horses for human consumption. 87 Holding in favor of the state, the Fifth
Circuit stated, "[w]e can find no indication that Congress intended to
prevent states from regulating the types of meat that can be sold for human
consumption.... FMIA's preemption clause is more naturally read as
being concerned with the methods, standards of quality, and packaging that
slaughterhouses use. 88
Similarly, in Cavel v. Madigan, the only remaining US horse
slaughter facility challenged an Illinois law that prohibited the slaughter of
horses, as well as the import or export of horse flesh for human

84. Zellmer, supra note 82, at 1660.
85. Brown, 599 F.3d at 1097 (internal citations omitted).
86. See, e.g., Professors' Brief supra note 81, at 20; William Funk, Judicial
Deference and Regulatory Preemption by FederalAgencies, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1233,

1234 (2010).
87. Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 329
(5th Cir. 2007).
88. Id.at 333.
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consumption. 89 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Richard

Posner, rejected the argument that the law was preempted by the FMIA
explaining that, "[g]iven that horse meat is produced for human
consumption, its production must comply with the [FMIA]. But if it is not
produced, there
is nothing, so far as horse meat is concerned, for the Act to
°
9

work upon.
Likewise, in Chicago-Midwest Meat Association v. Evanston, the

Seventh Circuit held that local ordinances providing for inspection of meat
delivery vehicles were not preempted. "Far from intending to preempt the
entire field of meat inspection, Congress actually designed the Act to
'protect the consuming public from meat and meat food products that are
adulterated or misbranded and to assist in efforts by State and other
Government agencies to accomplish this objective."' 91 And in Physicians
Committee for Responsible Medicine v. McDonald's, the California Court

of Appeal held that requirements that restaurants wam consumers about the
carcinogenic risk of consuming chicken flesh were not preempted. 92 These
cases stand in contrast to cases challenging labeling requirements different
than those imposed under the FMIA, which have been held to be
preempted.9 3 This was the legal framework that the courts confronted in
hearing NMA's challenge to the California law.
B. California Versus the NationalMeat Association in the Courts

The district court found that the state law was expressly preempted by94
federal law and granted NMA's motion for a preliminary injunction.
While California argued that the FMIA did not prohibit states from making
determinations regarding which animals may be slaughtered, the court
rejected this argument, finding that disabled pigs are not a "type of animal"
and that California's attempts to prohibit their consumption and ensure that
they be humanely euthanized ran afoul of federal law.95
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, explaining that:

89. See Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 551 (7th Cir. 2007).
90. Id. at 554.
91. Chi.-Midwest Meat Ass'n v. Evanston, 589 F.2d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing
21 U.S.C. § 661(a)).
92. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. McDonald's Corp., 187 Cal. App.
4th 554 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2010).
93. See Jones v. Rath Packing, 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977); Brief in Opposition for the
Non-State Respondents at 4-5, Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) (No.
10-224); Barron, supranote 6 at 260.
94. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, No. CV-F-08-1963, 2009 WL 426213, at *24 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 19, 2009).
95. Id. at *25.
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[the FMIA] preempts state regulation of the "premises,
facilities and operations" of slaughterhouses, and [the
California law] deals with none of these.... Regulating
what kinds of animals may be slaughtered calls for a host
of practical, moral and public health judgments that go
far beyond those made in the FMIA.
These are the kinds
96
of judgments reserved to the states.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the FMIA's express preemption
provision did not reach decisions regarding animals that never make it to
slaughter because the purpose of the law is to ensure that those animals
who are slaughtered for human consumption are safe to eat. 97 Moreover,
nothing in the California law made it impossible to comply with both
federal and state law. Given the state's traditional role in regulating health
and animal welfare, there was no reason to interfere with the state's
attempts to protect disabled animals and public health. The Ninth Circuit
relied largely on the horse slaughter cases discussed previously.
In the Supreme Court, the parties and numerous amici curiae laid out
arguments as to why the Court should uphold or reverse the Ninth Circuit
decision.
According to NMA, federal law already provided a
comprehensive scheme regarding what to do with nonambulatory animals,
and there was no room for California to act. In its brief to the Supreme
Court, the Association argued that the "FMIA's preemption provision
shows the 'clear and manifest' intent of Congress that federal law alone
sets the standards for slaughterhouse operations." 98 NMA went on to state
that "Congress ...made it very clear that this federal system was to set the

exclusive standards for slaughter-house operations." 99 NMA
further argued
00
that the presumption against preemption should not apply.'
In an amicus curiae brief on behalf of NMA, the US Solicitor General
argued that it was necessary to find that state law was preempted in order to
ensure "that FSIS inspectors and veterinarians will have an adequate
opportunity to conduct the FMIA-required ante-mortem inspection of
nonambulatory animals."' 0'
The US further argued that a finding of

96. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2010).
97. Id. at 1099.
98. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) (No.
10-224).
99. Id. at 23.
100. ld.at25.
101. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Nat'l
Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) (No. 10-224).
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preemption would prevent "state interference [with] the federal inspectors
who work at slaughterhouses."'' 0 2 The US ultimately concluded that
"[u]nwarranted intrusion by state law could hamstring FSIS inspectors in
03
the discharge of their duties."'
Numerous amici, as well as the state and non-state respondents, laid
out various reasons that the Supreme Court should uphold the Ninth Circuit
Decision. Preemption law professors argued that:
[w]hich animals a State chooses for ethical reasons to
exclude from being slaughtered and processed into meat
falls outside the federal government's interest in inspecting
the animals that will be sold as meat for human
consumption. And federal law does not require state law
determinations as to what animals are suitable for slaughter
to be left at the slaughterhouse gates....
Federal law expressly contemplates an active state role in
regulating the meat industry, even as it more jealously
guards the federal inspection process of animals bound for
slaughter. California's prohibition on the slaughter of nonambulatory animals is consistent, even supportive, of the
balance struck by federal law, since it deals with which
animals may be slaughtered and sold as meat, as opposed
to how animals bound for slaughter should be inspected.
Indeed, interpreting the FMIA to require displacement of
California's determination that non-ambulatory animals are
excluded for ethical reasons from the slaughtering process
would upset the federal-state balance contemplated by the
FMIA, turning preemption principles on their head.'°4
Other amici arguing against preemption included six consumer groups and
fourteen states.10 5 Two veterinarians disputed the claims made by NMA

102. Id.
103. Id. at 34.
104. Professors'Briefsupra note 81, at 4, 6-7
105. See, e.g., Brief for Public Citizen, AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) (No. 10-224); Brief for
the States of Alaska, Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nat'l
Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) (No. 10-224).
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and the US Solicitor General that California's law would make meat less
safe. 106
Nevertheless, in a terse, fourteen-page, unanimous opinion written by
Justice Elena Kagan, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the
California law was preempted by the FMIA. While the opinion includes
little analysis of the relevant laws and no analysis of preemption law or
discussion of the traditional state role in regulating animal welfare and food
safety, the Court held that the FMIA clearly preempted the California law.
According to the Kagan, the FMIA's preemption clause:
prevents a State from imposing any additional or different
- even if non-conflicting - requirements that fall within the
scope of the Act and concern a slaughterhouse's facilities
or operations. And at every turn [the California law]
imposes additional or different requirements on swine
slaughterhouses.... California's statute substitutes a new
regulatory scheme for the one the FSIS uses.1 7
Moreover, the Court rejected the arguments accepted by the Ninth Circuit
that states were free under the FMIA to prohibit the slaughter of certain
animals. As stated by the Court:
[t]he FMIA's scope includes not only "animals that are
going to be turned into meat," but animals on a
slaughterhouse's premises that will never suffer that
fate.... [O]ne vital function of the Act and its regulations
is to ensure that some kinds of livestock delivered to a
slaughterhouse's gates will not be turned into meat. Under
federal law, nonambulatory pigs are not among the
excluded animals. 108
The Court went on to hold that, while this analysis makes clear that the
requirements under the California law were different than those of the
FMIA, they did not fall outside of the FMIA's scope.' 0 9
The Court also rejected arguments made by the respondents that
certain aspects of the law - those governing treatment of animals prior to

106. See generally Brief for Tim Blackwell, D.V.M. and Kristie Mozzachio, D.V.M.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965
(2012) (No. 10-224).
107. Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012).
108. Id. at 973-74.
109. Id. at 974.
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their arrival at the slaughterhouse and those prohibiting the sale of their
flesh after they are processed by the slaughterhouse - fell outside the scope
of the FMIA. "1 0 Moreover, the Court presumed that, because FSIS
inspectors are tasked with enforcing the HMSA, that humane slaughter
considerations are similarly subsumed by the FMIA, despite the fact, as
detailed above, the I{MSA provisions are incredibly limited."'
As noted above, analysis of preemption law was nonexistent and the
Supreme Court did not discuss the presumption against preemption or the
savings clause in the FMIA. While this opinion seemed to fly in the face of
traditional preemption law, legal scholar Sandra Zellmer has documented
how the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts in particular have frequently used
preemption law to find in favor of corporations and against states and
individuals, noting that:
in relatively few of the recent cases have the Rehnquist or
Roberts Courts actually delved into congressional purposes
underlying a particular statute in any depth; ... [nor] has

the Court considered the impact of preemption on
cooperative federalism objectives or the relative
competence of different levels of government to solve
societal problems. Rather,

. .

. preemption cases exhibit a

type of "faux textualism in which the Court invokes the
alleged plain meaning of two wholly ambiguous words" in
a statutory clause to reach antiregulatory results."12
Moreover, "recent Supreme Court cases reveal a pattern of increasingly
hostile reception of savings clauses."" 3 According to Professor Zellmer, in
preemption cases, the justices do not generally line up along typical
ideological lines, and:
[a]s a result, Supreme Court opinions seem to oscillate
between a love of federalism, which would suggest a
restrictive view of preemption, and an aversion to state
interference with federal programs. It is tempting to
surmise that the preemption cases are not about federalism
at all but rather reflect promarket, antiregulatory goals.' 14

110. Id.at971-73.
111. Cassuto, supra note 4, at 2; Deckha, supra note 15, at 531-32.
112. Zellmer, supra note 82, at 1669-70 (internal citations omitted).
113. Id.at 1660.
114. Id. at 1670 (internal citations omitted).
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Unfortunately, in Harris, all the justices were able to coalesce around an
anti-federalism, pro-federal regulation position." 5
This understanding of the balance between federal and state laws
jeopardizes human and nonhuman health and limits the openings for states
to act to protect their residents. As stated by the intervenors in Harris,
giving the FMIA broad preemptive effect in an area traditionally left to the
states, has "the perverse effect of turning the food safety sword Congress
created with the enactment of the FMIA' into
a shield against any and all
6
meat safety reform efforts by the States."
While the actual holding in Harris is relatively narrow since most
state laws do not directly govern the slaughter of animals, and therefore
would not fall under the purview of the FMIA, the potential harm of the
holding and the Supreme Court's willingness to allow federal agencies to
control areas of traditional state control even when their ability to do so is
woefully inadequate has far reaching implications.Moreover, David
Cassuto has pointed out that the opinion conflates animals and meat,
treating live animals as though they are already meat,' 1 7 which has potential
implications for any number of laws attempting to improve the conditions
under which animals are raised for food. Furthermore, other commentators
have noted that the Supreme Court could potentially strike down laws
impacting agriculture products from other states as violative of the dormant
commerce clause."18 And, in fact, in February 2014, Missouri sued
California claiming that California's prohibition on the sale of
eggs from
9
chickens kept in battery cages violates the Commerce Clause."
While the Supreme Court presumes that federal law provides a
modicum of protection for farmed animals, other commentators have
demonstrated that this presumption is false. 120 As a result, "the only hope
for legal protections is at the state level.,,121 The Court's assumption
regarding humane slaughter in particular raises concerns about the state
humane slaughter laws that apply to species not protected under federal
law. "Unless Congress's preemption power over state animal welfare law is

115. See generally Harris,132 S. Ct. at 965.
116. Brief for Defendant-Intervenor-Appellants at 16-17, Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris,
132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) (No. 10-224), 2009 WL 2610229.
117. Cassuto, supra note 4, at 3, 12.
118. Sean P. Sullivan, Empowering Market Regulation of Agricultural Animal
Welfare through Product Labeling, 19 ANIMAL L. 391, 400 (2012).
119. See David A. Lieb, MissouriAG Challenges CaliforniaEgg Law, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 4, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.orgfarticle/missouri-ag-challenges-califomia-

egg-law.
120. See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 27, at 206-07.
121. ld.at208.
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challenged, the federal government will retain an unchecked authority to
suppress legislative expressions of our moral and ethical values, by
defining and enforcing artificial limits to our humanity. 1 22 This
interpretation of the law is particularly problematic given the inability of
USDA to adequately protect animals or the food supply as addressed in the
next section.
V. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY LANDSCAPE BEFORE AND AFTER
NATIONAL MEATASSOCIATION V. HARRIS

Rather than interpreting the FMIA as creating a federal floor, the
Supreme Court in Harris interpreted the law as creating a federal ceiling
under which all states and their residents are forced to fall regardless of
their own moral understandings and wishes. This interpretation undermines
that traditional state role in regulating animal welfare and impedes state
moral progress, halting legal innovation at a truncated level. Moreover, the
decision endangers public health by preserving authority for protecting
food safety in the hands of USDA.
Over the years, animal agriculture opponents and food safety
proponents have continually urged better regulation at the federal level.
While FSIS has made some modifications to its regulations over the years,
those changes have been few and far between despite numerous failures to
protect either food safety or animal welfare. The agency has been most
willing to make changes following a major incident such as the release of
the Hallmark/Westland video, but once public scrutiny focuses elsewhere,
it falls back to its ineffectual position. This section details the efforts of
competing stakeholders to compel the USDA to act to enforce existing laws
over the years since the passage of the FMIA and HMSA and surveys the
abject failure of the USDA to protect animal welfare or the safety of the
food supply in the years both before and after Harris.
A. FSIS Regulation of Food Safety andAnimal Welfare
Cassuto has detailed how the expectations on FSIS inspectors make it
nearly impossible for them to succeed in adequately inspecting animals,
noting that:
[w]e know that in 2010, 9,000 inspectors inspected
147,000,000 animals. That means that each inspector
inspected an average of approximately 16,330 animals. If
every inspector works forty-eight weeks a year, five days

122.

Vesilind, supra note 5, at 704.
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per week, eight hours per day, and if we assume that all
they do is live inspect animals, then this would mean that
each of them inspects slightly more than eight animals per
hour. That might seem possible if ante-mortem inspections
were all they did. But it is not all they do. Furthermore,
even if it were all they did, this hourly inspection rate123does
not align with the hourly kill rate at a slaughterhouse.
This is particularly problematic because the inspection regime relies
largely on visual examination of animals before and after slaughter. The
agency has been reluctant to alter the FSIS inspection system since the law
was passed in 1907 despite the fact that the methods employed have more
to do with meat quality (how the meat appears and tastes to consumers) and
24
less to do with meat safety (whether the meat is infected with pathogens). 1
For years, the agency was largely unwilling to adopt new testing
requirements, and faced vehement opposition from the animal agriculture
industry when it has attempted to do so.
After a major E. coli outbreak in 1993, USDA made one of the only
significant changes to the food safety regulatory regime in the last
century.125 Between 1998 and 2000, FSIS phased in a pilot program,
applying the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system,
for certain chicken, turkey, and pig facilities. 126 "Upon the announcement
of testing for microbial pathogens, the meat industry fought back and filed
suit to enjoin the USDA from requiring testing, claiming that the USDA
did not have the regulatory authority and that the regulations were arbitrary
and capricious.' ' 27 While the court challenge was unsuccessful, 2 1 industry
did succeed in getting the agency to weaken the regulations to place
primary responsibility on consumers for cooking meat thoroughly to kill
29
pathogens.1

123. Cassuto, supra note 4, at 5.
124. See CATTLE INSPECTION, supra note 40, at 8-10.
125. Hinderliter, supra note 40, at 744-45; Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to
Hamburger: The Fiction of a Safe Meat Supply, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 411, 453

(1997).
126. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-775, FOOD SAFETY: MORE
DISCLOSURE AND DATA NEEDED TO CLARIFY IMPACT OF CHANGES TO POULTRY AND
HOG INSPECTIONS 2 (2013) [hereinafter GAO-13-775]; Hinderliter, supra note 40, at

745.
127. Brian Daluiso, "Is the Meat Here Safe?" How Strict Liabilityfor Retailers Can
Lead to Safer Meat, 92 B.U. L.REV. 1081, 1093 (2012).
128. Tex. Food Indus. Ass'n v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 144 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
129. Daluiso, supra note 127, at 1094.
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While the HACCP system is seemingly an improvement over the
previous system because it relies on science, rather than the traditional
"poke and sniff' method and has been lauded by the agency, 30 it has a
number of major drawbacks. For one thing, the system is largely
implemented by industry. It removes FSIS inspectors from slaughterhouse1
3
processing lines and relies on them primarily to review industry records.1
Moreover, the HACCP system cannot detect bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) - commonly known as mad cow disease - which is
always deadly when contracted by humans (and cows if they live that
long). 32 In response to concerns expressed by Consumers Union and other
33
consumer groups, USDA agreed to engage in some testing for BSE.
However, the agency refused to engage in comprehensive testing such as is
134
done in other countries.
Enforcement of animal welfare requirements has been even less
substantial. While the agency has issued numerous regulations related to
its food safety duties, the regulations enforcing the HMSA are minimal and
fill only six pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. 135 Acceptable
methods of slaughter under the regulations include carbon dioxide, captive
bolt, gunshot, and electric current.' 36 Calls for USDA to more fully enforce
the law to protect animals have similarly been rejected. This is not
surprising, perhaps since the agency opposed the law from the beginning
and has often been more concerned with keeping the animal agriculture
industry happy than with vigorously enforcing federal laws. These issues
have led other commentators to conclude that experience has shown:
the difficulty of asking inspectors to serve two masters (food safety
and animal welfare). Improving enforcement of the HMSA will . .. be
difficult so long as enforcement responsibility remains with the FSIS. A
further problem with asking the FSIS to enforce the HMSA is that the FSIS
tries to work cooperatively with industry. FSIS inspectors may be reluctant
to compromise their relationships with slaughterhouse management ...in

130. See generally Karen L. Hulebak & Wayne Schlosser, Hazard Analysis and
CriticalControl Point (HA CCP)History and Conceptual Overview, 22 RISK ANALYSIS
547 (2002); FOOD SAFETY INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., HACCP-BASED
INSPECTION
MODELS
PROJECT,
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portaI/fsis/topics/

regulatory-compliance/haccp/haccp-based-inspection-models-proj ect/history-HIM P
(last visited May 14, 2014).
131. See Hinderliter, supra note 40, at 746; Lassiter, supra note 125, at 445-46.
132. See Hinderliter, supra note 40, at 750.
133. Id.at 752.
134. Id.at 793.
135. Welty, supra note 34, at 188.
136. 9 C.F.R. § 313 (1988).
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order to promote
humane slaughter, an issue that is peripheral to their core
137

purpose.

Moreover, placing responsibility for HMSA enforcement with FSIS
inspectors is simply out of touch with how slaughterhouses operate. For
example:
[t]he way the plants are physically laid out, meat
inspection is way down the line. A lot of times, inspectors
can't even see the slaughter area from their stations. It's
virtually impossible for them to monitor the slaughter area
when they're trying to detect diseases and abnormalities in
carcasses that are whizzing by. Furthermore, meat
inspection is increasingly technical. Inspectors are
scientists, trained to conduct chemical and bacteriological
tests prior to approving meat. Conducting humaneslaughter inspections is a very different type of work, for
which meat inspectors receive little training.'3 8
Animal advocacy organizations have petitioned USDA on numerous
occasions to adequately enforce the law. As noted in an Animal Welfare
Institute petition last year, the regulations implementing HMSA have only
been modified twice in the last two decades, and neither amendment was
intended to result mi more humane treatment of animals. 39 "In 1994,
USDA amended the regulations to permit use of carbon dioxide to kill and not merely stun

_

pigs.

1 40

Then, ten years later, "USDA added an

amendment to prohibit use of penetrating captive bolt devices that inject air
into[BE the,,141
cranial cavity of cattle due to the findings of a risk assessment on
USDA has been similarly reticent to prohibit disabled animals from
entering the food supply despite ongoing pressure from animal advocacy
and consumer organizations. Following revelations that a cow with BSE
had entered the US food supply in 2003, the agency engaged in initial
efforts to prohibit disabled cows from being slaughtered for human

137. Welty, supra note 34, at 197.
138. Id. at 195 (quoting USDA Meat Inspector Dave Carney).
139. DENA JONES, ANIMAL WELFARE INST., PETITION FOR RULEMAKING
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 8 (2013) (on file with author).
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consumption. 42 However, after issuing a rule, "USDA issued Notice 5-04,
which instructed inspectors to allow downed cattle to be slaughtered for
human consumption if they initially appeared otherwise healthy but then
collapsed in the slaughter plant itself due to an acute injury.' ' 143 USDA
itself has recognized that "underlying diseases are often undetectable and
may make an animal disoriented, weak, or uncoordinated, thereby
predisposing the animal to injury."' 144 It was not until 2009, after the
Hallmark/Westland video, that USDA finally entirely prohibited the
slaughter of adult nonambulatory cows for human consumption.1 45 The
agency, nevertheless, maintained exceptions for calves and for all other
46
animals.
In 2013, in response to an HSUS petition, the agency stated its
intention to issue a proposed rule that would extend the ban to calves being
raised for veal.' 47 That decision was precipitated by the release of an
undercover video from Vermont showing abuse of disabled calves over a
six-week period in front of USDA inspectors. 148 The video included film of
"employees skinning and decapitating conscious veal calves, [who were]
about 1-week old.', 149 The agency has not indicated, however, when it will
issue the proposed rule stating, "[b]ecause our resources for regulatory
development are limited,... the Agency is unable at this time to project
when it will initiate rulemaking."' 150 Unfortunately, also last year, the
agency again rejected calls to prohibit other disabled animals from entering
the food supply. In response to a petition from Farm Sanctuary, the agency

142. See generally Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human
Food, 69 Fed. Reg. 1862 (Jan. 12, 2004) (interim final rule and request for comments);
HSUS Petition,supra note 1, at 13-14.
143. HSUS Petition, supra note 1, at 14.
144. Id.; see also 9 C.F.R. § 309.3(e) (revised 2004); Prohibition of the Use of
Specified Risk Materials for Human Food, 69 Fed. Reg. 1870 (Jan. 12, 2004) (interim
final rule and request for comments).
145. See generally Requirements for the Disposition of Cattle that Become NonAmbulatory Disabled Following Ante-Mortem Inspection, 74 Fed. Reg. 11,463 (Mar.
18, 2009) (final rule).
146. 9 C.F.R. § 309.13(b) (2007).
147. Letter from Alfred Almanza, Administrator, Food Safety Inspection Serv., to
Gina Tomaselli & Peter Brandt, Humane Soc'y of the U.S. (Mar. 13, 2013) (on file
with author) [hereinafter FSIS Response to HSUS]; Press Release, The Humane Soc'y
of the U.S., USDA Moves to Ban Slaughter of Downer Veal Calves Too Sick or
Injured to Walk (Mar. 19, 2013), available at http://www. humanesociety.org/
news/pressreleases/2013/03/usda-downer-veal-calves-slaughter-ban-031913.html.
148. HSUS Petition,supra note 1, at 31-37.
149. LISA SHAMES, Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-203, HUMANE
METHODS OF SLAUGHTER ACT: WEAKNESSES IN USDA ENFORCEMENT 1 (2010).
150. FSIS Response to HSUS, supra note 147.
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stated, "FSIS has concluded that its existing regulations are effective in
ensuring that pigs, sheep, goats, and other livestock are handled humanely
at slaughter and that diseased livestock do not enter the human food
supply. '15 1 However, as explained in detail below, nothing could be further
from the truth.
B. ContinuingFSIS Failureto ProtectAnimals or Public Health
As noted above, the US Solicitor General and industry representatives
argued in Harristhat state laws were unnecessary because federal law and
regulations already fully protect public health and animal welfare.
However, the reality shows that this confidence is misplaced. Abuse of
animals in slaughterhouses and foodbome illness continue to be enormous
problems in the US, and USDA shows no signs of acting to remedy these
issues.
Numerous audits and investigations have revealed that USDA fails to
enforce its own regulations and puts industry interests ahead of those of the
public time and again. "According to USDA records, the Agency has
permitted downed animals with serious conditions and illnesses, such as
gangrene and hepatitis, to enter the food supply. 1 52 Last year, a USDA
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) audit investigating pig
slaughterhouses found that FSIS' "enforcement policies do not deter swine
slaughter plants from becoming repeat violators of the [FMIA]. As a result,
plants have repeatedly violated the same regulations with little or no
consequence.' ' 53 The audit also found that some inspectors did not perform
adequate post-mortem and sanitation55inspections, 154 and that FSIS failed to
ensure humane handling of animals.1
During their limited inspection, the auditors witnessed a number of
egregious violations. For example, they saw numerous pigs who were still
conscious after being stunned - either by bolts or by carbon dioxide - and
employees failing to take steps to immediately re-stun the pigs. 56 One pig
"was able to right its head, make noise, kick, and splash water in reaction to

151. Letter from Alfred Almanza, Administrator, Food Safety Inspection Serv., to
Kathy Hessler, Animal Law Clinic, Lewis & Clark Law School (Mar. 13, 2013) (on
file with author).
152. Repphun, supra note 39, at 184
153.

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,

INSPECTION

SERVICE

-

INSPECTION

U.S.

AND

DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD SAFETY AND
ENFORCEMENT

ACTIVITIES

SLAUGHTER PLANTS, AUDIT REPORT 24601-0001-41 4 (2013)
REPORT 24601-0001-41].

154.
155.
156.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23-24.

AT

SWINE

[hereinafter

AUDIT

20141

HEALTH AND WELFARE PREEMPTED

being placed in a scalding tank.' ' 157 The auditors also witnessed abuse of a
disabled pig. 158 In addition to HMSA violations, the auditors witnessed

numerous food safety violations including fecal matter and abscesses on
pigs that had been cleared for159human consumption, and the presence of
cockroaches and other "pests."'
FSIS inspectors failed to take appropriate action following these
incidents despite the fact that many facilities were repeat offenders. The
auditors theorized that actual violations were likely more extensive since
those they witnessed occurred with the knowledge that they were
present.' 60 "Only 0.0006 [percent] of the NRs [noncompliance records
issued by FSIS inspectors] resulted in a suspension" including those that
were for egregious violations and in no instances did FSIS withdraw
inspection, which has the effect of shutting down the facility. 16 ' These
findings are consistent with numerous OIG and Government
Accountability Office (GAO) investigations over the years that have found
that USDA fails to adequately enforce the62laws and regulations governing
both food safety and treatment of animals.
Moreover, efforts by inspectors to actually do their jobs have been
impeded by USDA. In 2010, Dr. Dean Wyatt, an FSIS veterinarian
testified before Congress regarding his efforts:
to shut down Seaboard Farms, a hog slaughtering and
processing plant in Oklahoma, for numerous egregious
violations, including pigs "shackled on the slaughter line"
while "awake and kicking rapidly" and "being stuck with a
knife." Another had its throat slit. Partitions were erected
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160.
161.
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so that inspectors couldn't view off-loading of livestock
from trucks after Wyatt and other inspectors had observed
pigs "being crushed" and trampled.
Time and again, Wyatt's supervisors sided with Seaboard,
even telling him to "drastically cut back" on time spent on
humane handling enforcement, and that63 "there was no way
he could have seen" what he reported. 1
After Wyatt was transferred to another plant, he continued to face similar
issues. For example:
[a]t Bushway Packing, Wyatt witnessed calves one to
seven days old arriving by truck after being shipped for ten
hours or more, unable to walk due to injury or weakness.
He saw them dragged down unloading ramps by a hind leg,
dragged through holding pens, even thrown like a football.
Wyatt suspended operations three times, but each time the
district office allowed the plant to reopen. After the owner
complained that Wyatt "was harassing him," Wyatt was
ordered to attend training for new public health
veterinarians, which took him out of the plant for three
64
weeks. 1
165
Other whistleblowers have told comparable stories.
USDA's inability to keep the food supply safe is apparent in the high
rates of foodbome illness, most of which are the result of animal-based
foods. 166 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), every year nearly fifty million people become sick from foodborne
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165.

Kaufmann, supra note 39.
Id.
See Mike McGraw, Animal Abuse Persists at Some Slaughter Plants, KANSAS
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166. See GAO-13-775, supra note 126, at 1; John A. Painter et al., Attribution of
Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and Deaths to Food Commodities by Using
Outbreak Data, United States, 1998-2008, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 407
(2013); Roots, supra note 59, at 2422; Gretchen Goetz, II Years of Data Show Poultry,
Fish, Beef Have Remained Leading Sources of Food-RelatedOutbreaks, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS, June 28, 2013, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/20l3/06/20-years-of-foodbome
-illness-data-show-poultry-fish-beef-continue-to-be-leading-sources-of-outbreaks/.
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illness; 128,000 of those are hospitalized and 3000 die.' 67 The nationwide
costs associated with foodbome illness are estimated to be between $51 and
nearly $80 billion annually.' 68 Headlines related to foodbome illness seem
69
to appear nearly every day.'
Evidently, USDA's methods of preventing foodbome illness are
failing; the agency's attempts to address outbreaks once they occur have
been similarly unsuccessful. There are numerous issues related to
addressing foodbome illness outbreaks, one being that USDA relies largely
on voluntary recalls once a foodborne illness associated with meat or eggs
is discovered. Past experience has shown that such recalls are largely
unsuccessful and70that the majority of tainted food is never removed from
the marketplace.1

While USDA has continually promised to change and be more
vigilant about enforcing the law, in fact, rather than strengthening the
regulatory regime and oversight of slaughterhouses in the face of the
numerous failures documented by GAO and OIG, USDA has taken steps to
provide less oversight by establishing regimes that allow for self-regulation
by industry through the HACCP program detailed above. Not surprisingly,
the recent OIG audit found that this program has not been adequately
monitored and has failed to result in safer food or better treatment of
animals. According to the auditors, HACCP plants "have fewer FSIS
inspectors, and processing lines are allowed to operate at higher speeds
than in traditional plants because plant employees - rather than FSIS
inspectors - sort out diseased carcasses and parts before they reach FSIS
inspectors for final determination of wholesomeness."' 7' Despite the fact
that only thirty of 6300 pig slaughter facilities nationwide are HACCP
facilities, 172 the OIG auditors found that:
3 of the 10 plants cited with the most NRs from FYs 2008
to 2011 were [HACCP] plants. In fact, the swine plant
with the most NRs during this timeframe was a [HACCP]
167.
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http://www.foodsafetynews.com/sections/foodbome-illness-outbreaks/.
170.

Meat Recalls, PBS

FRONTLINE,

http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/

shows/meat/safe/recalls.html; SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE AGRIC. PROJECT, FOOD
DATA, http://www.sraproject.org/2009/04/fsis-2/ (last visited May 15, 2014).
171. AUDIT REPORT24601-0001-41,supra note 153, at 17.
172. Id.at].
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plant-with nearly 50 percent more NRs than the plant
with the next highest number.
This occurred because of
73
FSIS' lack of oversight.'
FSIS agreed with this assessment stating that it would "complete an
evaluation of [HACCP] market hog establishments .... Such an evaluation
may support rule-making to amend regulations to make an inspection
system informed by the market hog [HACCP] pilot permanent. FSIS will
complete this evaluation and determine if a permanent program is
warranted.' 74 However, as noted above, this audit was only one of many
going back at least a decade and finding similar noncompliance. Thus far,
the agency has failed to make the promised changes.
More recently, USDA has come under fire by consumer groups for its
plans to expand the system and greatly reduce the number of FSIS
inspectors in chicken and turkey facilities. 175 According to the Washington
Post, "[n]early 1 million chickens and turkeys are unintentionally boiled
alive each year in U.S. slaughterhouses, often because fast-moving lines
fail to kill the birds before they are dropped into scalding water.' 76 The
new proposal, allowing "poultry companies to accelerate their processing
lines,... would also make the problem of inhumane treatment worse,
according to government inspectors and experts in poultry slaughter.' 77 In
September of 2013, GAO released a report criticizing the agency for not
providing accurate information to the public regarding the success of the
pilot program. 17 While the release of the report resulted in significant
criticism of the agency and the program, 179 USDA has indicated that it,
nevertheless, plans to move forward.18 )

173. ld.at 17.
174. id.
at 19.
175. See Kimberly Kindy, USDA Plan to Speed up Poultry-ProcessingLines Could
Increase Risk of Bird Abuse, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/usda-plan-to-speed-up-poutiry-processing-lines-couldincrease-risk-of-bird-abuse; Tom Philpott, USDA Ruffles Feathers With New Poultry
Inspection Policy, MOTHER JONES, Apr. 24, 2013, http://www. motherjones.com/tomphilpott/2013/04/usda-inspectors-poultry-kill-ines-chicken; Press Release, Food &
Water Watch, Privatized Meat Inspection Experiment Jeopardizes Food Safety (Mar. 7,
2012), available at http://www. foodandwaterwatch.org/pressreleases/privatized-meatinspection-experiment-jeopardizes-food-safety.
176. Kindy, supra note 175.
177. Id
178. GAO-13-775,supranote 126.
179. GAO Report Questions USDA Plans to Change Poultry Inspection Program,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS, Sept. 4, 2013, http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/09/ gaoreport-questions-validity-of-usda-poultry-inspection-program; Kindy, supra note 175;
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There is little evidence that anything is likely to change in the near
future. According to a report from the Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable
Future, food safety "regulatory agencies in the [Obama] administration
have acted regressively in their decision-making and policy-setting
procedures."1' 81 The report goes on to state that, "[w]hile a few federal
initiatives that held promise were initially promoted, pushback from the
agricultural industry has resulted in the dropping or significant weakening
of these approaches. Consequently, it is not expected that measurable
changes in rates of foodborne illness resulting from contaminated animal
'1 82
products will be observed."
For decades, numerous commentators, including the author of this
article, 83 have pointed to USDA's inability to adequately carry out its
conflicting duties to protect public health and to advance agricultural
product consumption and have explored alternative options to ensure a
safer food supply.1 84 The Supreme Court decision in Harris exacerbates
these issues and places states in an untenable situation, unable to act to
protect their residents. Congress could remedy this situation by clarifying
the reach of the federal law and the specific limits of its preemptive effect.
However, as detailed in the next section, not only has Congress failed to
strengthen the state role, it is considering steps that could move in the
opposite direction, further threatening the food supply, and undermining
state initiatives to require better treatment of animals.

Robert Roos, GAO: USDA Took Shortcuts in Poultry Inspection Plan, CTR. FOR
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES.

& POL'Y, Sept. 4, 2013, http://www.cidrap. umn.edu/news-

perspective/2013/09/gao-usda-took-shortcuts-poultry-inspection-plan;

Joe Whitworth,

Senators Legislation Push Follows GAO Criticism of USDA Poultry Inspection Plans,

Sept. 13, 2013, http://www.foodqualitynews.com/Legislation/
Senators-legislation-push-follows-GAO-criticism-USDA-poultry-inspection-plans.
180. Jerry Hagstrom, USDA Will Not Withdraw Poultry Rule, AGWEEK, Sept. 9,
2013; http://www.agweek.com/event/article/id/21620/.
181. JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 46.
182. Id. at 16.
183. Marya Torrez, Meatless Monday: Simple Public Health Suggestion or Extremist
Plot?, 28 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. (forthcoming 2014).
184. See generally, e.g., Daluiso, supra note 127; Lassiter, supra note 125; Tania
Rice, Letting the Apes Run the Zoo: Using Tort Law to Provide Animals with a Legal
Voice, 40 PEPP. L. REv. 1103 (2013); Sullivan, supra note 118; Diana Winters, Not Sick
Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and Barriers to Justiciability, 77 BROOK. L. REv.
905 (2012).
FOOD QUALITY NEWS,
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V. CONGRESS' ROLE [N REMEDYING OR EXACERBATING THE PROBLEMS

Preemption law is entirely a matter of congressional intent.' 85
Therefore, Congress has the authority to reverse the Court's decision in
Harris and restore the state role in regulating animal welfare and food
safety. Given USDA's inability or unwillingness to enforce existing food
safety and animal welfare provisions and the Supreme Court's willingness
to cede authority to that agency at the purported behest of Congress,
Congress needs to clarify the preemption provision in the FMIA and act to
protect the food supply and farmed animals. "[B]ecause preemption does
such violence to states' interests, the respect for those interests inherent in
our concept
of federalism demands that Congress knowingly take such
'1 86
action."

Unfortunately, Congress' attempts to strengthen the state role or
existing federal laws have largely failed. 187 There have seemingly been no
efforts to overturn the Court's decision in Harris,and the unanimity of the
Court's decision leaves little opening for changes in the near future. The
commercial agriculture industry spends millions of dollars to ensure that
this is the case. According to the Center for Responsive Politics,
agribusiness, including animal agriculture, spent more than $600 million
since 1990 to ensure that their interests are represented in Congress and
federal agencies, including almost $80 million in the882012 election cycle
and more than $15 million already for the 2014 cycle.1
One of Congress' few attempts to strengthen the HMSA occurred in
2001 in response to a Washington Post story "chronicl[ing] horrifying
violations of the HMSA in Washington State and elsewhere, including
cattle being butchered while still fully conscious. It reported that the
USDA rarely took significant enforcement action, even at slaughterhouses
where repeated violations of the HMSA had occurred."' 8 9 What resulted

was "sense of Congress" language in the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 stating that the USDA should enforce the existing
law.' 90 Obviously, that is something USDA was already required to do. A

185. See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Medtronic v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
186. Funk, supra note 86, at 1256.
187. Repphun, supra note 39 at 198.
188. CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, AGRIBUSINESS: LONG-TERM CONTRIBUTION
TRENDS, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle-2012&ind=A
(last
visited May 15, 2014)
189. Welty, supra note 34, at 187.
190. Id.
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number of attempts to specifically address the issue of disabled animals
beginning as early as 1992 have similarly failed. 9 '
Unfortunately, in recent years members of Congress have made
efforts to move in the-reverse direction, further undermining the ability of
states to protect their residents. According to Johns Hopkins, "the House
of Representatives has stepped up the intensity of its attacks on avenues for
reform and stricter enforcement of existing regulations, paving the way for
industry avoidance of scrutiny and even deregulation, masked as protection
92
of the inappropriately termed 'family farmer." "
As this is being written, the latest version of the Federal Agriculture
and Risk Management (FARM) Bill of 2014 was being finalized.' 93 The
FARM Bill is a massive piece of legislation that deals with numerous
aspects of the US food supply, including crop subsidies for farmers,
incentives for organic and local food production, benefits for low income
families, and much more.' 94 The House passed an amendment to the bill,
introduced by Steve King of Iowa, that would have prohibited states from
enforcing laws that require "agricultural products" to comply with
requirements that are different than those imposed by federal law or the law
of the state the product comes from.' 95 King is known as an avid opponent
of animal welfare protections and has, for instance, recently opposed
efforts to prohibit adults from taking children to dogfights, as well as a
provision requiring protection for companion animals in disasters. 196
King's amendment would extend the reach of Harris and further
undermine state laws that aim to improve animal welfare. As explained by
Bruce Friedrich of Farm Sanctuary, "King's amendment will create a race
to the regulatory bottom on issues from consumer protection to fire safety
to animal welfare by dictating that no state can require any condition on the

191. See, e.g., Downed Animal Protection Act of 1992, H.R. 5680, 102d Cong.
(1992); Downed Animal Protection Act, H.R. 453, 105th Cong. (1997); Downed
Animal Protection Act, H.R. 2519, 108th Cong. (2003); Downed Animal and Food
Safety Protection Act, H.R. 661, 110th Cong. (2007); Downed Animal and Food Safety
Protection Act, H.R. 3704, 112th Cong. (2011).
192. JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 46
193. Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2013, S. 954, 113th Cong. (2013).
194. RALPH M. CHITE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43076, THE 2013 FARM BILL: A
COMPARISON OF THE SENATE-PASSED (S.954) AND HOUSE-PASSED (H.R. 2642, H.R.
3102) BILLS WITH CURRENT LAW (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/

crs/misc/R43076.pdf.
195. Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2013, H.R. 2642,
ll3th Cong. § 11312 (2013).
196. See Nicole Greenstein, King Farm Bill Amendment Angers Animal Advocates,
TIME, Aug. 17, 2013, http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/17/kin-farm-bill-amendment
-angers-animal-advocates/.
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sale of any agricultural product that falls even one step above that of the
least restrictive state.' 97 The National Conference of State Legislatures
expressed similar concerns, 98 as did certain members of Congress, stating
in a letter to House Agriculture Committee ranking member Collin
Peterson - who indicated his support for the amendment' 99 - that it "has the
potential to repeal a vast array of state laws and regulations covering
everything from 0food
safety to environmental protection to child labor to
20
animal welfare.,
Fortunately, in January of 2014, this amendment was removed in
conference between the House and Senate and thus was not included in the
version of the bill ultimately enacted. 20 1 However, if such a provision was
enacted into law, it could extend the holding in Harristo innumerable other
state laws including those mentioned above that restrict the use of gestation
crates for pigs, battery cages for hens, and confinement pens for calves. At
the same time, another bill has been introduced in Congress that could
similarly undermine the efforts of California and other states to provide
better protections for hens. Amendments to the Egg Products Inspection
Act "would prevent states and localities from adopting requirements that

197. Bruce Friedrich, Farm Bill Could Overturn Dozens of State Laws. Why Does
Tea PartyDarling Steve King Want to Centralize Power in Washington?, HUFFINGTON
POST GREEN BLOG (Sept. 26, 2013, 8:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brucefriedrich/steve-king-the-tea-party-_b_3969209.html?utm hpref=green;
see
also
Kathleen Parker, Steve King's Inhumane Farm Bill Measure, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kathleen-parker-steve-kings-inhumane
-farm-bill-measure; Laura Sesana, The King Amendment to the Farm Bill Threatens
State's Rights, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013, http://communities.washington
times.com/neighborhood/world-our-backyard/2013/sep/28/king-amendment-farm-billthreatens-states-rights/; Leighton Woodhouse, Steve King's Farm Bill Amendment
Hurts Animals - and California Farmers, THE HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG (Sept. 5, 2013,
1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/ economy-a-budget/320449-stevekings-farm-bill-amendment-hurts-animals-and-california-farmers.
198. Letter from Terie Norelli & Bruce Starr, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures,
to Debbie Stabenow, Chair, Senate Agric., Nutrition & Forestry Comm., Frank Lucas,
Chair, House Agric. Comm., Thad Cochran, Ranking Member, Senate Agric., Nutrition
& Forestry Comm., & Collin Peterson, Ranking Member, House Agric. Comm. (Aug.
5, 2013) (on file with author).
199. "Tired of States Doing this Crap": Collin Peterson Backs Steve King's Scary
Farm Bill Amendment, BLUESTEM PRAIRIE, Aug. 26, 2013, http://www.
bluestemprairie.com/bluestemprairie/2013/08/tired-of-states-doing-this-crap-collinpeterson-backs-steve-kings-scary- farm-bill-amendment.html.
200. Letter from Members of Congress, to Collin Peterson, Ranking Member, House
Comm. on Agric. (Aug. 2, 2013) (on file with author).
201. See Michael Doyle, Farm Bill Deal Keeps California Rules Intact,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 27, 2014, 5:55 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolaIert latest/
2014/01/farm-bill-deal-keeps-califomia-rules-intact.html.
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exceed those outlined in the legislation regarding minimum floor space and
enrichments for egg-laying hens. 2 °2
Therefore, while Congress could reverse the damage done by the
Supreme Court in Harris and restore the state role in regulating public
health and animal welfare, it instead seems to be moving in the reverse
direction, further undermining the important state function in these areas.
For the time being, states are left impotent to protect their residents or to
legislate their own vision of justice or moral progress when it comes to
other animals.
VI. CONCLUSION

The incidents detailed in the introduction are just a few of the
innumerable instances of animal cruelty that are caught on tape every year,
often in front of USDA inspectors. And clearly, undercover investigations
only reveal a small portion. Moreover, at the same time that states are
being impeded in their ability to pass laws protecting animals, a number of
states are passing laws that make it illegal to gather the types of videos that
often serve as the only means of knowing what is occurring in our nation's
slaughterhouses and factory farms.2 °3
Our evolving conception of justice should be allowed to continue with
states operating at very different places on a moral continuum until the time
that the nation as a whole is prepared to adopt different conceptions of
morality. That does not mean that Congress cannot adopt a federal floor
under which states should not be permitted to fall below, but it should not
create a federal ceiling effectively halting state innovation and requiring
states to act contrary to their moral convictions. For the time being, states
like California are in an untenable situation. While either the Supreme
Court or Congress could remedy this situation, neither appears likely to do
so. USDA continues to fail to protect the food supply and the animals that
are a part of it, and states are prohibited from acting.
Legal scholar Maneesha Deckha has detailed how, throughout
Western history, animal protection measures have been utilized to condemn
the activities of marginalized populations while the comparable activities of

202. JOHNS HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 26.
203. See Sara Lacy, Hard to Watch: How Ag-Gag Laws Demonstrate the Need for
FederalMeat and Poultry Industry Whistleblower Protections, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 127,
128-29 (2013); AM. Soc'Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
http://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower-suppressionlegislation (last visited May 15, 2014).
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mainstream groups have gone uncritiqued.2 °4 While numerous ways we
treat other animals are now nearly universally condemned, the daily torture
of the billions of animals that are killed each year for food goes largely
unassessed. This dynamic was likely at play in the Supreme Court's
decision in Harris. While other courts had little difficulty upholding laws
banning the slaughter of horses, the Supreme Court justices were unwilling
to extend that rationale to the slaughter of animals whose consumption is
readily accepted as normal and appropriate by most Americans. Attorney
Matthew Liebman has discussed how this reality makes creative advocacy
25
for animals in the courts difficult.
Our history regarding animals indicates evolving conceptions of
justice that are radically different state by state. While many people may
find laws aimed at protecting farmed animals absurd - just as most
Americans found laws banning dogfighting absurd a century ago - that
does not mean that those Americans who want to pass such laws should be
prevented from doing so. Rather, this is precisely why these issues need to
be left to the purview of the states, allowing states to serve as laboratories
for the evolving moral compass of the country. As the Supreme Court
stated recently in United States v. Windsor, striking down the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, "[t]he dynamics of state government in the
federal system are to allow the formation of consensus respecting the way
the members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact
and constant interaction with each other., 20 6 The same is true for our
treatment of other animals.

204.

Deckha, supra note 15, at 515; see also Maneesha Deckha, Toward a

Postcolonial, Posthumanist Feminist Theory: Centralizing Race and Culture in

Feminist Work on Nonhuman Animals, 27 HYPATIA 527, 538 (2012). For example,
Americans readily condemn dogfighting, cockfighting, and shark finning, which are
associated with African-Americans, Latin Americans, and Asians respectively.
205. See generally Matthew Liebman, Who the Judge Ate for Breakfast: On the
Limits of Creativity in Animal Law and the Redeeming Power of Powerlessness, 18
ANIM. L. 133 (2011).

206.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
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I. INTRODUCTION
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio spent much of his time during
his successful 2013 campaign positioning himself as the populist candidate,
pointedly contrasting himself with the outgoing mayor, billionaire Michael
Bloomberg.2 There is one Bloomberg initiative, however, that de Blasio
has committed to carry forward: the city-wide size restriction on sales of
"sugary drinks," most commonly, carbonated sodas.3 On city public health
issues such as the sugary drink policy, the populist de Blasio and the
billionaire Bloomberg would appear to have much in common. "People are
dying every day, this is not a joke," remarked Bloomberg in striking a
populist tone in defense of his initiative.4
In September of 2012 the New York City Board of Health adopted the
"Portion Cap Rule," adding section 81.53 to the New York City Health
Code prohibiting the sale of "sugary drinks" in containers exceeding
sixteen ounces.' A "sugary drink" is defined as a "carbonated or noncarbonated beverage that is non-alcoholic,.., sweetened.., with sugar or
another caloric sweetener,... has greater than 25 calories per 8 [fluid]
ounces,... and does not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk
substitute by volume." 6 The Portion Cap Rule would have applied to "food
service establishments," defined as "a place where food is provided for
individual portion service directly to the consumer whether such food is
provided free of charge or sold, and whether consumption occurs on or off
the premises or is provided from a pushcart, stand or vehicle.", 7 This would
have included restaurants, movie theaters, sports venues, coffee shops,
pizza shops, delicatessens, food trucks, and street carts. 8
A lawsuit challenging the Portion Cap Rule was filed less than one
month later by a broad coalition of groups, including the National

2.

Michael Grynbaum, Taking Office, de Blasio Vows to Fix Inequity, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/nyregion/bill-de-blasio-inauguration.
html? r=0.
3.

Kate Taylor, De Blasio Names Ex-Bloomberg Official as Health Chief But

Vows New Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/
01/1 7/nyregion/de-blasio-names-ex-bloomberg-official-as-health-chief-but-vows-new-

approach.html.
4.

Ross Barkan, Michael Bloomberg Defends Soda Ban on Grounds that 'People

Are Dying Everyday,' N.Y. OBSERVER, Mar. 11, 2013, http://observer.com/
2013/03/michael-bloomberg-de fends-soda-ban-on-grounds-that-people-are-dyingeveryday/.
5. N.Y.C., N.Y. HEALTH CODE § 81.53 (2012).
6. N.Y.C., N.Y. HEALTH CODE § 81.53(a) (2012).
7. N.Y.C., N.Y. HEALTH CODE § 81.03(s) (2012).
8. N.Y.C., N.Y. HEALTH CODE §§ 81.53(b)-(c) (2012).
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Restaurant Association, the National Association of Theatre Owners of
New York State, and the New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce. 9 Cries of a Bloomberg "nanny state" rang out
across the media and blogosphere. 10 Criticism was not limited to industry
groups and right-leaning media: the Portion Cap Rule was also criticized by
Hazel Dukes, the President of the NAACP New York State Conference,
and others putatively concerned with public health and communities of
color, on the grounds that this policy deprived consumers of freedom of
choice, that it was not enough, and that it discriminated against minorityowned businesses." This latter opposition was surprising since excess
12
sugary drink consumption has been tied to elevated rates of obesity, 3
especially in communities of color, which have been particularly hard-hit.
At any rate, the Portion Cap Rule remains in legal limbo. New York
Supreme Court Judge Milton Tingling enjoined New York from
implementing it, declaring section 81.53 to be invalid, 14 and a state appeals
court has upheld that ruling.' 5 The New York State Court of Appeal will

9. New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York
City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, at *1-2

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2013).
10. Karen Hamed, The Michael Bloomberg Nanny State in New York: A Cautionary
Tale, FORBES, May 10, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/05/10/the-

michael-bloomberg-nanny-state-in-new-york-a-cautionary-tale/; Katrina Trinko, Soda
Ban? What About Personal Choice?, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/03/10/soda-ban-what-about-personalchoice-column/1977091/.
11. Hazel N. Dukes, Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Ban: Misdirected and ShortSighted, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 27, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hazel-n-

dukes/ny-soda-ban b 1834816.html; Letitia James & Melissa Mark-Viverito, Why the
Soda Ban Won't Work, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 27, 2012, http://www.huffington

post.comletitia-james/nyc-soda-ban b_ 1652169.html.
12. See, e.g., Adolfo J. Ariza et al., Risk Factorsfor Overweight in Five- to SixYear-Old Hispanic-AmericanChildren: A Pilot Study, 81 J. URB. HEALTH: BULL. N.Y.
ACAD. MED. 150, 150 (2004); see also infra, notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTOR

SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEM
BRIEF No.
1304
3 (2011),
available at
http://www.health.ny.gov/statistics/brfss/reports/docs/1304_overweight-andobesity.p
df.
14. New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 2013 WL
1343607 at *20-21.

15. Matter of New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v.
New York City Dep't. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2013).
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review the rule in 2014.16 The biggest legal problem with the Portion Cap
Rule appears to be that it needed to be legislatively enacted by the New
17
York City Council, and not just implemented by administrative fiat.
The problem of obesity is quite serious, however, such that public
health officials now describe it as an "epidemic."' 8 Of particular concern
are new findings that obesity seems to be locked in at a surprisingly young
age - most children who are obese by the age of eleven remain obese for
the rest of their lives.' 9 Sugary drinks, while not the entire cause of the
epidemic, provide a large infusion of calories for a large fraction of the
population, and appear to be a major contributor to obesity. 20 Moreover,
sugary drink consumption and obesity give rise to other, more serious
21
health conditions, including type 2 diabetes and coronary heart disease.
Given the continuing importance of the problem, some quantitative
analysis would appear to be useful, especially in light of the incendiary
rhetoric surrounding the Portion Cap Rule. This article seeks to refocus the
debate on sugary drink regulation by setting forth a rough cost-benefit
analysis of sugary drink regulations, such as the New York City Portion
Cap Rule. This article seeks to answer the following question: if the
Portion Cap Rule had been implemented, would it likely have generated
more monetizable health benefits than it would cost sellers of sugary
drinks? Of course, this is not the only criteria by which the Portion Cap
Rule should ultimately be judged. Non-monetizable ethical concerns
shadow the outcome of any cost-benefit analysis, and the sugary drink ban
raises quite a few of them. Most of the benefits of sugary drink
consumption are derived from the extraordinarily high profit margins on
sugary drinks such as carbonated soda, while providing virtually no
nutritional value to consumers. However, given the amount of controversy
generated by the Portion Cap Rule, some cooler discussion would appear to

16. Michael Grynbaum, New York Soda Ban to Go Before State's Top Court, NY
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, http://www. nytimes.com/2013/10/18/nyregion/new-york-sodaban-to-go-before-states-top-court.html.
17. Matter of New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce, 970
N.Y.S.2d at 10-12 (stating that "[i]n sum, we find that... the Board of Health
overstepped the boundaries of its lawfully delegated authority when it promulgated the
Portion Cap Rule to curtail the consumption of soda drinks. It therefore violated the
state principle of separation of powers").
18.

CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

&

PREVENTION,

THE

OBESITY

EPIDEMIC,

http://www.cdc.gov/CDCTV/ obesityEpidemic/index.html (last visited May 19, 2014).
19. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Obesity Is Found to Gain.Its Hold in Earliest Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/science/obesity-takes-holdearly-in-life-study-finds.html?_r=0.
20. See, e.g., Ariza et al., supra note 11.
21. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 17.
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be warranted. Some effort to consider the costs and benefits of sugary
drink regulation may provide a different perspective on the muchtrumpeted liberty of palate.
This article performs a cost-benefit analysis for New York City not
only because of the controversy surrounding the Portion Cap Rule, but also
because a public health initiative aimed at reducing sugary drink
consumption and concomitant obesity seems especially appropriate for a
major city. Many public health programs are carried out at the local level,
such that addressing a problem such as obesity in a holistic fashion would
best be undertaken by local government. This article aims to provide
guidance for local governments considering sugary drink regulation.
II.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

This study is limited in an important way: it estimates the total profits
derived from sales of sugary drinks in New York City (the reduction of
these sales would be the compliance costs), and the total health costs
attributable to sugary drink consumption (the reduction of these costs
would be the benefits). In other words, this study does not actually perform
a cost-benefit analysis of the Portion Cap Rule itself, but rather of a total
ban of sugary drinks within New York City. While such a total ban is
impractical, it helps to place some perspective on the trade-offs of any
sugary drink restriction for a discrete jurisdiction such as New York City.
Undertaking this larger but simpler analysis also avoids the need to guess at
the effectiveness of the Portion Cap Rule in reducing sugary drink
consumption. Whether the Portion Cap Rule would induce people to
consume less soda, or whether it would induce people buy multiple drinks
or cross the street and buy a large soda from a non-regulated vendor, is a
matter that would require too much conjecture, and would, in the end, be
unlikely to change the conclusion of this analysis.
This simplified approach can also be justified because if an
epidemiological link between sugary drink consumption and health
outcomes can be made, then it does not matter how effective the Portion
Cap Rule would actually be. If the health benefits of a total ban outweigh
the compliance costs of a total ban, then any measure short of a total ban is
also likely to generate net benefits. In other words, this analysis assumes
that both compliance costs and health benefits scale linearly with
effectiveness of any regulatory attempt; if the Portion Cap Rule managed to
reduce consumption by twenty percent, it would reduce both sugary drink
profits and sugary drink-induced health costs by twenty percent. To the
extent that sugary drink consumption contributes to health costs, this
assumption seems very reasonable. The only goal is thus to determine if
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generally, the compliance costs of sugary drink restrictions are greater than
health benefits.
The approach of this analysis is as follows: the costs of sugary drink
regulation are estimated as the total profits of sugary drink sales in New
York City, so that a sugary drink ban will result in a loss of these profits as
a societal cost. As discussed below, this analysis will only focus on certain
sellers of sugary drinks. The benefits of the sugary drink regulation are
estimated as the health costs attributable to sugary drink consumption, so
that a sugary drink ban will result in health benefits in the form of avoided
illness, medical treatment costs, lost productivity, and premature mortality.
Working from national data on the health costs of obesity, type 2 diabetes,
and coronary heart disease (CHD), this analysis scales down in two stages:
(i) calculating the fraction of national health costs specific to New York
City, and (ii) calculating the fraction of these New York City-specific costs
attributable to sugary drink consumption. In addition, this analysis
estimates the number of premature deaths attributable to sugary drink
consumption. The City of New York provides statistics on deaths and
underlying causes, but again, some scaling-down is required to determine
which of those deaths can be attributed to sugary drink consumption.
III. COSTS OF THE RULE
This article estimates the economic cost of sugary drink regulation as
the lost profits from prohibited sales of sugary drinks. I ignore any
nutritional and caloric benefits of sugary drinks; a plethora of healthier
sources of caloric intake exist. I also do not attempt to estimate the
consumer's surplus of sugary drink regulation. There no doubt exists some
hedonic benefit to the taste of a sugary drinks; so, too, with cigarettes. At
least for sugary drinks there exist low-calorie substitutes, such as diet
drinks and perhaps even just plain water. In light of the possibility of
substitution, the loss in consumer's surplus by having to switch from a
sugary drink to a diet drink is assumed to be small.
In fact, if there is a bias in the costs of this analysis, it is to
overestimate the costs to sugary drink sellers. If a total or partial ban on
sugary drink sales were implemented, there would likely be a great deal of
substitution of diet drinks, which would not be covered by sugary drink
regulation (the Portion Cap Rule did not). This substitution would recoup
much of the lost profits to sellers, as almost every sugary drink seller also
sells diet drinks.
Sugary drinks are sold by many different kinds of sellers, but this
analysis focuses only on three: (i) full-service restaurants, (ii) limitedservice restaurants, and (iii) convenience stores. There is reason to believe
that the costs would be concentrated in these three types of establishments,
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as they are the primary sellers of sugary drinks that are dispensed through
fountains. Movie theaters also dispense sugary drinks from fountains, and
in fact account for about twenty percent of theater profits.22 However, the
profits for New York City's thirty-nine theaters from sales of sugary drinks
are so small - under this analysis, two orders of magnitude smaller than the
overall total estimate - that they are excluded from this analysis as
insignificant.23 Obviously, movie theater owners would disagree: the
National Association of Theater Owners cared enough to join in the lawsuit
challenging the Portion Cap Rule. But in terms of societal gains and losses
from sugary drink consumption, movie theater profits do not register a
large economic impact.
This analysis also excludes upstream profits, such as those of drink
manufacturers such as the Coca-Cola Company. They are substantial:
Coca-Cola reported 2012 net operating revenues of about $48 billion, with
net income of $9.02 billion, yielding a net profit margin of 18.8%.24 But
the profits of Atlanta-based Coca-Cola and other manufacturers are
external to New York City, and are thus excluded from the cost side of this
analysis.

22. National Association of Theater Owners Executive Director Robert Sunshine
was quoted as saying that "[s]oda accounts for 20 percent of theater profits." Chris
Dolmetsch & Henry Goldman, New York Soda Size Limit Statute Barred by State
Judge, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0311 /new-york-city-soda-size-limitations-barred-by-state-court-judge.html.
23. There are thirty-nine movie theaters in New York City with a total of 250
screens. This figure was obtained by visiting the website NYC.com, which allows for
searching for movie theaters by neighborhood. By searching in all neighborhoods
offered in the drop-down menu, we were able to survey all thirty-nine theaters and
ascertain the number of screens for each theater. Revenues for these New York City
movie theaters are unknown, but revenues for AMC Entertainment's 4988 screens
across the United States were about $2.65 billion, generating pre-tax profits of about
$58 million. AMC ENTERTAINMENT INC, FORM 8-K, CURRENT REPORT, FILED WITH THE
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO § 13 OR § 15(D)

OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT (Mar.
13, 2013), available at
http://investor.amctheatres.com/Cache/16284513.pdf?IID=4171292&FID= 16284513&
O =3&OSID=9. This translates into a profit of about $11,630 per screen. Assuming
that twenty percent of New York City theaters' profit is derived from sales of sugary
drinks, New York City's 250 screens only derive a total profit of about $580,000 from

the sales of sugary drinks.
24. The COCA-COLA COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO § 13 OR § 15(D) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31,
2012 29 (Item 6: Selected Financial Data) (Feb. 27, 2013), available at

http://ir.thecoca-colacompany.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=94566&p=irol-sec. The profits of
Coca-Cola include profits from Dasani, bottled water that would not be part of any
sugary drink regulation, and do not contribute to adverse health outcomes.
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From the local, retail perspective, this analysis focuses on profits from
selling sugary drinks dispensed from soda fountains because those profits
are exceptionally high, while those from packaged sodas are generally very
low. Profit margins on fountain-dispensed sugary drinks are very high.
The best estimate of the average price of a fountain-dispensed sugary drink
served in New York City is $2.53.25 A typical cost of the syrup for a
twelve ounce soda is about $0.21.26 Allowing liberally for another $0.05
for transportation costs, the cost of cups, lids, and straws, and for a fraction
of personnel time, yields an estimated profit margin of about ninety
percent.
By contrast, the retail profit margin on packaged sugary drinks (not
fountain-dispensed) appears to be exceptionally low. Data on the retail
profitability of sugary drinks outside of full-service and limited-service
restaurants is spotty, but the available information strongly suggests that
the profit margin on bottled drinks and drinks in cans is miniscule in
comparison with fountain-dispensed drinks. For example, in 2009, the
warehouse retailer Costco announced it would stop selling Coca-Cola
products, a stunning announcement from the world's largest warehouse
retailer involving the world's largest drink manufacturer.27 For a firm with
Costco's very small profit margin - 2.5%28 - a decision (which was
eventually reversed) to discontinue sales of Coca-Cola products is
testimony to the infinitesimal margins enjoyed by retailers of Coca-Cola.
If Costco prices are close to wholesale - and the 2009 incident suggests it
is - then comparing Costco prices and New York City retail prices could
reveal at least a rough estimate of profit margins. Costco Business
Delivery, the company arm specializing in delivering Costco bulk products
to retail businesses, advertises that it will sell a thirty-two-pack of twelve
ounce cans of Coca-Cola for $12.18,29 or an average of $0.38 per can. The
2013 Statistical Yearbook of Non-Alcoholic Beverages reports an average

25.

See Data Shows Soft Drink Price Highly Variable Throughout Country,

Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/O4/07/idUS109820+07Apr-2008+BW20080407; See also For Some, RestaurantSoft Drink Price Spike Tough
to Swallow, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Nov. 12, 2012, http://www.wtsp.com/
rss/article/28270 1/250/For-some-soft-drink-price-spike-tough-to-swallow.
26. See Home Soda Fountains,MARK POWERS & Co., http://www.markpowers-andcompany.com/PageHome Fountain.htm (last visited May 19, 2014); Wilton
Marburger, Costing Out Soda & Free Refills - How to Price Soda, PATE DAWSON CO.,
http://www. pdco.com/node/88289 (last visited May 19, 2014).
27. Bruce Watson, Costco Yanks Coca-Cola From its Shelves, but Don't Cry for
Coke, DAILYFINANCE, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/1 1/18/costcoyanks-coca-cola-from-its-shelves-but-dont-cry-for-coke/.
28. Id.
29. COSTCO, http://www2.costco.com (last visited May 19, 2014).
REUTERS,
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retail price in New York City of $3.49 per twelve-pack,30 or $0.29 per can.
This back-of-the-envelope calculation obviously does not represent
economic realities, as New York soda vendors have clearly figured out a
way to avoid losing money selling Coca-Cola and other sugary drinks. But
even such a rough order of magnitude calculation suggests that the profit
margins are very, very small. It is particularly revealing that while New
York City residents suffer a high cost of living, 3' they still pay about the
same amount for packaged soda as do their counterparts in cheaper cities
such as Dallas, Phoenix, and Minneapolis, and in fact less than the average
American city-dweller. 32 This suggests that New York City retailers of
Coca-Cola enjoy very low economic leverage and derive very little profit
from selling sugary drinks such as Coca-Cola.
Finally, even if New York City-specific retail and distributor profits
were to be included, it would not be likely to change the results. If the
roughly $9 billion profits of Coca-Cola were spread evenly throughout the
country and New York City contributed its population's share, Coca-Cola's
net profits for New York City would be about $240 million. 33 Nationwide,
Coca-Cola holds about a thirty-five percent market share for packaged
drinks.34 If we assumed unreasonably liberally that retailers and
distributors were taking as large a chunk of the profits as all drink
manufacturers such as Coca-Cola, that would still only add about $750
million to the cost side of the ledger which, as will be seen below, would
not change the outcome of this analysis.

30.

BEVERAGE DIGEST, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF NoN-ALCOHOLIc BEVERAGES,

2013 160 (Table F-i) (on file with author).
31. See, e.g., Jason McCormick, 10 Most Expensive Places to Live in the U.S., CBS
MONEYWATCH, Apr. 5, 2013, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/10-most-expensiveplaces-to-live-in-the-u-s- 163648923.html.
32. BEVERAGE DIGEST, supra note 29, at Table F-2 (showing average retail prices
for soda for many U.S. cities; shows New York City prices as a slightly below the
United States average of $3.72 per twelve pack).
33. The population of New York City in 2012 was estimated by the United States
Census Bureau to be 8,336,697.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY
QUICKFACTS, NEW YORK (CITY), NEW YORK, http://quickfacts.census. gov/
qfd/states/36/3651000.html (last visited May 19, 2014). The population of the United
States in 2012 was estimated to be 313,873,685. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE &
COUNTY QUICKFACTS, USA, http://quickfacts.census. gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last
visited May 19, 2014). Taking this fraction, 0.0266, and multiplying it by Coca-Cola's
total profits of $9 billion, yields an estimated New York City-specific profit of $240
million.
34. BEVERAGE DIGEST, supra note 29, at 55.
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According to the 2007 U.S. Census,3 5 New York has 7265 full-service
restaurants3 6 (which include steakhouses and pizza parlors,37 in addition to
New York's famously expensive restaurants), and 5427 limited-service
(mostly fast-food) restaurants. 38 Total revenues were approximately $7.48
billion and $2.94 billion, respectively. 39 Approximately 6% of revenues of
full-service restaurants are from non-alcoholic beverage sales,4 ° which is
assumed to be sugary drinks, and 4% of revenues of limited-service
restaurants are derived from the sale of sugary drinks.41 Assuming a 90%
profit margin (as derived above), the profits from sugary drink sales from
full-service and limited-service restaurants in New York City are estimated
to be $404 million and $106 million, respectively.
There were 554 convenience stores in New York City in 2007, with
total revenues of $241,787,000. 42 Nationally, sales of "cold, dispensed
drinks" - sugary drinks from fountains - account for about 11.3% of
convenience store sales, 43 suggesting (if national numbers can be applied to
New York City convenience stores) that about $25 million of convenience
store revenue in New York City can be attributed to the sale of cold,
dispensed drinks. 44
All of these calculations are set forth in tabular form below. The total
costs, in terms of foregone local profits, of a ban on selling sugary drinks in
New York City, is estimated to be roughly $534 million.

35. This analysis uses 2007 Census data because more recent data is not available.
Of necessity, this analysis assumes negligible change in the number of establishments
between 2007 and the years in which other data are collected for this study.
36. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FACTFINDER QUERY ON JANUARY 24, 2014 (printed query
on file with author).
37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Id. The more precise figure reported for full-service restaurants was
$7,484,339,000, and for limited-service restaurants was $2,937,078,000.
40. CliI A. TLAPA, RICHARD K. MILLER, & KELLI WASHINGTON, THE 2010
RESTAURANT, FOOD & BEVERAGE MARKET RESEARCH HANDBOOK 20 (2011), available
at http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/
docs/160/210698/The 2010
Restaurant,_Food &.pdf. In full-service restaurants. 15% of revenues are from sales of
alcoholic beverages, leaving 6% from non-alcoholic beverages. HOOVERS, CASUAL
RESTAURANTS INDUSTRY

OVERVIEW,

http://www.hoovers.com/industry-facts.casual-

restaurants.1443.html (last visited May 19, 2014) (printed query on file with author).
41. TLAPA ETAL.,supra note 39, at 20.
42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 35.
43. Convenience Store Sales Topped $700 Billion, ASS'N FOR CONVENIENCE & FUEL
RETAILING, Apr. 10, 2013, http://www.nacsonline.com/News/Daily/Pages/ND0410131
.aspx#. UumsxPuymB4.
44. Id. The more precise estimate is $24,589,738.
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Table 1
Full-service
restaurants
(a) Number in NYC
(b) Revenues ($1000)
(c) Fraction of revenues
from non-alcoholic
drinks
(d) Profit margin
(e) Profits from sales of
non-alcoholic drinks
($1000) [(b) x (c) x (d)]
Total profits from
sales of non-alcoholic
drinks (assumed to be
sugary drinks) ($1000)

Convenience
stores

7265
$7,484,339
0.06

Limitedservice
restaurants
5427
$2,937,078
0.04

0.90
$404,154

0.90
$105,735

0.90
$24,590

554
$241,787
0.113

$534,479

IV. BENEFITS OF THE RULE
This study estimates the benefits of sugary drink consumption by
making a rough calculation of the monetized health benefits of curtailing
sugary drink consumption. Most of the known adverse health outcomes
stem from the contribution that sugary drinks make in making people
obese. Treatment of obesity and the costs of obesity are expensive, but
obesity imposes further costs if it persists, leading to Type 2 diabetes ,4
coronary heart disease (CHD), and a variety of cancers.46 There is good
reason to believe that communities of color would reap greater-thanaverage net health benefits. In New York State, obesity rates are 23.6% for
non-Hispanic whites, but 26.3% for Hispanics and 32.5% for non-Hispanic
blacks. 47 The overall rate of obesity in New York City is 22.1%.48 But

45. Type 2 diabetes is largely overlapping with diabetes mellitus. Melissa C.
St6ppler, Diabetes Mellitus, MEDICINENET (last visited May 20, 2014), http://www.
medicinenet.com/diabetes mellitus/page5.htm #type 2 diabetes.
46. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 12, at 3.
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diabetes rates in New York City are more than twice as high for Hispanics
and non-Hispanic blacks as they are for whites.49
This analysis undertakes two different approaches to estimating the
health benefits of regulating sugary drink consumption. The first approach
focuses on the two major negative health outcomes stemming from obesity:
type 2 diabetes and CHD. Drawing on nationwide data from the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) on the costs of treating and stemming from type
2 diabetes and CHD, and on epidemiological data on the link between
sugary drink consumption and the two diseases, national cost data is scaled
down to New York City to determine the costs of type 2 diabetes and CHD
suffered in New York City. These estimates are scaled down again to
determine the fraction attributable to sugary drink consumption.
The second approach, instead of focusing on specific diseases
resulting from sugary drink consumption, considers the costs of obesity
generally, and attempts to attribute a fraction of the obesity problem from
sugary drink consumptions. Nationwide data on the costs of obesity from
the CDC is scaled down to its incidence for New York City. And as with
the diabetes and CHD estimates, this figure is then scaled down again using
epidemiological research to determine the fraction of those health costs
attributable to sugary drink consumption.
Both of these approaches likely underestimate the health benefits of
curbing sugary drink consumption, because of the other negative health
outcomes that may be attributable to sugary drink consumption. For
example, researchers are now investigating the possibility that sugary drink
consumption leads to pancreatic cancer" and endometrial cancer.51 Other
causal pathways probably exist linking sugary drink consumption with
negative health outcomes. But this part of the analysis focuses only on
those for which a known and studied link exists between sugary drink
consumption and negative health outcomes.
Both approaches also necessitate an additional calculation to estimate
for the costs of premature mortality attributable to sugary drink
consumption. CDC estimates of the national costs of obesity, type 2

49. N.Y.C.

DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, DIABETES IN NEW YORK CITY:

1-2 (figure 1-8) (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/htmi/doh/downloads/pdf/epi/ diabeteschartbook.pdf.
50. See generally Eva S. Schernhammer et al., Sugar-Sweetened Soft Drink
PUBLIC HEALTH BURDEN AND DISPARITIES

Consumption and Risk of Pancreatic Cancer in Two Prospective Cohorts, 14 CANCER

2098 (2005).
51. Maki Inoue-Choi et al., Sugar-SweetenedBeverage Intake and the Risk of Type I
and Type H Endometrial Cancer Among Postmenopausal Women, 22 CANCER
EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 2384 (2013).
EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION
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diabetes, and CHD do not include the costs of premature mortality. 52 This
is a very significant omission, because the cost of premature mortality
potentially adds significantly to the benefit side of the ledger. If one adopts
the EPA's value of a statistical life for mortality risk valuation - $7.4
million 53 - then one can imagine that the cost of even a relatively small
number of deaths could swamp other benefit and costs considerations.
Notwithstanding some uncertainty regarding the causal pathways to
premature mortality, some linkage must certainly exist. The wellestablished linkages between sugary drink consumption and obesity, type 2
diabetes, and CHD, combined with the sheer number of cases and nontrivial mortality rates, very strongly suggest that sugary drink consumption
produces some premature deaths. It would be a very curious omission to
exclude these estimates.
A. Approach One: Costs of Type 2 Diabetesand CoronaryHeart Disease
Attributable to Sugary Drink Consumption
The first approach requires separate estimates of the cost of diabetes
and of CHD. New York City does not collect this specific data, so an
estimate of these costs for New York City must start with data at the
national level, and then be scaled down to reflect New York City's share of
national costs. New York City residents do not suffer diabetes or CHD at
the same rate as Americans generally, so something more refined than a
raw population-based scaling-down is called for. Once city-wide figures of
total costs for diabetes and for CHD are estimated, some estimate of the
fraction attributable to sugary drink consumption is needed. For both
diabetes and for CHD, some epidemiological studies producing something
akin to dose-response relationships exist, and are combined in this analysis
with consumption data to determine the fraction of cases of diabetes and
CHD that are attributable to sugary drink consumption.

52.

2011

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES FACT SHEET,

(2011),

available at

http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/pdf/ndfs 201 .pdf

[hereinafter 2011 Fact Sheet]; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEART

DISEASE FACTS, http://www.cdc.gov/heartdisease/facts.htm (last visited May 20, 2014).
53. NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS ON MORTALITY RISK VALUATION, http://yosemite.epa.gov/

EE%5Cepa%5Ceed.nsf/webpages/MortalityRiskValuation.html
2014).

(last visited May 20,

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 10

1. Diabetes
a. Direct andIndirect Costs

The CDC reports that type 2 diabetes costs the United States $174
billion annually. 54 This estimate includes direct costs such as the cost of
medical treatment, as well as indirect costs such as lost productivity costs.
This estimate is derived from a 2008 study,55 and so is a bit dated. The
study also warns that this is likely an underestimate because of a number of
other hard-to-quantify costs. 56 Nevertheless, this study provides a starting

point for an estimate of the benefits of restricting sugary drink
consumption. This CDC estimate does not include the costs of premature
mortality. An estimate of the costs of premature mortality attributable to
sugary drink consumption is undertaken in the latter part of this section.
The next question is what fraction of these costs occurs in New York
City. A simple scaling-down by population of these national costs is
inappropriate, because that would assume that type 2 diabetes occurs at the
same rate in New York City as it does nationally. In fact, there is reason to
suspect that New York City suffers diabetes at a rate lower than the
national average. The CDC reports that based on an analysis of death
certificates, 231,404 deaths occurred in 2010 nationally in which type 2
diabetes was a major or contributing factor.57 New York City reports that
in 2010, 1711 deaths occurred from diabetes mellitus, or more commonly,
type 2 diabetes.5 8 Death from type 2 diabetes takes place against the
backdrop of overall deaths, and it is important to ascertain whether diabetes
claims a larger or smaller fraction of lives in New York City than
nationally. The answer is that New York City deaths from type 2 diabetes
are about a third that of the national fraction of diabetes deaths to all
deaths,5 9 suggesting that diabetes occurs with much less frequency in New

54. 2011 FactSheet, supra note 51.
55. See generally Am. Diabetes Ass'n, Economic Costs of Diabetes in the U.S. in
2007, 31 DIABETES CARE 596 (2008), available at http://care.diabetesjournals.org/
content31/3/596.full.pdf+html.
56. Id. (noting that "[t]he actual national burden of diabetes is likely to exceed the
$174 billion estimate because it omits the social cost of intangibles such as pain and
suffering, care provided by nonpaid caregivers, excess medical costs associated with
undiagnosed diabetes, and diabetes-attributed costs for health care expenditures
categories omitted from this study").
57. Id.
58. Strppler, supra note 44.
59. In 2010, 1711 New York City residents died from type 2 diabetes, out of 52,575
total New York City deaths, about 3.25 percent. 2011 Fact Sheet, supra note 51, at 7.
Nationally, 231,404 Americans died from type 2 diabetes, out of 2,468,435 total
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York City than nationally. It is difficult to know whether this difference is
due to differences in measurement, differences in definition, or if it is truly
because New Yorkers suffer from type 2 diabetes much less than the
average American. But it is impossible to ignore the discrepancy and make
the assumption that the incidence of type 2 diabetes is the same in New
York City as it is nationally. For this reason, this analysis uses the ratio of
New York diabetes deaths to national diabetes deaths (1711 / 231,404) as
the estimate of New York City's share of national overall costs of type 2
diabetes. 6° New York City's cost of type 2 diabetes is estimated to be
roughly $1.29 billion,61 out of the national total of $174 billion. This
excludes (for now) the costs of premature mortality from type 2 diabetes,
which is calculated separately below. The ratio is only utilized here to
make a reasonable estimate of how to scale down national costs (excluding
death) to New York City costs (excluding death).
Table 262

(a) National cost of type 2 diabetes ($1000)
(b) National deaths from type 2 diabetes

$174,000,000
231,404

(c) New York City deaths from type 2 diabetes
Cost to New York City from type 2 diabetes ($1000) [(a)
x (c)/(b)]

1711
$1,287,000

Having estimated New York City's share of the national cost of type
2 diabetes, it remains to be estimated what fraction of these New York
City-specific costs are attributable to sugary drink consumption, as opposed
to other risk factors. Key to the analysis was Schulze et al. ,63 which studied
the link between sugary drink consumption and type 2 diabetes in young
and middle-aged women. This article is important because it breaks out
sugary drink consumption by different levels of consumption and estimates
the resulting risk relative to non-drinkers. 64 This is the leading study which

American deaths, or 9.37 percent, almost three times the New York City fraction.
CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

& PREVENTION,

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/

deaths.htm (last visited May 20, 2014).
60. Id.
61. The more precise figure is $1,286,555,116. Am. Diabetes Ass'n., supra note 54,
at 596.
62. Id.
63. See generally Matthias B. Schulze et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, Weight
Gain, and Incidence of Type 2 Diabetes in Young and Middle-Aged Women, 292
JAMA 927 (2004).
64. Id. at 927.
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attempts to establish, in rough terms, an effective dose-response
relationship between sugary drink consumption and type 2 diabetes.65
The limitation of this study to one gender and certain age groups is
obviously non-ideal. But careful and credible studies are often limited for
purposes of studying a specific causal pathway. This analysis takes these
studies as the best available estimates for the incremental effects of sugary
drink consumption on type 2 diabetes risk.
This part of the study also produced some data-matching problems, as
exploiting this kind of dose-response information requires some data on
how many people consume how many sugary drinks. For New York City,
three possible sources of estimates exist: (i) a New York Times poll
conducted in August 2012;66 (ii) a CDC survey conducted from 2005 to
2008;67 and (iii) a New York City Community Health survey conducted
from 2007 to 2009.68 Ideally, data could identify how many New Yorkers
consumed one to six drinks per week, one or two drinks per day, and two or
more drinks per day. None of the surveys fit that bill. The most
appropriate of these surveys is the CDC survey, because it provided a
relationship between calories of consumption from sugary drinks each day
with a percentage of the population. 69 That is, given a particular amount of
sugary drink consumption, the CDC data provided an estimate of how
many people consumed that given amount.70 Reassuringly, these fractions,
based on national survey data, appear to be fairly consistent with the
available New York City consumption figures. This CDC consumption
data is then combined with the dose-response relationships in Schulze et al.
into estimates of how many New Yorkers were exposed to an increased
risk over baseline of type 2 diabetes. In Table 3 below, this consumption

65. Id.
66.

New York Times's Public Opinion Poll,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, http://www.

nytimes.com/interactive/2012/08/22/nyregion/22nyc-poll.html?ref -nyregion.
67. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR DRINKS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2005-2008, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS DATA BRIEF No. 71 (2011),

available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db71 .pdf.
68.

N.Y.C.

SWEETENED

DEP'T OF HEALTH

BEVERAGES

IN

& MENTAL HYGIENE, CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR

NEW

YORK

CITY

2

(2011),

available

at

http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/epi/datatable4.pdf.
69. OGDEN ET AL., supra note 66, at 1-2.
70. Consumption data used for this study was obtained graphically, from a graph
with calories of sugary drink consumption on the vertical axis, and the cumulative
fraction of the population consuming that amount on the horizontal axis. Ogden et al.,
supra note 68, at 3 (fig. 3). The consumption data should thus be considered
approximate. A twelve ounce can of Coca-Cola contains 140 calories, all of it from

sugar. SUGAR

STACKS, BEVERAGES,

visited May 20, 2014).

http://www.sugarstacks.com/beverages.htm (last
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data is used to estimate how many New York City residents consume these
certain amounts of sugary drinks (in rows (a) and (b) in Table 3 below).
Schulze et al. estimated the relative risk (RR)7 of different levels of
sugary drink consumption. 72 RR is the ratio of the heightened risk (due to
exposure to the risky condition; in Schulze et al., drinking soda) to the
baseline risk (the background risk faced by a population not exposed to the
risk; in Schulze et al., non-soda drinkers or very low soda drinkers).7 3
These are expressed as the incidence of risk for each level of sugary drink
consumption, ranging from less than one per month to more than one drink
per day.74 RR can be translated into the amount of heightened risk,
experienced annually, of diabetes produced by drinking sugary drinks.75
This in turn can be translated into an estimated number of individuals that
will be diagnosed with diabetes as a result of sugary drink consumption.
For a given consumption level C, the number of individuals with diabetes
attributable to sugary drink consumption is given by the following formula:
Individuals with diabetes because of sugary drinks at level C =
individuals consuming at level C x (RRc - RRbaseline) x baseline risk
Schulze et al. found a total of 531 cases of diabetes among nondrinkers (those drinking less than once per week) from a total of about
570,000 person-years of study, meaning that in tracking the health of many
individuals totaling 570,000 person-years of data, 531 .times a fresh
diagnosis of type 2 diabetes occurred. This suggests an annual baseline
risk of 0.1 percent. 76 That is, for any given year, the baseline risk is that
one in one thousand will be diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. Utilizing these

71.

For a population, the relative risk is the incidence rate of the diseased condition

(in our study, type 2 diabetes or coronary heart disease) in the high-risk group (in our
study, the incidence of diabetes or coronary heart disease among soda drinkers) divided
by the incidence rate of the diseased condition in the non-risk group (in our study, nonsoda drinkers). See, e.g, FAMILY HEALTH OUTCOMES PROJECT, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F.,
FHOP

PLANNING

GUIDE

APP.

111-B

156-62

(2010),

available

at

http://fhop.ucsf.edu/fhop/docs/pdf/pubs/pgapxllIB.pdf.
72. Schulze et al., supra note 62, at 927, 929.
73. FAMILY HEALTH OUTCOMES PROJECT, supra note 70, at 155.
74. Schulze et al., supra note 62, at 932 (see the fourth line of table 3, "Multivariateadjusted RR"). Schulze et al. only state that respondents "were asked how often they
had consumed a commonly used unit or portion size of each ... item." Id. at 928. For
lack of a better unit, a drink is assumed to be twelve ounces.
75. The Schulze et al. study only took place over a decade, so the risk measured is
that of a diagnosis within ten years of a treatment. For purposes of this analysis, this
risk is assumed to be equivalent to a lifetime risk, experienced annually. Id. at 927.
76. Id. at 932 (see the first line of the first column of table 3).
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RR factors then, we can calculate the additional diabetes cases each year
that are attributable to sugary drink consumption by totaling up the
additional cases at the two consumption levels - two to six drinks per week
and one or more drinks per day. That total is 2696, about a quarter of all
diabetes diagnoses each year.
Once an estimate is obtained for the additional diabetes cases
attributable to sugary drink consumption, the New York City-wide costs of
diabetes can be determined. That fraction of New York City-wide costs
that are attributable to sugary drink consumption is the same fraction of
diabetes cases attributable to sugary drink consumption divided by all
diabetes cases. Table 3 sets out the calculation of type 2 diabetes costs
attributable to sugary drink consumption in New York City, which is
estimated to be $331 million.
Table 3

(a) Fraction of NYC residents consuming
sugary drinks of this amount (from CDC
data)
(b) Number of NYC residents consuming
sugary drinks of this amount ((a) x total
NYC pop of 8,366,697)
(c) Heightened risk of type 2 diabetes
diagnosis from consuming sugary drinks
(RR-1, from Schulze et al., Table 3, line
4)
(d) Baseline risk of type 2 diabetes
diagnosis (Schulze et al.)
(e) NYC residents diagnosed with type 2
diabetes attributable to sugary drink
consumption each year [(b) x (c) x (d)]
(f) Number of NYC residents diagnosed
with type 2 diabetes because of sugary
drink consumption each year (total of
figures from row (e) in both columns)
(g) Baseline number of NYC residents
diagnosed with type 2 diabetes each year
((d) x NYC pop of 8,366,697)
(h) Total number of NYC residents
diagnosed with diabetes each year ((f)

_+(g))

2-6/week
0.2

1,667,339

1+ /day
0.3

2,501,009

0.49

0.83

0.001

0.001

761

1935

2696

7769

10,465
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(i) Cost of diabetes in NYC ($1000)
Cost of diabetes in NYC attributable to
sugary drink consumption ($1000) 1(i)
x (f)/(h)]
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$1,286,555
$331,429

As noted above, however, the estimates of the national costs of type 2
diabetes undercount because they do not take into account the cost of
premature mortality. The following section undertakes that calculation.
b. Costs of PrematureDeath
As noted above, New York City reports that 1711 deaths occurred
from type 2 diabetes in 2010. 77 In Table 2 above, a fraction was calculated
to determine the number of diabetes cases attributable to sugary drink
consumption out of all diabetes cases. That fraction was used to determine
the amount of total diabetes costs that can be attributed to sugary drink
consumption. This same fraction is now used to determine the number of
diabetes deaths attributable to sugary drink consumption, over the total
number of diabetes deaths of 1711. This is tabulated in Table 4 below, and
multiplied by the value of a statistical life to estimate the cost of premature
mortality from consuming sugary drinks.
Table 4
(a) Number of people dying from type 2 diabetes in
NYC
(b) Baseline number of people diagnosed with type 2
diabetes in NYC annually
(c) Number of people diagnosed with diabetes
attributable to sugary drink consumption
(d) Number of NYC residents dying from type 2
diabetes attributable to sugary drink consumption [(a)
x (c)/((c)+(b))]
(e) EPA value of a statistical life ($1000)
Cost of premature mortality in NYC from type 2
diabetes attributable to sugary drink consumption

1711
10,465
2696
441

$7400
$3,262,697

($1000)

77. BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
SUMMARY OF VITAL STATISTICS 2010: THE CITY OF NEW YORK - POPULATION AND
MORTALITY 42 (2011), available at http://www.nyc.gov/htmlldoh/downloads/ pdf/vs/

vs-population-and-mortality-report.pdf.
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Adding together the totals from Tables 3 and 4, the total cost of type 2
diabetes in New York City attributable to sugary drink consumption is thus
roughly $3.6 billion. This estimate is dominated by the estimated cost of
premature mortality.
c. A Lower-Bound Estimate of the Costs of Diabetes
These results are sensitive to the value of the RRs reported by Schulze
et al., and utilized in this analysis. If the RR is in reality lower than the
central estimates used in this analysis, not only would the direct and
indirect costs be overstated, but the number of premature mortality cases
attributable to sugary drinks would be overstated as well; this is because
the number of diabetes deaths attributable to sugary drinks is pegged to the
number of diabetes cases attributable to sugary drinks, which depends on
the RR.
To test the sensitivity of the results to the RR, the lower end of the
95% confidence intervals from Schulze et al. were used to estimate a lower
bound of type 2 diabetes costs, cases, and deaths. 78 Using those values as a
lower bound, the estimated cost of type 2 diabetes was about $176 million,
with the number of New York City diabetes deaths attributable to sugary
drink consumption falling to 233, yielding a premature mortality cost of
about $1.73 billion. The total cost of type 2 diabetes under that lowerbound scenario is about $1.9 billion.
2. Coronary Heart Disease

a. Direct and Indirect Costs
The same calculation can be made for CHD costs attributable to
sugary drink consumption. For CHD, the CDC cites a study estimating the
direct and indirect costs of CHD at $108.9 billion each year. 79 This CDC

78. For those drinking two to six sugary drinks per week, the lower bound was 1.16
(as opposed to the central estimate of 1.49), and for those drinking one or more sugary
drinks per day the lower bound was 1.42 (as opposed to the central estimate of 1.83).
Schulze et al., supra note 62, at 932 (see the first line of the first column of table 3).
79. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 51 (citing Paul A.
Heidenreich et al., Forecasting the Future of CardiovascularDisease in the United
States: A Policy Statement from the American Heart Association, 123 CIRCULATION
933, 935, available at http://circ.ahajoumals.org/content/123/8/933.long (see Tables 2
and 3 showing direct medical costs and lost productivity for coronary heart disease,
adding up to $108.9 billion in 2010)).
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estimate, like the one for type 2 diabetes, includes direct costs such as the
cost of medical treatment, and indirect costs such as lost productivity costs,
but does not include the cost of premature mortality.
Ascertaining the correct fraction of New York City CHD cases to
national CHD cases poses definitional challenges not encountered when
estimating the cost of type 2 diabetes. What the CDC refers to as CHD is
not clearly referenced in New York City's report of vital statistics, which
lists deaths from "[d]iseases of the heart." 80 What can be estimated is the
fraction of heart disease deaths generally, which the CDC estimates as
597,689 each year, 81 of which CHD accounts for about 385,000.82 If we
assume that CHD accounts for approximately the same fraction of New
York City deaths (out of all heart diseases), then an estimate for New York
City CHD deaths can be obtained by multiplying this fraction with the total
number of New York City heart disease deaths, which the City reports as
17,929.83 This yields an estimate of New York City CHD deaths of 11,549.
The tabulation is set forth in Table 5 below.
Table 5
(a) Number of people dying from heart disease
nationally
(b) Approximate number of people dying from
CHD nationally
(c) Number of NYC residents dying from heart
disease
Approximate number of NYC residents dying
from CHD [(c) x (b)/(a)]

597,689
385,000
17,929
11,549

As estimated, the fraction of New York City deaths from CHD is
somewhat higher than the national CHD fraction; 22% of all deaths as
opposed to 16% nationally. 84 On the same reasoning as was utilized for our
type 2 diabetes analysis, this difference is assumed to represent a
differential between the rate at which New York City residents suffer and
die from heart disease than the nation as a whole. New York City residents
suffer more from CHD than does the national population generally. New
80.
81.

BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 76, at 9 (see line 12 of table MI).
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH,

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/ lcod.htm (last visited May 20, 2014).
82.

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 51.

83. BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 76, at 9 (see line 12 of table M1).
84. The NYC fraction is 11,549/52,575 = 0.22, while the national fraction is about
385,000/2,468,43 5 = 0.16.
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York City's cost of CHD is thus estimated to be its proportional share of
CHD deaths multiplied by the national cost of CHD. This calculation is set
forth in Table 6 below, and is estimated to be $3.27 billion.
And
although mortality rates were used to calculate this fraction, the cost of
premature mortality is excluded from this estimate.
Table 6
(a) National cost of CHD ($1000)
(b) Approximate national deaths from CHD
(c) Estimated New York City deaths from CHD
Cost to New York City from type 2 diabetes
($1000) [(a) x (c)/(b)]

$108,900,000
385,000
11,549
$3,266,000

Having estimated New York City's share of the national cost of type
2 diabetes and CHD, it remains to be estimated what fraction of these New
York City-specific costs are attributable to sugary drink consumption, as
opposed to other risk factors. While Schulze et al. provided an effective
dose-response link between sugary drink consumption and risk of type 2
diabetes, Fung et al. conducted a study of the link between sugary drink
consumption and CHD. 86 Like Schulze et al., Fung et al. provides a
relative risk (RR) ratio for different levels of sugary drink consumption,87
and is set forth in row (c) in Table 7 below. Like Schulze et al., Fung et al.
is limited because it is limited to middle-aged women and younger women.
Fung et al. provides a finer resolution than Schulze et al. because it
estimates the RR for an additional, higher level of consumption (two or
more drinks per day).
Using a calculation identical to the one used to estimate the type 2
diabetes diagnoses attributable to sugary drink consumption, I estimate the
additional number of new CHD cases occurring each year at each of three
levels of sugary drink consumption. Fung et al. found a total of 1606 new
cases of CHD among non-drinkers (those drinking less than once per week)
from a total of about 1,069,645 person-years of study, yielding a baseline
risk of about 0.15 percent.88 Using the RR factors from Fung et al., I

85. The more precise estimate is S3,266,695,723.
86. Teresa T. Fung et al., Sweetened Beverage Consumption and Risk of Coronary
HeartDisease in Women, 89 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1037, 1040 (2009).
87. Id. at 1040 (see the fifth line of table 2, "Multivariate-adjusted").
88. Id. (see the third line of table 2) (noting that the number of cases of CHD among
those drinking less than one per month or one to four drinks per month). The research
subjects in Fung et al. were all screened for pre-existing cardiovascular disease, so that
the RRs in their paper reflect the heightened risk of sugary drink consumption on a
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estimate the additionalCHD cases each year that are attributable to sugary
drink consumption by totaling up the additional cases at the three
consumption levels - two to six drinks per week, one to two drinks per day,
and two or more drinks per day. That total is 1515, about a tenth of all
CHD cases each year. Taking the fraction of CHD cases attributable to
sugary drink consumption over all CHD cases yields an estimate of the
share of NYC's CHD costs attributable to sugary drink consumption:
about $353 million.
Table 7

(a) Fraction of NYC residents
consuming sugary drinks (CDC)
(b) Number of NYC residents
consuming sugary drinks ((a) x
pop of 8,366,697)
(c) Heightened risk of CHD from
consuming sugary drinks (Fung

2-6/week

1+/day

2+/day

0.2

0.1

0.2

1,667,339

833,670

1,667,339

0.08

0.27

0.39

0.0015

0.0015

0.0015

200

338

976

et al.)

(d) Baseline risk of CHD each
year
(e) Number of new CHD cases
attributable to sugary drink
consumption each year [(b) x (c)

completely "healthy" population (in terms of CHD). Arguably, the RRs from Fung et
al. should be adjusted before applying it to the New York City population because
clearly, a significant number of people in New York City already have cardiovascular
disease. Whether the heightened risk for CHD posed by sugary drink consumption is
the same for a population of completely "healthy" people as it is for a population that
includes some with pre-existing cardiovascular disease is unclear. There does not
appear to be any literature on the incrementalrisk of sugary drink consumption on an
already unhealthy population. If one assumes, reasonably, that cumulative risks are
greater, then the RRs reported in Fung et al. are under-estimates, and the health
impacts of sugary drink consumption are greater than those estimated in this analysis.
One can also ask why a fraction of the New York City population already has
cardiovascular disease; if this analysis is reasonably accurate, some fraction of those
cases of pre-existing cardiovascular disease in New York City were attributable to the
consumption of sugary drinks. In other words, if one goes far back enough in time, the
introduction of sugary drinks to New Yorkers was an exposure to a completely
"healthy" population, in which case the RRs in Fung et al. are appropriate. Finally,
given the very high benefit-to-cost ratios estimated in this paper, a slightly inaccurate
RR is not likely to change the outcome significantly.
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x (d)]
(f) Total number of new CHD
cases attributable to sugary drink
consumption each year (total of
figures from row (e) in all three
columns)
(g) Baseline number of new CHD
case each year
(h) Total number of new CHD
cases each year [(f) + (g)]
(i) Annual cost of CHD in NYC
($1000)
Cost of CHD in NYC
attributable to sugary drink
consumption ($1000) 1(i) x
(f)/(h)]
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1515

12,517
14,032
$3,266,695
$352,605

b. Costs of PrematureDeath
Table 5 above sets out the estimate of New York City CHD deaths of
11,549. To estimate the fraction of this attributable to sugary drink
consumption, a scaling-down calculation like the one employed for type 2
diabetes deaths is appropriate. This involves finding the fraction of CHD
cases attributable to sugary drink consumption, and multiplying it by
11,549. Again employing the EPA figure for the value of a statistical life
($7.4 million), the resulting estimate of the cost of premature mortality in
New York City attributable to sugary drink consumption is roughly $9.2
billion.
Table 8
(a) Number of people dying from CHD in NYC
(b) Baseline number of people diagnosed with CHD in
NYC annually
(c) Number of people with CHD attributable to sugary
drink consumption
Number of NYC residents dying from CHD
attributable to sugary drink consumption (a) x
(c)/((c)+(b))
(e) EPA value of a statistical life ($1000)
Cost of premature mortality in NYC from CHD
attributable to sugary drink consumption ($1000)

11,549
12,517
1515
1247

$7400
$9,224,716
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Adding together the totals from tables 7 and 8, the total cost of CHD
in New York City attributable to sugary drink consumption is thus roughly
$9.6 billion.
c. A Lower-boundEstimate of Costs of CoronaryHeart Disease
As with the type 2 diabetes analysis, it is worth exploring the
possibility that the RRs reported in Fung et al. are too high. As in the
estimate for diabetes costs, if we take the lower end of the 95% confidence
intervals estimated by Fung et al., we can derive a lower bound for the
direct and indirect costs and the premature deaths attributable to sugary
drink consumption. 89 These lower-bound estimates are $188 million and
$4.9 billion, respectively, for a total lower-bound estimate of the CHD cost
attributable to sugary drink consumption of about $5.1 billion.
3. Total Direct and Indirect Costs, and Cost of Premature Deaths
Attributable to Sugary Drink Consumption
Adding together the costs of type 2 diabetes and of CHD attributable
to sugary drink consumption, the total health costs of sugary drink
consumption is estimated to be roughly $13.2 billion. Using the lower
ends of the confidence intervals in both Schulze et al. and Fung et al. yields
a total lower bound estimate of about $7 billion. That is, if the actual
RR for both diabetes and CHD are at the lower end of the confidence
intervals reported by Schulze et al. and Fung et al., respectively, the
estimate of the total health and premature mortality costs of sugary drink
consumption is still about fourteen times higher than the potential lost
profits.
These figures are clearly dominated by the estimated cost of
premature mortality. Without the estimated cost of premature mortality,
the central estimate of the total costs of type 2 diabetes and CHD would be
just $684 million. This is comparable to the compliance costs. But unless
the number of deaths from type 2 diabetes and CHD attributable to sugary
drink consumption are extremely small, the health benefits of curbing
sugary drink consumption is very likely to be larger than the compliance
costs.

89.

Id. (see the fifth line of table 2).
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B. Approach Two: Costs of Obesity Attributable to Sugary Drink
Consumption
The second approach is to estimate the costs of obesity in New York
City attributable to sugary drink consumption. This analysis for this
approach mimics that of the analysis for the first approach, in that a
national estimate is scaled down to produce a New York City estimate, and
then scaled down again to ascertain a fraction attributable to sugary drink
consumption.
The CDC estimates that nationally, obesity-related healthcare costs
add up to about $147 billion per year. 90 In addition to the $147 billion in
direct medical costs, a study commissioned by the Society of Actuaries
found that obesity costs the United States $44 billion in lost worker
productivity due to death, $39 billion in lost worker productivity due to
temporary disability, and $65 billion in lost worker productivity due to
permanent disability. 9' Omitting the costs of productivity loss due to death
(because that is assumed to be a part of the costs of premature mortality),
the total cost of obesity in the United States, exclusive of the costs of
premature mortality, is $251 billion annually. Again, scaling down by
population might be a guess, but it would be worrisome because the obesity
rate in New York City (22.1%92) is lower than it is nationwide (35.7%93). I
estimate an obesity rate-adjusted population scaling down from national
costs to New York City costs. In other words, I estimate the number of
obese individuals nationally and in New York City, and assume that New
York City's share of obesity costs are identical to its share of obese
individuals. This estimate, set out in Table 9 below, yields a total
estimated cost of obesity in New York City of roughly $4.13 billion.
Table 9
(a) Cost of obesity in the United
States (excluding lost productivity
due to death, and excluding death)

90.

CTRS.

FOR

DISEASE

CONTROL

&

$251,000,000

PREVENTION,

ADULT

OBESITY

FACTS,

http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/ dataladult.html (last visited May 21, 2014); see also E.A.
Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer- and
Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. w822, w831 (2009).
91.

DONALD F. BEHAN ET AL., SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES, OBESITY AND ITS RELATION TO

http://www.soa.org/
Files/ResearchlProjects/research-2011 -obesity-relation-mortality.pdf.
MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY COSTS 39-41 (2010), available at

92.

93.

N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 12, at 3.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 89.
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(b) Population of the United States
(c) Population of New York City
(d) Obesity rate for the United States
(e) Obesity rate for New York City
Cost of obesity for New York City

99

313,940,040
8,336,697
0.357
0.221
$4,126,150

[(a) x (e) x (c)/(d) x (b)]

The next step is to estimate the fraction of the New York-specific
obesity problem that is attributable to sugary drink consumption. Babey et
al. estimated the heightened risk of obesity resulting from sugary drink
consumption for a California population. 94 Babey et al. reported risk
increases for two dose-response groups: those drinking "occasionally"
(between one drink per week and one drink per day), and those drinking
one or more sugary drinks per day. Those drinking occasionally had a 15%
greater chance than nondrinkers of becoming overweight or obese, and
those drinking one drink per day or more were 27% more likely to be obese
or overweight. Since 22.1%, or 1,842,410, of New York City residents are
obese, the task is to determine what fraction of that population is obese
because of sugary drink consumption. Note that this line of analysis,
following the results in Babey et al., does not produce annualized risk
estimates, but rather lifetime risk estimates. This also assumes that the
incremental risk of obesity is comparable as between California and New
York City.
The baseline risk of obesity is not known because the 22.1% includes
those New Yorkers that are consuming sugary beverages and thus expose
themselves to a heightened risk of obesity from soda consumption.
Following Babey et al., a heightened risk exposure - from drinking two to
six drinks per week and one or more per day - can be expected to produce
a proportionately higher number of cases: 15% and 27% more,
respectively. The baseline rate is the rate for all New York City residents,
on top of which some suffer heightened risk from consuming sugary
drinks. In other words, the overall obesity rate of 22.1% is just the
weighted average of all the risk groups combined, weighted by their
fraction of the population and their heightened risk. The baseline rate is R
in the following equation:

94.

See generally

RESEARCH, BUBBLING
CALIFORNIA
(2009),

SUSAN H. BABEY ET AL., UCLA CTR. FOR HEALTH POLICY
OVER: SODA CONSUMPTION AND ITS LINK TO OBESITY IN

available at

BubblingPolicyBrief.pdf.

http://www.publichealthadvocacy.org/PDFs/
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New York city obesity rate = 0.221 = (R x 0.5) + (R x 1.15 x 0.2) +

(R x 1.27 x 0.3)
Solving for R yields a baseline obesity rate of 0.199. Without sugary
drinks, 199 New Yorkers out of 1000 would be obese; with sugary drinks,
221 are obese. From this an estimate the number of New York City
residents that are obese because of their sugary drink consumption can be
derived. The calculation is shown in Table 10 below. The cost of obesity
in New York City, excluding premature mortality, is roughly $412 million.
Table 10

(a) Fraction of population
consuming...
(b) Number of NYC residents
consuming...
(c) Heightened risk of obesity
(d) Baseline risk of obesity
(e) Risk of obesity [(d) x (1 +
(c))]
(f) Number of NYC residents

No sugary
drinks at all
0.5

2-6/week

1+/day

0.2

0.3

4,168,349

1,667,339

2,501,009

0
0.199
0.199

0.15
0.199
0.229

0.27
0.199
0.253

829,167

381,417

631,826

obese [(b) x (e)]

(g) Total number of NYC
residents obese
(h) Number of NYC residents
obese because of sugary drink
consumption [(c) x (d) x (f)]
(i) Total number of NYC
residents obese because of
sugary drink consumption
(j) Cost of obesity in NYC
($1000)
Cost of obesity in NYC
attributable to sugary drink
consumption ($1000) [(j) x
(i)/(g)l

1,842,410
0

49,750

134,325

184,075

$4,126,150
$412,243

But obesity is clearly linked with premature mortality, so an estimate
of the costs of premature mortality from obesity attributable to sugary drink
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consumption is needed. As New York City does not include obesity as a
cause of death in its mortality statistics, another estimate is needed.
Masters et al. estimate that unlike earlier studies, the fraction of
deaths attributable to obesity is 18.2%. 95 An earlier estimate of the number
of deaths attributable to obesity is from Allison et al., which estimates that
approximately 280,000 deaths occur annually in the United States from
obesity96 out of a total of about 2.4 million deaths per year. 97 The
previously authoritative Allison et al. estimate was about 11%. Assuming
that obese New York City residents will die at the same rate as those in the
Masters et al. sample and the Allison et al. sample, these two estimates are
used as bookends to estimate the number of deaths attributable to obesity.
New York City, however, has lower obesity rates than the United
States as a whole - 22.1% as opposed to 35.7% nationally. These two
bookend obesity death rates are thus scaled down by the ratio of the New
York City obesity rate to the national obesity rate to arrive at an estimate of
the New York City obesity death rate. Using the Masters et al. and the
Allison et al. estimates, the New York City obesity death rates are
estimated to be 11.3% on the high end and 7.2% on the low end. Again
using the EPA value of a statistical life, the estimates of the cost of
premature mortalities from obesity in New York City are shown in Table
11 below.
Table 11

(a) Death rate attributable to
obesity
(b) NYC deaths in 2010
(c) NYC deaths in 2010
from obesity

95.

High estimate of
NYC death rate
from obesity

Low estimate of
NYC death rate
from obesity

(Masters et al.)

(Allison et al.)

0.113

0.072

52,575
5923

52,575
3811

Ryan K. Masters et al., The Impact of Obesity on US Mortality Levels: The

Importance of Age and Cohort Factors in Population Estimates, 103 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH, 1895, 1899 (2013).

96. David B. Allison et al., Annual Deaths Attributable to Obesity in the United
States, 282 JAMA 1530, 1535 (1999).
97. The exact figure is 2,391,399.

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEATHS By SINGLE YEARS OF AGE, RACE, AND
SEX: UNITED STATES 1999 1 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
statab/VSOO 199_TABLE3 I 0.pdf.
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(d) Value of statistical life
(e) Cost from premature
mortality from obesity in
NYC
(f) Number of obese
individuals in NYC
(g) Number of obese
individuals in NYC due to
sugary drink consumption
Cost of premature
mortality from obesity in
NYC attributable to
sugary drink consumption
1(e) x (g)/(f)]
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$7.4 million
$43.8 billion

$7.4 million
$28.2 billion

1,842,410

1,842,410

184,075

184,075

$4.4 billion

$2.8 billion

Adding to these figures the direct medical costs of treating obesity
and the cost of lost productivity (derived in Table 10) produces an estimate
of the total costs of obesity in New York City. Using Allison et al. and
Masters et al. as bookends for a range of costs, the total costs of obesity in
New York City are estimated to range from $3.2 billion to $4.8 billion.
Similar to the analysis for the measure of the health costs through type 2
diabetes and for CHD, the cost-benefit analysis is largely animated by the
cost of premature mortality.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The estimates of costs and benefits are summarized in Table 12
below.
The three columns in Table 8 pertain to two different
methodologies, and for one methodology, a high and low estimate of the
costs of premature mortality. Bear in mind that these are the total potential
costs and benefits - the total amount of profits from sugary drink sales, and
the total amount of health costs attributable to sugary drink consumption.
To the extent that any policy seeks to curb sugary drink consumption and
does so incompletely, the costs and benefits would both be smaller. Again,
the assumption adopted for this analysis is that both would scale down
proportionately. All benefits are in the form of reduced health costs, and
are those in New York City only, and attributable to sugary drink
consumption.
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Table 12 (all figures in billions of dollars, annually)

Total potential compliance
costs
Cost of type 2 diabetes
Cost of premature mortality

Benefits
measured by
reduced type
2 diabetes
and CHD
costs
0.53

Benefits
measured
by reduced
obesity
costs (high
mortality)
0.53

Benefits
measured
by reduced
obesity
costs (low
mortality)
0.53

0.41
4.38

0.41
2.82

4.79

3.23

0.33
3.26

from type 2 diabetes

Cost of CHD

0.35

Cost of premature mortality
from CHD
Total potential benefits
(diabetes & CHD)
Cost of obesity
Cost of premature mortality
from obesity
Total potential benefits

9.23
13.17

(obesity)

A number of caveats are in order. A number of analytical junctures
give rise to the possibility of error in this analysis. The most significant
and obvious sources of potential error include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

revenues from sugary drink sales;
profit margins from sugary drink sales;
unaccounted-for profits from sugary drink sales;
uncounted benefits of sugary drink sales other than profits, such as
consumer's surplus in consuming sugary drinks;
(e) estimates of the national costs of type 2 diabetes, CHD, and
obesity;
(f) inter-jurisdictional translations of data, and the resulting scalingdown of national costs to New York City costs;
(g) accuracy and application of sugary drink consumption data;
(h) inappropriate extension of Schulze et al., Fung et al., and Babey et
al. to general populations;
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(i) inaccuracies stemming from the Schulze et al., Fung et al., and
Babey et al. studies,
(j)
epidemiological studies that provide the dose-response
relationships; and
(k) estimates in the mortality rates of type 2 diabetes, CHD, and
obesity.
It was also surprising that the estimated health costs of sugary drink
consumption were lower when considering its impact on obesity than it was
in considering its impact through two specific causal pathways: (i) type 2
diabetes and (ii) CHD. Since obesity probably captures a broader spectrum
of health risk factors, an estimate of the costs of obesity attributable to
sugary drink consumption should wholly include the costs of attributable
types 2 diabetes and CHD, and therefore be higher. Again, there a number
of possible reasons for this possible anomaly. It could be that the CDC
obesity estimates assume more modest linkages to CHD.
In the end, the ratios of benefits to costs are uniformly high. Even
using the lower bound estimates of the RRs reported by Schulze et al. and
Fung et al., the total costs, including the cost of premature mortality, are $7
billion, yielding a 14:1 benefit-cost ratio. Using the lowest estimates of the
costs of obesity ($3.23 billion) still yields a benefit-cost ratio of 6:1. And
even if this analysis inappropriately discounted the profits from selling
sugary drinks in New York City, the error is very unlikely to have bucked
the 6:1 to 26:1 ratio of benefits to costs. These high ratios are driven by the
cost of premature mortality. It is worth noting that even if the costs of
premature mortality were to be excluded, a cost-benefit analysis of a total
ban on sugary drink sales would yield roughly even costs and benefits.
Even implausibly conservative assumptions about premature mortality, and
even a very conservative value of a statistical life, however, would still
produce a cost-benefit analysis that points in the direction of regulating the
consumption of sugary drinks.
Despite the preliminary and rough nature of this analysis, it still
seems reasonable to conclude that any attempt in New York City to reduce
the consumption of sugary drinks would likely generate far more benefits
(in the form of reduced health and mortality costs) than it would costs (in
the form of reduced profits from the sales of sugary drinks). As noted
above, there are a number of non-monetizable issues that shadow an
analysis such as this one, but it would at least appear that New York City
would be monetarily better off with some sugary drink regulation than
without it. Hand-wringing over "freedom of choice" or "liberty of palate"
seems superficial under these circumstances.
The significance of this finding - that the benefits of sugary drink
regulation will generally outweigh the costs - extends far beyond New
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York City. New York City is not a representative city; it is less compelling
to reduce sugary drink consumption in New York City than in other cities.
The incidence of type 2 diabetes and obesity in New York City are both
well below national averages, so there are fewer gains to be had from
reducing sugary drink consumption. While New York City's obesity rate is
22.1%, the 2010 obesity rate of the following cities was significantly
higher: Chattanooga, TN - 30.4%; Memphis, TN - 35.3%; Detroit, MI 33.1%; Dallas, TX - 33.8%; and New Orleans, LA - 32.6%. 98 The sugary
drink consumption problem could be greater in these areas, and could yield
greater benefits in the form or reduced health costs.
Finally, it is worth noting that the nature of at least this rudimentary
cost-benefit analysis is such that health costs and premature mortality are
measured for some fictitious "average" adult individual. But given what
we now know about obesity over a lifetime - that childhood obesity is
almost certain to lead to adult obesity, and a lifetime of illness and lower
life-expectancy99 - measures that attack childhood obesity are almost
certain to yield greater benefits than those estimated in this analysis. Were
a sugary drink restriction to apply to younger individuals, the benefit-tocost ratios would certainly be even higher than those produced by this
analysis. Thus, if a cost-benefit analysis leads to the conclusion that sugary
drink regulation is generally a desirable policy, then the cost-benefit
analysis would apply with even greater force to a sugary drink restriction
targeted at younger individuals.
Public discourse loudly celebrates a variety of liberties. And liberty is
a difficult thing to price, depending on the contexts in which they are
considered. But it seems that the liberty of palate has been celebrated in
excess of its actual importance to society, and with utter disregard to the
costs of that liberty. Liberty of palate, when it comes to the consumption
of sugary drinks, offers a particularly stark example of how important it is
to take a step back and attempt to consider the consequences of that liberty.
It could well be that some liberties are much more expensive than they are
important to the functioning of a society.

98.

OBESITY

RATES

FOR

STATES,

METRO

AREAS,

GOVERNING,

http://www.governing.com/gov-data/obesity-rates-by-state-metro-area-data.html
visited May 21, 2014).
99. See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 18.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The marketing of goods under geographical names has always been
common. In addition to introducing commercial facets of wine distribution
agreements, this article discusses the justifications, principles and, policies
that lie behind the protection of geographical indications (GIs) for wine on
an international level as well as in the Old World and, to a lesser degree, in
the New World.' The scope and shape of the GI system will then be
scrutinized in light of its own justifications and in the light of its impact on
international trade, intellectual property, and agricultural policy.
The undercurrents of the global wine industry are better understood
through a brief history of wine as well as an overview of international wine
distribution. Some countries have longer historical and cultural ties with
wine than others and that can affect the quality and perception of the
product in the eyes of the consumer. The essential issues that this article
attempts to address, in relation to the latter, are the basis and criteria for the
granting of GI rights, the scope of the protection that is afforded to GIs, and
the justifications for the above in light of the functions and policies that
underlie the granting and protecting of GIs.2 These are factors which can
create a superior wine (at least from a marketing perspective) and therefore
produce a competitive advantage both domestically and internationally.
First, the origin of the term "geographical indication" will be
explained. Formerly, legal protection for GIs was based on the idea that
geographical origin provides a product with exclusive qualities and
characteristics. The current premise is that a geographical name extends
beyond and exists apart from the product and therefore deserves its own
protection. The view will be taken that the minimum standards provided in
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

1. The Old World is generally regarded to be comprised of European Union (EU)
Member States, while the New World is generally taken to be comprised of Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa, Mexico, and the United States
(US). In this article, the position of the Old World will mainly be discussed in relation
to France, and the position of the New World will mainly be discussed in relation to
Australia. See Christine Fund & Stephen Stem, The Australian System of Registration
and Protectionof GeographicalIndicationsfor Wines, 5 FLINDERS J.L. REFORM 39, 40
(2000); see also Sarah Hinchliffe, When PlaceNames are Worth Bottling, 82 L. INST. J.
44, 44-47 (2008).
2. In this article "protection" encompasses both the determination of the GI,
including boundaries and the name, and use of the GI on labels of wines.
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(the TRIPS Agreement) 3 highlights this shift and, in so doing, has
formalized a global system of GI protection which encompasses the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the New World, and the Old World. The scope
and shape of this system will be scrutinized through a discussion of GI
protection in relation to international trade, intellectual property laws and
agricultural policy, which in effect operate in favor of the European Union
(EU).4
Second, despite a wide range of scholarship on the WTO, intellectual
property, and agricultural policy, the conceptual underpinnings of GIs have
not been scrupulously examined.5 The rationale for the protection of GIs in
international law will therefore be discussed, which raises the issue of the
normative justification for GI rights. It will be argued that GI protection in
international law is justifiable for many of the same reasons that protection
of trademarks is warranted: primarily, to protect consumers against
confusion. 6 However, the current level of protection that is afforded to
wine and spirits by the TRIPS Agreement goes beyond what any existing
theory of property can support.
Third, the purpose and operation of EU laws will be examined. GIs
confer legal monopoly rights on local producers and, on a national level at
least may be seen as incompatible (in part, at least) with the notion of free

3.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,

1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement], Annex IC, Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1867 U.N.T.S. 299
(incorporating by reference the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property), July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 306 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne

Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised on
July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 222.
4. J Boutonnet, R. Jassaume & D Sautier, The Place of "Localized" Food Systems
within the Political Economy of the Agri-Food System 1, 1 (paper presented at the
World Congress of Sociology, Durban, July 24, 2006); see also THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1 (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick,
eds., 2002).
5. The most thorough treatments of GIs in international law are: BERNARD
O'CONNOR, THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (2004); Tomer Broude, Taking
"Trade and Culture " Seriously: GeographicalIndicationsand CulturalProtections in
WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 623, 625 (2005); Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta,
and Bourbon: The SpiritedDebate About GeographicalIndications, 58 HASTINGS L. J.
299, 301 (2006).
None of these publications, however, critically assess the
fundamental property rights claims that underlie GI protection.
6. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168 (2003); KEITH MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS INTHE GLOBAL ECONOMY 47 (2000); Nicholas Economides, The Economics of
Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 528 (1998); William Landes & Richard Posner,
TrademarkLaw: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 284 (1987).
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movement of goods in the common market.7 From an international trade
perspective, various national laws have allowed the EU to gain market
power and to effectively shield itself from increasing competition from
New World GI products. It will be argued that this situation can be
justified from the perspective of competition policy. It will be argued that,
while systems of GI protection seem justified in the Old World, the
animosity created in the New World has amplified uncertainty and
contributed, though not always directly, to unprincipled and unsatisfactory
outcomes that seem to work against the concept of GI protection.
The final section looks at certain commercial aspects of wine
distribution agreements precipitated as a result of domestic measures and
international trade measures.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS

A. Underlying Themes

GIs, in a broad sense, are words, signs or symbols that indicate or
imply that a given product has its origin in a specific area or place. 8 GIs
can enhance the value of a wine product whose distinctive characteristics
are associated with its geographical origin and can thus protect the linkage
between a product and its physical source. In this regard, four possible
functions for GIs exist, which are drawn upon throughout this article to
justify the existence and scope of protection afforded to GIs. 9 These are:

7. Oskari Rovamo, Monopolizing Names? The Protection of Geographical
Indications in the European Community (Aug. 2006) (unpublished dissertation,
Helsinki University), available at https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/
21550/monopoli.pdfsequence=2.
8. Kasturi Das, International Protection of India's Geographic Indications with
Special Reference to "Darjeeling" Tea, 9 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 460, 461 (2006). In
this article, reference to "GI" is used in a general sense to embrace all forms of the
concept, including more specific terms such as indication of source, appellation of
origin, protected designation of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indication
(PGI), and traditional terms that come from different international and EU legal
instruments.
9. The functions of GIs are similar to those traditionally distinguished for
trademarks. See, e.g. JEREMY PHILIPS, TRADE MARK LAW: A PRACTICAL ANATOMY
603 (2003); Onno Brouwer, Community Protection of Geographical Indications and
Specific Character as a Means to Enhance Foodstuff Quality, 28 COMMON MKT. L.

REV. 615, 630 (1991). Trademarks have been distinguished for a different number of
functions. The simplest categorization is used as a starting point for GIs and is
discussed in WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 587 (5th ed. 2003).
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"

Origin: Designations operate as indicators of origin from
which the products come, or are in some other way
connected.

*

Quality: Designations symbolize qualities which certain
products have or which consumers associate them with and
guarantee that they measure up to expectations.

*

Investment or advertising: Designations are ciphers around
which investment in the aggrandizement of a product is
fabricated. Instilled in such an investment is inherent value,
which is deserving of protection - even when no abuse arises
from misrepresentations about origin or quality.

" Culture protecting and exchange: Designations protect culture
by preserving traditional production methods, cultural
identity, and consumption patterns.' 0
In this regard, the value of each of these functions guides the
assessment of trade interests in intangible property, of which a GI right is
one." Wine distribution agreements play a key role in reinforcing the
importance of GIs in an international trade context. As will be discussed,
the presence of trade interests will often generate systems of protection for
such rights. Accordingly, aims to prevent abuse have given rise to separate
forms of legal protection for GIs which link global trade in physical
produce with borderless trade in intangibles.12
Under the strongest forms of GI protection, GIs are treated as a
separate form of concerted intellectual property whereby protection
concerns the product itself and is not dependent on consumer deception, or
on a specific right holder.' 3 The use of geographical names is closely
10. See Broude, supra note 5, at 626.
11. See infra pp. 135-36.
12. Commonwealth, Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry Legislation Amendment
Bill (No.]) 1998 Second Reading Speech, House of Rep. 688 (Nov. 25, 1998) (Mr.
Connor): "Mr. Brian Croser, past President of the Winemakers Federation ...
challenged the audience not to view his industry as a rural industry but as part of the
entertainment industry."
13. See Rovamo, supra note 7. GIs are intellectual property that are affixed to a
specific place and identify a collective commercial source of the products as opposed to
trademarks that identify a single commercial source, i.e. all producers from a given
geographical area are conferred the right to use a GI to identify their product. See
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controlled by a priori geographical delineation, also backdrop of quality
standards to be realized within the requisite delineated area. 14 The oldest
and most famous of such protection is the system of appellations d'origine
contr6l~e (AOC) in France. 15 GIs are also protected under bilateral treaties
and under multilateral treaties such as the TRIPS Agreement. These forms
of GI protection also treat GIs as a separate form of collective intellectual
property, but in addition might also be justified on the basis of avoiding
consumer deception. However, these forms of GI protection are not as
strong as the protection that is afforded to GIs under the AOC system. The
protection afforded to GIs in both of the above contexts may be justified
only if GIs really fulfill their functions.
1. Consumer Protection through Information
Consumers constantly encounter choice of similar products offered
for sale. Superficial similarities between products may conceal differences
in their characteristics and quality.' 6 So, in addition to other signs and
advertising, consumers may use the help of GIs to identify these
differences in levels of quality. Identifying the source of the product
enables a consumer to identify which best caters to a range of personal
expectations about quality and characteristics, which in turn may derive
from previous experience or the recommendations of others.' 7 This
presents a strong case to control misleading indications in the interest of

FOOD

&

AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

A RESOURCE MANUAL, Ch. 3.4.1: IV Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (R. Silva Repetto & M. Cavalcanti);
Felix Addor & Alexandra Grazioli, Geographical Indications Beyond Wines and
Spirits: A Roadmap for a Better Protectionfor GeographicalIndications in the WTO
TRIPS Agreement, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 865, 869-70 (2002).
14. Rovamo, supra note 7; see also STEPHEN LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VOL. III 1574 (1975);
ON AGRICULTURE:

Stefania Fusco, GeographicalIndications:A Discussion on the TRIPS Regulation after
the Ministerial Conference of Hong Kong, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 197, 239
(2008); see also MARSHA ECHOLS, GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS FOR FOOD PRODUCTS:
INTERNATIONAL, LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES (2008).

15. In France, the year 2005 was the 100-year anniversary of the law establishing
the concept of geographic origin and the 70th birthday of the appellations d'origine
contrdlke system. See e.g., 2005 ANNEE DES TERROIRS, http://www.agrisalon.com/
fr/actualites/productions-vegetales/article/3870157/2005-annee-des-terroirs-Ce-5-aoetla-Fete-de-l-Ail-Rose-de-Lautrec-a-Lautrec-(Tam).html (last visited May 7, 2014).
16. See KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWERFUL TOOL FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH 151 (2003).

17.

Id.
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consumers. Artificial product differentiation, through regulated use of GIs,
however, might not be in the interest of consumers as it would allow
producers to create monopolies and gain market power based on nonexistent uniqueness and quality.' 8 This is particularly so if GIs convey
non-geographical qualities arising from the geographical origin of the
product, because such products cannot truly be reproduced anywhere else.' 9
Yet, such protection would only be indirect because GI protection does not
grant enforceable rights to consumers but rather to producers.2 °
2. Producer Promotion
It is in the interest of a producer to try in some way to differentiate his
products from those of others. GIs may provide producers with a unique or
an alternative way to identify their products as prime, and with a view to
targeting the consuming public. 21 This is particularly important to smaller
wine producers who may not be able to make the substantial investments
which are needed to promote an individual brand.22

18.

PERSPECTIVES

ON

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

LAW

SERIES:

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND MARKET FREEDOM, VOLUME 2 101 (Adrian Sterling ed., 1997); see also

IDRIS, supra note 16, at 153; Marina Kolia, Monopolising Names: EEC Proposals on
the Protection of Trade Descriptions of Foodstuffs, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 233,
237 (1992); Maria Kolia, MonopolisingNames of Foodstuffs, 4 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 323,
326 (1992).
19. Although consumers take great interest in the true origin of products, they do not
in general recognize what the GI stands for. This is the case even in France and Italy
where GIs have been used for decades to inform consumers of origin and quality. See
Bruce Babcock & Roxanne Clemens, GeographicalIndications and PropertyRights:
Protecting Value-Added Agricultural Products 3-4, (MATRIC Briefing Paper 04MBP 7, Midwest Agribusiness Trade Research and Information Center, May 2006),
available at http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/04mbp7.pdf.
20. This which is true of trademark law is also, in my mind, applicable to laws
governing GIs. See Jennifer Davis, To Protect or Serve? European Trademark Law
and the Decline of the Public Interest, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 180, 187 (2003).
The author also argues that the rights and interests of consumers and producers in
relation to GIs are inextricably connected but that modem trademark law cannot be
explained with reference to consumers.
21. PHILIPS, supra note 9, at 26.
22. See Sanjeev Agarwal & Michael Barone, Emerging Issues for Geographical
Indication Branding Strategies 1, (MATRIC Research Paper 05-MRP 9, Midwest
Agribusiness Trade Research and Information Centre, 2005), available at
www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/05mrp9.pdf, Broude, supra note 5,
at 621. The EU seems to have undertaken at least some of the promoting. See Press
Release, European Commission, C 27.6 Million EU Support for the Promotion of
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GIs facilitate producers to create an attractive product image that a
consumer associates with the product. The image that is constructed has 23a
sales-promoting effect intended by the advertising or investment function.
This sales-promoting effect of a given GI is generally connected to the
quality of the product. GIs (and wine GIs to a more limited degree),
however, can also generate their efficacy through evocative, and aesthetic
uses. 24 This means that the GI itself becomes a desired characteristic of a
good, notwithstanding its quality, and such a GI may gain selling-power
above that of the underlying goodwill.25 Producers of GIs are therefore
able to obtain premium prices for products that may otherwise be regarded
as a mere commodity.26 Others may try to imitate a GI and use the
goodwill that producers have developed or fortified by using the GI on a
related or disparate product, which may be viewed as unfair competition."
3. Protecting Tradition
Wine GIs in the EU seem apposite for the preservation of traditional
know-how. This is because such GIs do not reward innovation but rather
producer adherence to the traditional methods used in the region of
production. 28 Internationally, the EU is the main partisan of this cultural
rationale claiming that GIs are "key to EU and developing countries'
cultural heritage, traditional methods of production and natural
29
resources.

Agricultural Products (July 7, 2006), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/06/960&format=HTML&aged=0& language=EN&guiLanguage=en.

23.

See

ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

60-69 (Michael

McAleer & Les Oxley eds., 2007).
24. See Rovamo, supra note 7; see also CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 9, at 587.
25. See Andrew Griffiths, The Impact of the Global Appreciation Approach on the
Boundaries of Trademark Protection, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 326, 328 (2001); see also
DAVID AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 7-8 (1996) (identifying goodwill as
consisting of the following four elements: awareness, loyalty, perceived quality, and
positive associations).
26. See Rovamo, supra note 7; see also Agarwal & Barone, supra note 22, at 1.
27. See Rovamo, supra note 7. Regarding the issue of "goodwill," see WESTON
ANSON, DONNA SUCHY & CHAITALI AHYA, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY VALUATION: A PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING VALUE 11-20

(2006).
28. O'CONNOR, supra note 5, at 373-74; Broude, supra note 5, at 631.
29. Broude, supra note 5, at 631 (quoting Delegation of the European Commission
to Japan, Why do GeographicalIndicationsMatter to Us? EU Background Note 01/04,
Feb. 10, 2004, availableat http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news-en newsjob553.php).
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In the EU, a wine product does not receive GI protection by the mere
fact of its geographical origin but rather because it complies with set of
criteria concerning content and production methods. 30 Generally, such
practices are grounded in social and historic circumstances and are not
necessary for the characteristics and qualities of the finished product. 3' It
seems logical to say that if such practices were to vanish, it would also
result in the elimination of the associated culture of production.
GI wine products may also represent cultural identity. Cognac and
Chardonnay, for example, form part of the cultural, national, and regional
identity of France. Therein, wine GIs operate as custodians of cultural
character or identity, also as an aegis against homogeneity precipitated by
globalization.32 Notably, markets and consumer preference affect both
directly and indirectly the methods of production. 33 In this context, it is fair
to say that, in the absence of culture or tradition, the pursuit for culture may
rely only on the use of cobbled up tradition.
III.

GLOBAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF WINE

GIs

A. Overview
The relatively recent standards on GI protection in the TRIPS
Agreement are built on over a century's progressive international
normative development. 34
The failed attempts to revise the Paris
Convention or loose accord on alternative arrangements, for example,
demonstrate the varying perceptions amongst countries concerning the
devoir to protect GIs. 35 When the United States (US) initiated the

30. In New World countries such as Australia and the US, the protection of tradition
is not a factor in determining the GI itself, and thus the protection of products from that
GI. See Gary Edmond, Disorder with Law: Determining the GeographicalIndication
for the Coonawarra Wine Region, 27 ADELAIDE L. REV. 59, 100-20 (2006). The term
GI is used in a general sense in this article to embrace all forms of the concept,
including appellationsd'origine contr6le (AOC).
31. Id.at 115-16.
32. Griffiths, supra note 25, at 328.
33. See Eric Hobsbawm, Introductions:Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION (Eric Hosbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 2003).

34. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr.
14, 1891; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883. A
detailed account of these multilateral treaties, however, is beyond the scope of this
article.
35. See Rovamo, supra note 7; see also Elena Kapustina, Protection of Well Known
Trademarks Under Russian Law, 9 TRADE PRAC. L. J. 64, 65 (2001).
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development of the TRIPS Agreement as a part of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade,36 the EU saw an opportunity to augment the international
protection of GIs and, with Switzerland, managed to anchor it on the
37
agenda of the negotiations for the TRIPS Agreement.
Broadly, Articles 22, 23, and 24 of the TRIPS Agreement 38 set out the
minimum standard of GI protection that WTO Members are to implement
in their national laws. 39 Failure to enact appropriate implementing
legislation will subject a Member to the possibility of claims and sanctions
under the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms. 40 In this way, GIs, through
the TRIPS Agreement, can be viewed as capable of uniting global
protection systems with an intrinsically necessarily localized basis of
production, linking cultural diversity and the local environment with global

markets.4'

36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; see
also Doha Ministerial Conference, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746
(2002).
37. Rovamo, supra note 7; see also PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 145 (2002); Ved
Nanda, Selected Aspects of International Trade and the World Trade Organization's
Doha Round: Overview and Introduction, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255, 258-59
(2008).
38. Article 22 sets out the general provisions for protection of GIs that applies to all
foodstuff. Article 23 provides for additional protection for GIs.
39. The WTO currently has 159 member countries. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org (last visited May 7, 2014).
40. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see also
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at Arts. 41 & 64; THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320
(1999), [hereinafter The Legal Texts].
41. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 39, at Art. 8. These factors in turn imply the
protection of consumer interests.
Jim Keon, Intellectual Property Rules for
Trademarks and GeographicalIndications:Important Parts of the New World Trade
Order, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 167 (Carlos Correa & Abdulqawi Yusuf, eds., 1998). Compare the
analysis of theories concerning the WTO's legal system. Chios Carmody, A Theory of
WTO Law II J. INT'L ECON. L. 527 (2008) (positing the idea that a theory can be
identified if the WTO Agreement is seen as protecting expectations about trade,
facilitating adjustment to realities encountered in trade, and promoting
interdependence); see also Neil Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six Philosophical
Issues Shaping AgriculturalLaw, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 216 (1993); Hal Shapiro & Lael
Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track: Building
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Article 22(1) of the TRIPS Agreement defines GIs as "indications
which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a
region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical
origin." 42 By virtue of this definition, GIs are categorized as an intellectual
property right, although according to some analysis of GIs, they are not
regarded as private property rights unlike other forms of intellectual
property. 43 A GI is associated not just with the goods having some
qualities or characteristics attributable to the place, but also to the
producers. Accordingly:
[t]he consumers'
mental association between the
indication, the place, the goods, the qualities or
characteristics of the goods, and the producers elevates a
geographic sign to the level of a distinctive source
identifier in that it functions to distinguish one producing
source from another producing source when used on
particular goods. 44
B. Barriers to Tradefor the New World
Other implementing regulations exist and operate as implicit barriers
to trade for New World wine GIs. These include the EC laws regarding
production potential, market mechanisms, oenological practices,
description, designation, presentation, and protection of certain products
and quality wine produced in specified regions.45 In Australia, such laws
Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name Change, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT'L. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003).

42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40.
43. International GI protection is a distinct set of IP standards and remains one of
the most complex and contentious issues in international intellectual property law. See
Sarah Hinchliffe, Overlap Between Trademarks and Geographical Indications in
Australia, 21 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 147-49 (2009).

44. In relation to trademarks, this would mean that GI are those with secondary
meaning in the country where protection is being asserted. See Amy Cotton, 123 Years
at the Negotiating Table and Still no Dessert? The Case in Support of TRIPS
GeographicalIndication Protection,82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2007).
45. See Commission Regulation 538/2011, 2011 0.1. (L147) 6 (EU) [hereinafter
Reg. No. 583/2011], amending Commission Regulation 607/2009, 2009 O.J. (L193) 60
(EC) (laying down certain detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation
479/2008, 2008 0.. (L148) 1 (EC) regarding protected designations of origin and
geographical indications, traditional terms, labeling, and presentation of certain wine
sector products); Commission Regulation 606/2009, 2009 O.J. (L193) 1 (EC) (laying
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are non-existent, yet they seem to surface when the issue of international
trade with the EU is raised.46 The obstacles to market entry by New World
wine producers, and thus their GIs, include the EU's system of tariffs,
internal taxes, governmental subsidies, licensing requirements, labeling

restrictions, marketing regulations and oenological practices, the operation
of which is discussed below.
1. Internal Taxes
Internal taxes function as a trade barrier to wine importers within the
EU. Internal taxes consist of an individual Member State's excise and
Value Added Taxes (VATs). 47
On January 1, 1993, the European
Commission of the European Economic Community established minimum
excise duty rates for alcoholic beverages, including wine.48 Prior to the
enactment of this legislation, each Member State levied excise duties based

down certain detailed rules for implementing Council Regulation 479/2008, 2008
(L148) I (EC) regarding the categories of grapevine products, oenological practices,
and the applicable restrictions; Commission Regulation 607/2009, 2009 O.J. (L193) 60
(EC) [hereinafter Reg. No. 607/2009] (laying down certain detailed rules for the
implementation of Council Regulation 479/2008, 2008 O.J. (L148) I (EC) regarding
protected designations of origin and geographical indications, traditional terms,
labeling, and presentation of certain wine sector products; Commission Regulation
670/2011, 2011 O.J. (L183) 6 (EU) [hereinafter Reg. No. 670/2011], amending
Commission Regulation 607/2009, 2009 O.J. (L193) 60 (EC) (laying down certain
detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation 479/2008, 2008 (L148) 1
(EC) regarding protected designations of origin and geographical indications,
traditional terms, labeling, and presentation of certain wine sector products;
Commission Regulation 772/2010, 2010 O.J. (L232) 1 (EU), amending Commission
Regulation 555/2008, 2008 O.J. (L170) I (EC) (laying down detailed rules for
implementing Council Regulation 479/2008, 2008 O.J. (L148) 1 (EC) on the common
organization of the market in wine regarding support programs, trade with third
countries, production potential and on controls in the wine sector.
46. See generally Michael Blakeney, Geographical Indications and the
InternationalTrade in Australian Wines 3 INT'L TRADE L. & REG. 70 (2012).
47. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, TAXATION & CUSTOMS UNION, THE EU's TAX POLICY
TOWARDS A BARRIER-FREE AREA FOR CITIZENS AND BUSINESSES 1-2 (2006), available
at
http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/l_avrupabirligi/l_6_raporlar/1 _3 diger/
commisionreport eutaxpolicy.pdf.
48. See Directive 92/83, of the European Economic Community of 19 October 1992
on the Harmonization of the Structures of Excise Duties on Alcohol and Alcoholic
Beverages, 1992 O.J. (L316) 21; Directive 92/84, of the European Economic
Community of 19 October 1992 on the Approximation of the Rates of Excise Duty on
Alcohol and Alcoholic Beverages, 1992 O.J. (L316) 29 [hereinafter Council Directive
92/84].
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on the weight or volume of wine with no minimum excise duty rates. 49 The
Economic and Finance Council for the EU adopted Directive 92/84 on
October 19, 1992, which deals specifically with the excise duty rates levied
on alcoholic beverages and the alcohol contained in other products. 50
According to this directive, the excise duties in the Member States for wine
must exceed the minimum level required, unless a Member State is given
an express exception by subsequent EU legislation. 5' However, these
directives only established minimum excise duties on wine. 52 Each
individual country within the EU also imposes taxes on wine through
VATs as well as the mandated minimum excise taxes.53
Moreover, the tax systems of the Member States within the EU are
still relatively diverse (even after the attempt by the EU to create a more
uniform system of excise and VATs for each individual state), and these
taxes make it more expensive to import wine into many countries of the
EU. 54 The diversity of these taxes among EU Member States distorts the
potential for sales among individual Member States within the EU. The
more money a bottle of wine commands in a particular Member State, the
less chance a consumer there has to purchase that bottle because of its
internal tax. In turn, this inhibits the ability of a wine producer to market
its product in the EU. Therefore, these differences in internal taxes
convolute sales among several countries within the EU. The more uniform
these taxes, the greater the opportunity a seller has to maximize sales in all
the EU countries equally.
Still, internal taxes imposed by the individual Member States appear
to impose the least amount of trade barriers to importers. These duties
49. See Council Directive 92/84, supra note 48, at Art. 3.
50. Id.; see also COMM'N OF THE EUR. CMTYS., REPORT FROM

THE COMMISSION TO

THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE ON THE RATES OF EXCISE DUTY APPLIED ON ALCOHOL AND ALCOHOLIC

BEVERAGES (PRESENTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 8 OF COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/84/EEC
ON THE APPROXIMATION OF EXCISE DUTY ON ALCOHOL AND ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES)

(examining the status of Community legislation in the field of excise duties on alcohol
and alcoholic beverages), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri = CELEX:52004DC0223&from=EN.
51. Council Directive 92/84, supra note 48, at Art. 5, 8.
52. Id. at Art. 4.
53. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL OVERVIEW, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/taxation/vat/how vat works/index en.htm (last visited May 8, 2014).
54. See ALAN SCHENK & OLIVER OLDMAN, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 90-102 (2007); ALAN TAIT, VALUE-ADDED TAX: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
AND PROBLEMS 389-95 (1988); Hans Fehr, Christoph Rosenberg & Wolfgang Wiegard,

Value-Added Taxation in the EC After 1992: Some Applied General Equilibrium
Calculations,37 EUR. ECON. REV. 1483, 1483 (1993).
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apply equally to all wine products, including EU wines. Furthermore, these
internal taxes, although a trade burden to Australian wines, are equally
burdensome on EU wines.
2. Government Subsidies
Unlike Australia, the EU provides massive outlays of government
subsidies to its wine industry. A significant portion of the EU's US $1.8
billion wine budget has been allocated to subsidize its wine industry.55
These subsidies consist of funding support for exporting costs, and for
production and non-production of wine.56 In addition, the EU provides
internal support to the wine sector, including distillation intervention,
storage aids, and vineyard restructuring support. Finally, promotional
funding is available through the individual wine producing states.
Countries generally justify the use of subsidies and other government
support for its agricultural products to maintain a system of self-sufficiency
in food and beverages. The EU asserts that self-sufficiency, by a system of
government support, provides an EU country with a national independence
of food security. A country with food security has independence and does
not have to rely on other countries, thereby giving it international political
power.
Wine is protected as an agricultural product under the justification of
national self-sufficiency and food security. However, the EU is being
disingenuous by classifying wine as a food or beverage product for food
security. Thus, it may be true that the European Commission support for
wine provides the EU self-sufficiency for the product itself. However, the
product of wine itself is not a food or beverage item that is necessary to a
nation's survival, such as milk or bread. Moreover, wine is a luxury and
not an essential agricultural product for food security of a country.
EU support for its wine industry goes beyond a desire for selfsufficiency and security. The EU, especially France, is immensely
protective of its wine industry through subsidies and other internal support,
for cultural and political reasons.57 The long history and success of EU
wines in the world market provide an incentive for EU wine-producing
countries, notably France, to maintain the success for this highly revered
and prestigious industry. 58 Accordingly, the EU attempts to preserve the
55.

Leo Cendrowicz, How Europe is Drowning in Wine, TIME, July 3, 2007,

http://content.time.com/time /business/article/0,8599,1639674,00.html.
56.
57.

Id.
O'CONNOR, supra note 5, at 95-96.

58. Id.
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success of its wine industry through subsidies and other government
support. 59 Australia offers a lesser degree of support through funding for
promotional programs. 60 This disparity between Australia and the EU in
providing government subsidies for wine makes it extremely difficult for
Australian wine companies to compete with the EU wine makers in the
European market. 6 EU support for its wine producers creates an advantage
by enabling the wineries to save on costs and62sell their products at lower
prices due to the internal support and subsidies.
Based on the above, it appears that the EU is not providing an equal
playing field for imported wine from New World countries such as
Australia. By virtue of the minimum standards afforded to GIs in the
TRIPS Agreement, and the lack of any guidance provided to Member
States to implement protection of GIs, the Old World's ability to use other
protectionist measures to oust the import of New World wine GIs has been
bolstered.63
3. Tariffs
The EU possesses a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) system which is
comprised of all the tariff measures that affect imports into the EU.64
Under the CCT, rates are determined by the alcohol strength of the wine,
container size, and wine type.65 The EU maintains tariff rates on imported
wine that are significantly higher than Australia's. 66 EU tariffs on imported
wine range from E13.1 to E32 per hundred liters, while Australia's tariffs

59. EUROPEAN COMM'N, EU CUSTOMS STRATEGY, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation
customs/customs/policyissues/customs strategy /index en.htm (last visited May 8,
2014) [hereinafter Customs Strategy].
60. See generally JOSEPH CARROLL & LINDY CROTHERS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
AUSTRALIA 2012 WINE ANNUAL (2012), available at http://gain.fas.usda.gov/
Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Wine%2OAnnual Canberra Australia 3-142012.pdf.
61. Id.
62. See Customs Strategy, supra note 59, at 1-2.
63. WORLD TRADE ORG., TRIPS: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, http://www.wto.org/
english/ tratope/trips e/gi background e.htm (last visited May 8, 2014).
64. See Customs Strategy, supra note 59, at 1-2.
65. See generally Cees Dekker, The Ambit of the Free Movement of Goods Under
the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories, 23 EUR. L. REV. 272, 724-26
(1998);

EUROPEAN

COMMISSION,

WHAT

IS

THE

COMMON

CUSTOMS

TARIFF?,

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/customs/customs duties/tariff
aspects/
index en.htm (last visited May 8, 2014).
66. See generally CARROLL & CROTHERS, U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 60.
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only range from a mere 9.9 cents per liter to 30.9 cents per liter.67
Maintaining higher tariff rates within the EU places Australian wine
companies at a disadvantage against EU wine companies competing for
international market share. The EU is complying with the present
conditions under the Uruguay Agreements, so Australia has no valid case
against the EU under the WTO.68 In turn, this has placed greater pressure
on the EU to rely on various non-tariff trade barriers to maintain protection
for their wine industry similar to those existing before the Uruguay Round
Agreement. 69 It is these non-tariff barriers that will increasingly need to be
the focus of attention for the Australian wine industry and government in
future WTO negotiations.7 °
IV. FREE CIRCULATION OF GOODS
In addition to tariffs, internal taxes, and subsidies, the EU imposes
various administrative and technical regulations considered by the industry
as barriers to the free circulation of goods. 71 These barriers include:
licensing regulations, labeling restrictions, marketing regulations,
regulations on oenological practices and certification regulations, discussed
briefly below. They may present themselves as silent critters in the context
of wine distribution agreements.
A. Licensing Regulations
The EU, through Commission Regulation 3388/81,72 established
detailed rules with respect to import licenses in the wine sector. Article 1
of this Commission Regulation requires that all wine imports into the

67.

AUSTRALIAN

DEP'T

OF

AGRIC.,

TARIFF

SCHEDULE

OF

AUSTRALIA,

http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us fta/final-text/Annex2bTariff
Elimination/Annex 2-B Australia Tariff Schedule.pdf; see also CARROLL &
CROTHERS, U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 60, at 1. See generally AUSTRALIAN
BUREAU OF STATISTICS,

AUSTRALIAN

SHIPMENTS OF WINE AND BRANDY IN AUSTRALIA BY

WINEMAKERS

AND

IMPORTERS
(2013),
available at
DANA BIASETTI, U.S. DEP'T OF

http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/8504.0;
AGRIC.,

2012

ITALY

EXPORTER GUIDE

(2013), available at http://www.calwin

export.comfiles/Wine /20AnnuaIRomeEU-27_3-1-2012.pdf.
68. See generally The Legal Texts, supra note 40, at 354-79.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Commission Regulation 3389/81, 1981 O.J. (L341) 2 (EEC) (laying down
detailed rules for export refunds in the wine sector).
72. ld. at 24.
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Community shall be subject to the production of an import license before
their wine can be imported into the EC.73 Among other things, the
following information is required for the license: the country of origin of
the wine producer, color of wine, tariff subheadings, and product
descriptions.74 Nations that participated in the Uruguay Round of GATT
recognized that the flow of international trade could be impeded by the
inappropriate use of import licensing procedures, and to counter this trade
barrier the participating members adopted the "Agreement On Import
Licensing Procedures. 75 This Agreement restricts nations from facilitating
unreasonable licensing requirements, resulting in the EU enacting policies
to comply with the Agreement. 76 Even though this regulation appears to be
a de minimis burden on a wine company exporting to the EU market, it
nevertheless is a barrier to trade.
B. Labeling Regulations
The EU imposes strict labeling requirements which, while Australia
has been somewhat successful in harmonizing labeling regulations with the
EU, pose a costly exercise for other New World producers such as
America.77 The labeling requirements the EU imposes on wine may be
found in a number of Council Regulations and the numerous amendments
to these regulations.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See MarrakeshAgreement, supra note 3, at annex IA.
76. See Commission Regulation 76/2008, 2008 O.J. (Li14) 3 (EC) (laying down
common detailed rules for the application of the system of import and export licenses
and advance fixing certificates for agricultural products; see also Commission
Regulation 1351/97, 1997 O.J. (L186) 5 (EC) (laying down special detailed rules in
respect of import and export licenses in the wine sector).
77. N.Y. Law School Ctr. for Int'l Law, United States/European Union: An
Agreement to Wine About, INT'L REV., Spring 2006, at 1-3, available at
http://www.nyls.edu/center for international law/wp-content/
uploads/sites/i 32/2013/08/CILNewsletterSpring2006.pdf.
78. See Reg. No. 583/2011, supra note 44; Reg. No. 607/2009, supra note 44; Reg.
No. 670/2011, supra note 44; see also Commission Regulation 1640/2000, 2000 O.1.
(L187) 43 (EC), amending Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 (L309) 1 (laying
down detailed rules for the description and presentation of wines and grape musts);
Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 O.. (L232) 13 (EEC) (laying down general rules for
the description and presentation of wines and grape musts) (no longer in force)

[hereinafter Council Regulation 2392/89]; Council Regulation 3201/90 of 16, 1990 O..
(L309) 1 (EEC) (laying down detailed rules for the description and presentation of
wines and grape musts) [hereinafter Council Regulation 3201/90].
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Broadly, Council Regulations provide the permissible and required
labeling requirements for imported wines. 79 These regulations draw a
distinction in their treatment of what information is required and limited on
wine labeling between imported wines described by reference to a
geographic area and imported wines that are not described by reference to a
geographic area. 80 For example, wine imports for retail sale must carry the
labels in the language of the importing country and provide specific
information including: the bottler's name and address, name of the region
where the grapes were grown, quality category (e.g. table wine, quality
wine, or quality wine with special attributes such as Cabernet), quality
control number which has been previously issued by an approved grading
agency, and alcohol content and net volume in metric units.81
Australia's labeling requirements, by comparison, are set out in
certain regulations. 82 Moreover, a wine importer must also be aware of,
and comply with, all the regulations and restrictions imposed by the
amendments to these Council Regulations.83 This process can be very time
consuming for a wine producer to have to read through in order to comply
with EU requirements. 84 Furthermore, although these regulations are
uniform within the individual EU states, local customs officials have the
ability to interpret and enforce these regulations.8 5 This method utilized by
the EU of interpreting and enforcing the regulations makes it cumbersome
and expensive for Australian wine
companies to conform to the local
86
customs officials' interpretation.

79.

See Reg. No. 670/2011, supra note 45.

80. Id.
81.

EUROPA, LABELLING OF WINE AND CERTAIN OTHER WINE SECTOR PRODUCTS,

http://europa.eu/ legislation summaries/other/121303_en.htm (last visited May 8,
2014).
82. See Australian Wine and Brandy CorporationAct 1980 (Austl.); see also Wine
Australia CorporationAct 1980 (Austl.).
83. Memorandum from Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau to All Wine
Exporters, availableat http://www.ttb.gov/pdf/vi l notice.pdf.
84. European Commission, Cutting Red Tape to Spur Growth, ENTERPRISE
INDUSTRY MAGAZINE, June 6, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/magazine/articles/
smes-entrepreneurship/articlel 1103_en.htm [hereinafter Cutting Red Tape].
85. Reg. No. 670/2011, supra note 44, at 7.
86. Cutting Red Tape, supra note 83.
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C. Marketing Regulations in Relation to Non-EU Wines
The EU also imposes marketing restrictions on imported wine.87 For
example, the EU has prevented the terms "table wine" and "reserve" from
appearing on non-EU wine. 88 The term "table wine" in Europe is known
by ordinary wine drinkers as a type that is consumed with everyday
meals.89 This restriction makes it extremely difficult for some New World
producers to market their wine as "dinner wine." 90 While New World wine
producers can get around this issue by selling clean skins to the EU, this
fails to generate as much money as a labeled wine would. 91 The only
guidance provided by the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms is that a table wine means a "grape wine with an alcohol content
not exceeding fourteen percent by volume., 92 US regulations on the use of
quality terms on wine sold in the US are less burdensome than the
regulations imposed by the EU for non-European wines sold in the EU,
requiring New World wine producers to factor this in from the outset of
93
production.
Further, no specific regulation exists against importers using the term
"reserve." Rather, the EU follows and implements the restrictions of
individual Member States in using the term for the labeling of non-EU
wine. 94 The term "reserve" is recognized by the EU as either fitting within
the French definition of a wine of superior quality, or the Spanish
interpretation of reserve as a wine from barrel aging.95 No such definition
for quality terms exists in Australia or in the US.
Further, the EU imposes other marketing regulations on imported
wines. First, all wines bottled for importation into the EU must carry a "lot

87. Commission Regulation 753/2002, 2002 O.J. (LI 18) 1 (EC).
88. Id.
89.

TABLE WINE,

http://www.virtualwineknow.com/2010/11/table-wine.html

(last

visited May 8, 2014).
90. Nicol Louw, Logistical Problems with Wine Exports, WINELAND, Oct. 2001,
available at http://wineland.co.za/archive/index.php?option=com-zine&view = article&
id=677:logistical-problems-with-wine-exports.
91. Id.
92. 27 C.F.R. § 4.21 (2013).
93. TABLE WINE, supra note 89.
94. Milo G. Coerper, Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting Wine
Appellations in the UnitedStates, 15 GEN. PRAC., SOLO & SMALL FIRM MAG. 42, 42-43

(1998).
95. FRENCH WINE CLASSIFICATION, http://www.slurp.co.uk/wine-pages/frenchwine-classification/ (last visited May 8, 2014).
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mark" so the EU can determine how to classify the wine. 96 The package
can possess any coding system except bar codes for use as a lot mark, as
long as the mark is preceded by an ostensible and distinct capital "L. '97
This imposes an added burden on New World wine producers whose
domestic laws do not require the mark. The EU has imposed unfair
marketing regulations on the treatment of awards on wine labels. The EU
only allows a wine bottle to display awards received in a competition
officially recognized in the EU.98 Ironically, the EU only recognizes its
own competitions,
which provides a disadvantage to New World wines in
99
marketing.

D. Quality Control
In a bid to deal with the increasingly competitive international
market, governments domestically appear to be increasingly active in
bringing about certain control measures with respect to wine trade. For
example, such support by governments, in this respect, exists in Portugal
and Spain and includes:
1. Quality control laws that specify boundaries of regions,
regulators for the production and naming of wines, and create
regional agencies to overseas production and enforcement of
regulations.
2. With assistance from the EU, research and development of
improved viticultural and enological technologies, and
monetary investment in training and physical equipment.
3. National marketing programs that promote their countries as
world class wine regions and assist individual producers to

96. Reg. No. 670/2011, supra note 45.
97. LABELLING REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTTLED SOUTH AFRICAN WINE INTENDED FOR
THE EUROPEAN UNION 7 (2012), available at http://www.sawis.co.za/winelaw/

download/EUlabellingguide July_2012.pdf.
98. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, LABEL APPROVAL CHECKLIST - EUROPEAN UNION 7
(2012), available at https://www.wineaustralia.com/en/Production%20and%20
Exporting/-/media/00001ndustry/o2OSite/Documents/Production%20and%2OExporting
/Labelling/Label%20Approval%20Checklist%20-%20EU.ashx.
99. See id.
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For example, with respect to the first abovementioned quality control
measure, Spain has introduced laws controlling wine production which
began in 1926 with the official demarcation of the Rioja region. 01' The
process was completed for the rest of the country in 1972 with the passage
of legislation that created the Instituto Nacional de Denomiaciones de
Origen (INDO) and established a system of Denominacion de Origen
(DO). 10 2 There presently exist 68 DOs in Spain. 10 3 Furthermore, since
joining the EU in 1986, Spain has had to conform to all regulations that
mandate continent wide standards for winemaking, land use, and the
marketing and distribution of alcoholic beverages. 0 4 In Spain, quality
wines, broadly speaking, are wines from the official DO, made from
authorized
varietals, and minified and aged according to the regulations of
05
that DO.
An additional level of quality control was created by law in 1988,
when Spain passed a law specifying that the most prestigious wine districts
will be designated as Denominacon de Origen Calificada (DOC) - that
being Spanish for "eminent" or "distinguished."'' 0 6 Initially, only Rioja was
designated a DOC. But in 2003, Priorat was also elevated to its prestigious
status. The quality level of a DO or DOC wine is indicated on its label by a
term that is based primarily on the amount of ageing that the wine received.
10 7
The requirements for ageing are spelled out separately for each district.
Most interesting, however, is Portuguese wine and regulation.
Portugal created the world's first demarcated wine region in 1756.
Because of certain political upheaval however, Portugal only finalized the

100.

REGULATION:

LAWS

THAT

REGULATE

THE

WINE

INDUSTRY

IN

SPAIN,

http://www.winesfromspain.com/
icex/cda/controller/pageGen/0,3346,1549487_
6763486 6778161 _0,00.html (last visited May 8, 2014) [hereinafter Regulation].
101. GREAT WINE AREAS: RIOJA, http://www.oxfordwine.co.uk/features/ summer08
/rioja.html (last visited May 8, 2014).
102. SPANISH WINE TYPES, http://www.spanish-wines.org/spanish-wines-types.html
(last visited May 8, 2014) [hereinafter Wine Types].
103. MAIN SPANISH WINE REGIONS, http://devinus.com/spanish-wine-do/ (last visited
May 8, 2014).
104. See Regulation, supra note 100.
105. Wine Types, supra note 102.

106. Id.
107. Id.
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creation of quality control laws for its wine trade following admittance into
the EU in 1986.108
The system of laws for Portugal's Deonominacao de Origem
Controlada is based on the Appelation d'Origine Controle system in
France. All laws are overseen by the Instituto da Vinhae Vinho, which
works closely with local authorities in each province. There exist certain
other guidelines governing the importing of alcoholic beverages into
Portugal. Often such guidelines are posited as or fall under the guise of a
quality control measure. One such measure in Portugal is that Port must
09
not only be made in the region, but shipped from Porto.'
V. REGULATIONS ON OENOLOGICAL PRACTICES

Wine, as an agricultural product, is subject to health and safety
regulations for the protection of consumers and so countries attempt to
protect the health and safety of wine consumers through the regulation of
oenological practices. Oenological practices are the specific methods used
by wine companies for the harvesting, production, and preservation of
wine.' 10 Both the EU and Australia regulate the oenological practices of
wines grown and produced for human consumption within their respective
markets.' 11 Nevertheless, the specific restrictions and regulations of
oenological practices that the EU imposes on imported wine are still
considered trade barriers." 2 The EU provided common rules for defining
the authorized oenological practices and processes for wine products to be
marketed and sold in the EU. 1 3 Wine products that fail to conform with
the authorized oenological practices and processes may not be legally

108. HISTORY OF PORTUGUESE WINE, https://bottlenotes.com/winecyclopedia/regionportugal-history (last visited May 8, 2014).
109. The Douro River region of Portugal claims the origin of Port wine and,
accordingly, seeks to augment the international level of protection for Port wines. The
Port industry is regulated by the Instituto dos Vinhos do Douro e Porto (IVDP). Portmuch like the French wine Champagne produced in the Champagne region of Franceis produced under very strict legal regulations. Port wine, under US -federal law, is
considered to be one of the sixteen semi-generic wines that currently are afforded legal
protection by the US government, but are not awarded as high of an indemnity as wines
classified as non-generic (see 26 U.S.C. § 5388 (2006)).
110.

CTR. FOR THE PROMOTION OF IMPORTS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, EU
WINE 2 (2008), available at http://www.allindiawine.con-/Portals/0

LEGISLATION:

/ACBIREPORT.pdf [hereinafter CBI].

111.

Id.

112.
113.

PETER J. GROVES, SOURCEBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 573 (1997).

CBI, supra note ll0, at2.
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marketed or sold within the EU. 114 For the most part, the EU rejects
oenological practices which do not specifically comport with intrinsic EU
methods and standards. 15 The EU methods and standards are provided in
various Council Regulations and the subsequent amendments to these
regulations."6 For example, the EU restricts the importation of wines that
do not maintain a standard minimum and maximum alcohol content. 17 As
another example, the EU mandates that oenological processes and practices
for wine intended for direct human consumption, amongst other similar
requirements, must conform to such 8 items as the use of heat treatment,
aeration, or bubbling using nitrogen."
The EU maintains that it regulates oenological practices for health,
safety, and quality reasons." 9 Nonetheless, these regulations amount to
trade barriers because not all countries utilize the same oenological
practices and processes as does the EU. 120 Many wine producing nations
possess their own unique system of oenological processes and practices. In
any event, a safe and effective oenological method takes time to develop
and perfect. These EU mandated standards effectively act as a trade barrier
to importers, because an importer must conform to these extremely
technical requirements of oenological methods. 121
VI. CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS

The certification regulations administered by the EU are closely
related to the labeling, marketing, and oenological regulations. Certification
regulation is the process that wine importers must go through to obtain
approval and become qualified to import. 22 The certification process is the
process which actually determines whether an importer is in compliance
with the labeling and oenological regulations. 23 The EU requires that
imported wines meet compositional limits according to European Union
24
standards.1

114. Id.
115. See Caoimhin MacMaolain, Eligibility Criteria for Protected Geographical
Food Names, 31 EUR. L. REV. 579, 580 (2006).
116. CB1, supra note l10, at 2.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. GROVES, supra note 112, at 573.
121. Id.
122. CBI, supra note 110, at 2.
123. Id.
124. Id.

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

(VOL. 10

In order for an exporter to demonstrate that these standards have been
met, a laboratory analysis is required which must be completed either by an
EU laboratory, or by a laboratory officially recognized by the country in
which the wine originated; 2 5 compliance which is time-consuming and
adds costs to the wine producer and thus a barrier to the free movement of
these products within the EU. While the EC-Australia Wine Agreement
allows for the mutual recognition of testing methods and certification
measures, not all New World countries are fortunate enough to obtain
concessions for the harmonization
of standards linked to the evolving EU26
1
standards.
legislative
wide
The implicit barriers to trade are a consequence of internal regulation
within the EU that do not appear to be superficially directed to curb
imports. 27 In reality, however, these regulations do have a protectionist
effect and therefore have the result of the EU monopolizing the GI sector of
wines. Monopolies are the kryptonite of competition - it can, nonetheless,
endure or even be fortified if they assist the evolution and development of
commerce to some extent. 128 As I see it, some of the above implicit
barriers to trade are justified as being consistent with what is seen as the
true mission of the TRIPS Agreement, to adopt intellectual property
policies that encourage countries to promote their national interest in the
way that will promote free trade. 29 But this is only a theoretical basis.
Trade is inhibited if one party does not have something to trade or lacks
leverage. With the increasing economic power of the EU, compared to, for
example, New World countries with less leverage, it is questionable
whether the TRIPS Agreement confers the same benefit on New World
countries in comparison to the Old World.
Further, the trade regime can be seen as a political regime.
Effectively, parties negotiate by banging their heads together until one
party's head gets soft. This assumes that they are willing to negotiate in the
first place. However, there are times when the political imperatives
preclude a trade approach. This is precisely the environment in which trade

125. MacMaolain, supra note 115, at 580.
126. GROVES, supra note 112, at 99.
127. Id. at 573.
128. See Rovamo, supra note 7.
129.

ILKKA RAHNASTO,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXTERNAL EFFECTS AND

ANTI-TRUST LAW: LEVERAGING IPRs IN THE COMMUNICATIONS

INDUSTRY 53-54

(2003); Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual Property
Organizationand the Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights Council in
Regulating Intellectual PropertyRights in the Information Age, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 578, 586 (1999).
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friction arises and one that brews competitive advantages over others. In
this regard, it remains to be seen whether the cobbled-together patchwork
of the TRIPS Agreement has the elegance necessary to survive more than a
decade, much less 100 years.
VII. OVERVIEW OF WINE DISTRIBUTION AND COMMERCIAL
CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the operation of international wine regulation from an
intellectual property rights perspective is a more subtle (but nevertheless
central) form of wine trade regulation, albeit from a contractual perspective
- wine distribution agreements. Such agreements, at least in theory, could
be seen to strike a balance between wine production and wine
consumption, but may nevertheless be influenced by domestic policy and
trade regulation. This section focuses predominantly on Europe and the US,
but averts from a discussion of pure marketing (including a comparison of
market share of wines in different countries), detailed economic analysis,
and an exhaustive discussion of legal themes.
A. The Nuts and Bolts
The sale of wine from a wine producer to a wine consumer can be a
very straightforward sale.
Wine Producer "- Consumer
However, in the international marketplace in particular, this simple
transaction between two parties can become a large number of different
transactions involving wine merchants, importers, distributors, wholesalers,
and retailers, before the final sale to someone who will actually drink the
wine. At any stage in the annals these parties can be represented by agents.
A comprehensive account of matters concerning wine vineyard production,
order and product flow, and international and domestic supply chain
atomization is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
Government departments become involved when wine is moved out
of one country and into another.
Other entities including storage
companies, road transport, shipping companies, bond stores, and insurance
companies may become involved and what started out as a simple
transaction ends up looking like a complex flow-chart. While a number of
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dimensions exist with respect to the abovementioned entities, this section
seeks to outline some of the practical contractual obligations that may exist.
Therein, contracts naturally reflect the comparative economic
bargaining power of the parties. 130 The "ideal" wine distribution contract
will vary among wineries and situations. The titles of some of the main
clauses present in such contracts (the drafting of which is not discussed in
this article), include:
" Recitals;
* Appointment;
" Territory Restrictions;
" Terms of Sale;
" Performance Standards (e.g. by wholesaler and/or winery)
" Terms of Agreement;
" Termination of Agreement;
" Liquidated Damages;
" Events Following Expiration or Termination;
" Claims, Damages, and Waiver;
" Warranties;
" Force Majeure;
" Notices;
" Severability;
" Governing Law;
* Waiver;
" Adherence to Laws;
" Entire Agreement;
" Nature of Agreement;
* Binding Agreement.
Parties should also be mindful of other factors, including domestic
laws and international obligations outlined in this article.' 3' Reference
should also be made to "INCOTERMS," introduced in 1936 by the
International Chamber of Commerce, which were designed to create a
bridge between different members of the industry by acting as a uniform
language they can use.1

130.

THEODORE

L.

BANKS,

DISTRIBUTION

LAW,

ANTITRUST

PRINCIPLES

AND

PRACTICE 86 (2nd ed. 2004).

13 1. For a comprehensive description of wine distribution laws in the US, see id.
132. INCOTERMS, http://www.foreign-trade,com/reference/incoterms.cfm
(last
visited May 8, 2014).
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Each INCOTERM refers to a type of agreement for the purchase and
shipping of goods internationally.133 There are eleven different terms, each
of which helps users deal with different situations involving the movement
of goods. 134 For example, the term FCA
is often used with shipments
35
involving Ro/Ro or container transport.
B. Domestic Factors

In addition to the above, a winery should also be aware of domestic
laws regarding bribery, registration of certain intellectual property such as
trademarks, the state's distribution system labeling requirements,
franchising laws (if relevant), and consumer protection laws (e.g. the three36
tier system), amongst other matters. 1
It is pertinent to, for example, examine the legal framework of a
state's distribution network, which may be comprised of "control" or "noncontrol" measures. 137 In relation to the former, a government "monopoly"
(broadly speaking) may exist for the wholesale distribution and sale of
wine.1 38 Control states (which exist mainly in the US) may sell directly to
the state, but would be required to appoint a broker or agent to assist them
in serving control state markets. In "non-control" or "open" states,
wineries from outside that state must generally sell to an in-state
wholesaler. 39 The wholesaler would, in-turn, sell the wine to retailers (i.e.
the "three-tier system", comprised of the winery/supplier, wholesaler, and
40
retailer).
VIII. SUMMARY

There is a notable increase in global trade in GI-related products over
the last sixty years that has resulted from a number of facets relating to

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
BANKS, supra note 130, at 4-5.
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 459.
WINE &

SPIRITS DISTS.

ILLINOIS: UNDERSTANDING

OF ILL.,

REGULATION OF BEVERAGE

ALCOHOL IN

THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM 2, available at http://wineand

spiritsill.com/images/Regulation%20ofP/ 20Beverage %20AIcohoI%20in%2011inois%
20Understanding%20the%2OThree%20-Tier/o2OSystem.pdf.
140. See id.
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For
political, economic, legal, and technological considerations.,4 '
example, there are increased transportation channels and methods of
choice, which facilitate fast movement of goods at competitive prices particularly for transcontinental transport. Of avid benefit has been the
establishment of international trade agreements, and international
instrumental bodies such as the WTO. These have been instrumental in
minimizing barriers to trade - including tariffs - as well as pruning nontariff barriers. Importantly, there has been a notable spur of consumer and
economic demand for GI-market products such as food, beverages, and
other drinks - particularly in countries such as China, Canada, the US,
Australia, and New Zealand. We now see that global markets have
precipitated from local markets, and therein established artisanal products,
such as champagne, Russian caviar, Tokaji, Gorgonzola, and even feta,
which are competing with modem options such as Australia or New
Zealand sparkling wines, American Paddlefish "Spoonfish" roe, Monterey
Jack, or Beyaz Peynir.
Of significance in this article is the ongoing issue surrounding GIs,
particularly for the international wine industry. Europe and the "Old
World" had previously led the way in the international wine market, but
now compete with producers in a number of "New World" countries,
including the US and Australia. Wine is a highly traded commodity and,
for two key powers in world trade - the EU and the US - is superimposed
transpires as reflecting
with cultural conflict.142 Viewed another way, 1this
43
New World technique against Old World terroir.
At the heart of Europe's keen efforts to expand GI protection is the
desire to preserve its historical and rich agricultural tradition. While the
US and other New World producers such as Australia are wary about
overtly strong GI protection (particularly at the WTO level), they do not
wholly reject the concept of GIs. Over 150 viticultural GIs are protected in
the US, including discrete designations such as the "Mississippi Delta"
wine-growing region. Further, precipitating from the relatively recent USAustralia Free Trade Agreement is Tennessee whisky, and Bourbon whisky
as protected GIs in Australia. The New World is, however, largely
opposed to the extension of the absolute protection standard of GI
protection to new food products, in addition to proposed procedural
extensions that would result in further embedding the absolute standard in
international law.
141. See Kal Raustiala and Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle over
GeographicIndications, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 337, 351 (2007).
142. See id.
143. See id.
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What is apparent is an intriguing parallel within the modem economy
of information and innovation in the form of GIs impelled to spout by a
spurring shift from local to global markets. And, on the flipside, rising
competition utilizes innovation to converge. While this article does not
endorse a claim that economic impetus drives all property claims, new
property rights are demanded by entities when cardinal benefits and costs
veer in an elemental manner. The evolution and prominence of GIs on an
international plateau highlights this. It is equally acknowledged that GI
partisans, who may seek to capitalize on GIs through the intellectual
property system, do fear the equalizing and homogenizing intrusion of
global competition.
As intellectual property rights aspire to conserve both stakeholders
(i.e. vineyards), and culture (i.e. heritage), GIs endure at the junction of
these foremost trends. Distribution agreements - specifically their
operation - are illustrative of this. This article has highlighted the
prominence of GIs on the international radar due to their assemblage of
cultural exchange, present globalization, and ongoing changes in consumer
preferences.
Moving forward, the compelling tread of technological progress and
unfolding impact of globalization, coupled with the expanding of global
economic liberalization, feasibly implies the ongoing presence of domestic
and international issues concerning wine in the present century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In mid-August of 2012, a group of Americans stormed the White
House, demanding transparency on a subject many Americans may find
surprising: beer.' More specifically, Americans requested White House
home brew recipes, a presidential secret until Barack Obama's
administration released them on September 1, 2012.2 Not only does
* Hannah Jeppsen received her J.D. from the University of Arkansas School of Law in
May 2014. She would like to thank Professor Dustin Buehler for his advice and
encouragement during the process of creating and drafting this article. She would also
like to thank her home brewing friends, who inspired her to write this article.
1. Petition to Release the Recipe for the Honey Ale Home Brewed at the White
House, WE THE PEOPLE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/release-recipe-honeyale-home-brewed-white-house/XkpkYwcO (last visited May 22, 2014) [hereinafter
Petition].
2. Sam Kass, Ale to the Chief: White House Beer Recipe, WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Sept. 1, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/09/01/ale-chief-whitehouse-beer-recipe; see also Lucy Madison, White House Releases its Beer Recipe, CBS
NEWS, Sept. 1, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544 162-57504866-503544/
white-house-releases-its-beer-recipe/. The administration released the recipes after
more than 12,000 Americans signed a petition on the White House website. See
Petition, supra note 1.
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Obama enjoy a good home brew, 3 he is also the first president to brew in
the White House and even take beer on the campaign trail.4 However, it
was the August petition that garnered home brewing national media
attention.5
What is the appeal of home brewing? How is it currently regulated
on the state and federal level? Is it possible, for a home brewer to monetize
his or her product? This article provides answers to these questions by
examining existing home brewing regulations, delving into the financial
issues and risks a home brewer faces in attempting to sell beer on the
brewery or microbrewery scale, and then proposing legislation to correct
problems in existing law.
Section II of this article explores a brief history of brewing, including
the creation of the first home brew and its deep roots in American history.
Section III notes the explosion of the modem home brewing hobby.
Section IV then describes federal and state regulations governing home
brewing, from Prohibition to current laws. Lastly, Section V addresses the
main problems facing home brewers who seek to monetize their product. It
further explores regulations passed in various states and proposes a
framework for permits or licenses that would allow home brewers to sell
their product on a small scale.
II. BREWING IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL LOOK
Home brewing has roots in ancient societies, and for thousands of
years brewing was done at home. 6 As cities and towns developed, smalltown breweries proliferated as beer gained popularity due to the scarcity of
clean drinking water.7 Less beer was brewed in the home as these

3. Kass, supra note 2.
4. Id.; Petition, supra note 2. This is not the first time home brewing has taken on
a presidential air. While Obama is the first president to brew beer in the White House he started with a kit in 2011 - presidents such as George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson brewed off White House grounds. Id.; see also CHARLES PAPAZIAN, THE
COMPLETE JOY OF HOME BREWING 1-2 (3rd ed. 2003); Rebecca Berg, A Petition to the
White House: Give up the Beer Recipe, THE CAUCUS (Aug. 22, 2012, 7:33 PM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/ 08/22/a-petition-to-the-white-house-give-upthe-beer-recipe/.
5. C. Frye, Try the White House Ale Recipes, THE EXAMINER, Sept. 5, 2012,
http://www.examiner.com/article/try-the-white-house-ale-recipes.
6. PAPAZIAN, supra note 4, at 5. The first beer may have been brewed by accident
in the Mesopotamian and Egyptian cultures when it was discovered that wet barley
turned to sweet malted barley which, when left in the rain, fermented into a "malt
soup" that was consumed regularly.

7.

Id. at 6.
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breweries became more prominent.' Regional, distinctive beers then
developed, with their flavor and content depending on the agriculture and
climate of the region, among a variety of other factors. 9
Beer arrived on American shores with the colonists in the 1600s.10
Throughout the seventeenth century, colonists brewed beer at home for
daily table use, while more affluent families imported it from England.11
Home brew was not sold outside the home, however, because it was
exempt from the per-barrel excise tax 12 levied on beverages at that time.' 33
Beer drinking remained strong throughout the 1600s, but the
introduction of beverages such as rum, wine, coffee, and tea began to
decrease beer consumption on a per capita basis.' 4 As colonists' discontent
over English taxes in the mid-1700s increased, beer was forced to the
forefront of the controversy when it was included in the boycotts of British
imports in reaction to high taxes. 15 Some colonists viewed these boycotts
in order
as an encouragement to home-manufacture goods, including beer,
16
to "render the consumption of foreign liquors less necessary.'
For several decades following the Revolutionary War, brewing was17
done mostly by housewives at home or in small, local breweries.
However, the growing popularity of spirits such as whiskey led to the need
to encourage the manufacture of beer on an industrial level.' 8 Efforts to
stimulate the industry proved fruitless, and the export and sale of American
deteriorated, by 1820 due to the
beer had diminished, if not completely
9
beverages.'
other
of
popularity

8. Id.at 6-7.
9. Id. These factors included indigenous grains, availability of local ingredients,
wartime priorities, shortages of grain, economics, other political factors, and the
presence of high taxes on alcohol. Id. at 7-8.
10.

STANLEY WADE BARON, BREWED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF BEER AND ALE IN

THE UNITED STATES 3 (1962). While initially all beer was shipped from England, the

Colonists later used barley and water to produce their own brews, making it a universal
beverage because "water was, generally speaking, not to be trusted." Id. at 5-6.
11. Id. at31.
12. Id. at 31-35. This tax was generally one shilling per barrel of "strong beer or
ale." Id.at 35.
13. Id.
14. Id.at 56-57. Despite this decline in consumption, more beer was manufactured,
imported and consumed in the eighteenth century as compared to previous centuries
due to the increase in population. Id. at 58.
15. Id.at 90.
16. Id.at 92.
17. Id.at 115.
18. Id. at 119-22.
19. Id. at 123-24. This decline occurred despite both private and official attempts to
stimulate the brewing industry. ld.at 124.
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The nineteenth century saw a revitalization of brewing as American
frontiers expanded, creating new markets for brewers.20 Advances such as
steam power positively affected the brewing industry, while other
inventions simplified the home brewing process. 2' This led to a rise in
local breweries, and by 1850, 431 American breweries were producing
about 750,000 barrels of beer per year.22 The number of emerging
breweries jumped to 1269 during the next ten years.2 3 However, in the
period between 1880 and 1910, small-town brewery numbers decreased
when a select number chose to focus on nationwide distribution through the
use of railroads and technological advances. 24 By 1900, founders of these
large breweries formed a group of extremely wealthy "beer barons" and
dynasties such as Pabst Blue Ribbon, MillerCoors, and Anheuser-Busch,
which had a powerful presence in the market.2 5
The reign of "beer barons" came to a jarring halt with Prohibition in
1920, which prohibited the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors" in the United States as well as the import and export
of any alcoholic beverages.2 6
Officials enforced the Eighteenth
Amendment through the Volstead Act, passed by Congress on May 19,
1919.27 The Act's purpose was to "prohibit intoxicating beverages" banned
by the Eighteenth Amendment. 2 8 After the United States Supreme Court

20. Id. at 125.
21. Id. at 157-61. One such invention was the "tripartite copper," which filtered
water through perforations over the malt repeatedly by means of a pump. Id. at 161.
Later, steam was found to save on labor costs in breweries by replacing heat,
previously provided by open fires, with a more "reliable and economical" method. Id.
at 229.
22. Id. at211.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 257-58.
25. Id. at 287-88; see also ANHEUSER-BUSCH, http://anheuser-busch.com/ (last
visited May 22, 2014); MILLERCOORS, http://www.millercoors.com/ (last visited May
2, 2014); PABST BLUE RIBBON, http://pabstblue ribbon.com/ (last visited May 22,
2014).

26. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealedby U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1,available
at http://www.gpo.gov/

fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-

19.pdf. The amendment was passed by Congress on December 18, 1917, but not
ratified until January 16, 1919. The Constitution of the United States, Amendments II27, ARCHIVES.Gov,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitutionamend
ments_1 1-27.html (last visited May 21, 2014).

27.

Prohibition of Intoxicating Beverages Act of 1919, H.R. 6810, 66th Cong., at 1

(1st Sess. 1919), available at http://research.archives.gov/description/299827
[hereinafter Volstead Act]. This act was also known as the "National Prohibition Act."

28. Id. Intoxicating beverages prohibited were defined as "alcohol, brandy, whisky,
rum, gin, beer, ale, porter and wine." Id. at 2. However, the Act also provided that
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upheld the Volstead Act as constitutional, 29 American brewing on a
national scale came to a standstill, 30 with the exception of brewers such as
Anheuser-Busch and MillerCoors, who continued brewing "near beer ' 31
with trace amounts of alcohol allowed by law.32
Prohibition inspired an "explosion in home brewing., 33 From the
Roaring 1920s to 1933, beer consumption in the United States increased to
twenty-five percent of its pre-Prohibition consumption rate, and home
brewers brewed 700 million gallons of beer annually during that period.34
Prohibition agents, who enforced Prohibition, 35 were generally
unconcerned about home-brewed beer, as seizure of large quantities and
producers was their main goal, and instead focused enforcement efforts on
the more potent and dangerous liquors being made at home.36

"dealcoholized" wine or liquids containing one-half one percent alcohol by volume
were not prohibited. Id. at 1.
29. Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 282-300 (1920). In that case, a
brewery owner was accused of possessing beer with alcoholic content of more than
one-half of one percent alcohol by volume in violation of the Act. Id. at 280. On
appeal, Ruppert contended the alcohol content of his beer did not make it
"intoxicating" despite the requirements of the Act, and claimed the Volstead Act
exceeded the war powers of Congress. Id. In affirming the alcohol content made it an
intoxicating beverage, the Court also reaffirmed Congress' power to enact the
Prohibition under its wartime powers, granted by the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8.
Id. at 282-300; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
30. BARON, supra note 10, at 313.
31. "Near Beer," MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/near%/620beer (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). This is defined as any beverages
that are considered nonalcoholic because they contain less than a specified amount of
alcohol. The first use of the term "near beer" dates back to 1909.
32. Chronology of the American Brewing Industry, BEERHISTORY.COM, http://www.
beerhistory.com/ library/holdings/chronology.shtml (last visited May 22, 2014). The
Act did not ban "dealcoholized" beverages that contained one-half of one percent
alcohol by volume. See VolsteadAct, supra note 27, at 1.
33. Amy Jabloner, Home Brewing During Prohibition, BREW YOUR OWN, Dec.
1997, available at http://byo.com/ stories/issue/item/839-homebrewing-duringprohibition (last visited May 22, 2014).
34. Id. This figure was estimated by the Prohibition Bureau from sales figures of
hops, malt, and other beer ingredients. Id. In the same period, it was estimated that the
sale of these ingredients, as well as home brewing equipment such as bottle cappers
and tubing, made up sales of about $136 million annually by the mid-1920s. Id.
35. Bureau of Prohibition, ALCOHOL: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, http://www2.
potsdam.edu/hansondj/Controversies/Bureau-of-Prohibition.html (last visited May 22,
2014). These agents were members of the Bureau of Prohibition, which existed from
1920-1933 in order to enforce Prohibition and was a federal agency that replaced the
Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury Department, which had originally been
designated to enforce the Act. Id.
36. Id.
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The boom in home brewing declined after Prohibition, when
commercial breweries resumed production. 37 Large beer producers were
able to survive Prohibition by selling malt products, an ingredient used in
the production of beer but also used in various foods, non-alcoholic
beverages, and other materials, 38 and were in a better position to regain
their footing after the repeal of Prohibition by the Twenty-First
Amendment in 1933.39 As a result, large breweries dominated the beer
industry following Prohibition.40
While the repeal of Prohibition legalized commercial production of
beer and home winemaking, a stenographer's mistake omitted home brew
beer from the Federal Register. 41 As a result, home brewing remained
illegal until President Jimmy Carter signed a bill repealing federal
restrictions in February 1979.42 This law provided for production of beer
43
or wine for "personal or family use," subject to regulation by the States.
Home brewing was now legal on the federal level.
Alcohol is and has historically been subject to strict limitations in the
United States and is heavily regulated by the state and federal
governments. 44 Concern for health, public safety, and other considerations5
'
have led to countless detailed regulations of "intoxicating beverages. A
However, despite these heavy regulations, the decades following the
federal legalization of home brewing brought a revitalization of
46
appreciation for beer in America.

37. Id.
38. Id.; see also Joe Hickenbottom, Mali in Foods, MALT PRODUCTS CORP.,
http://www.maltproducts.com/ news.maltinfood.html (last visited May 22, 2014).
39. PAPAZIAN, supra note 4, at 8; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. This
amendment was passed by Congress on February 20, 1933 and was then ratified
December 5 of the same year.
40. PAPAZIAN, supra note 4, at 8.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id.
43. An Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H.R. 1337, 95th Cong. §2
(1 st Sess. 1978); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5053(e).
44. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Controlled Substances: An Overview, LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alcohol (last visited on May
22, 2014) [hereinafter LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE].
45. Id. "Intoxicating beverages" vary from state-to-state, with some statutes
defining the beverages or prescribing a cut-off in alcohol percentage. For example,
Mississippi defines an "intoxicating beverage" as any beverage containing more than
two-tenths of one percent alcohol by volume.
46. Id.; see also PAPAZIAN, supra note 4, at XXII.
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III. THE RISE OF MODERN HOME BREWING

Even before home brew was officially legalized, the hobby of
brewing beer at home had gained popularity. 47 After its legalization in
1979, tens of thousands of home brewers began honing their craft. 48 This
continued into the 2000s, when the so-called "craft beer renaissance"
increased demand for home brew supplies as the hobby's popularity
exploded.4 9
In 2011, there were about 500,000 to 750,000 home brewers in the
United States. 50 Currently, home and craft brewers produce approximately
fifteen million gallons of beer annually, making up twenty-five percent of
the beer consumed in the United States market.5' Some 600 brewing
associations and clubs now exist worldwide, further illustrating the hobby's
rise in popularity.5 2 The American Homebrewers Association estimates
that currently, at least one million Americans brew beer or wine at home at
least once a year. 53
Another reason for the prevalence of home brewing is that basic tools
and ingredients are readily available through home brew suppliers, which
can be found locally and online.54 Indeed, active home brewers spend an

47. LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Company History, NORTHERN BREWER, http://www.northembrewer.com/
about/history/ (last visited May 23, 2014).
50. Charlie Papazian, How Much Homebrew is Brewed in the USA?, EXAMINER,
June 22, 2011, http://www.examiner.com/article/how-much-homebrew-is-brewed-theusa. This number is an estimate of all home brewers who brew beer at least once per
year, with an average of four five-gallon batches annually.
51. Id.
52. Joel Dames, Homebrewing for Fun, Taste and Profit, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 11,
1999, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/ text/fgl9991111a2.html. These range from 300
members in a home brewers club located in Kobe, Japan, to the American Home
Brewers Association, whose membership tops about 30,000. Id; see also Quick Facts,
AM. HOMEBREWERS ASS'N, http://www.homebrewersassociation.org/pages/ member
ship/american-home brewers-association (last visited May 23, 2014).
53. Jeff Engel, Homebrewing Legal in All 50 States After Mississippi Law Takes
Effect, MILWAUKEE BIZTALK (July 1, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/
milwaukee/blog/2013/07/homebrewing-legal-in-all-50-states.html?page=all.
54. Advertising, BREW YOUR OWN, http://byo.com/advertising [hereinafter BYO]
(last visited May 23, 2014); Beer Brewing, NORTHERN BREWER HOMEBREW SUPPLY,
http://www.northembrewer.com/shop/brewing?gclid=CL7ekt
_Mp7ICFWZfITAodUioAIg (last visited May 23, 2014); MONSTER BREW,
http://monsterbrew.com/CatEquipmentKits.cfm?gclid=CMrZltbMp71CFadNTAodchEAqQ (last visited May 23,
2014). The Northern Brewer started as a small storefront struggling to pay rent in 1993
in St. Paul, Minn., then grew to a national corporation in the 2000s with a warehouse
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average of $732 per year on home brewing equipment and supplies, adding
up to about $65 million in sales annually." Home brewing's process, along
with the technique and skill it takes to master the craft, make it a rewarding
hobby for those who enjoy the process.56
1g.REGULATIONS: A FEDERAL AND STATE OVERVIEW

The current federal statute governing home brewing allows for
production of 200 gallons of home brew beer per year in a household of
two or more adults, and 100 gallons in a single adult household. 57 "Adults"
permitted to produce beer under the statute must be a minimum of eighteen
years of statutory age in the applicable jurisdiction.5 8 Further, the statute
explicitly states home brewed beer may only be made for "personal or
family use and not for sale.", 59 It is important to note that in order for the
proposal set forth in this article to be applied at the state level, this
provision of the federal statute would first need to be loosened to allow or
least not specifically prohibit the sale of home brew. Amending the federal
statute would solve any problems
with federal preemption of the changes in
60
here.
proposed
law
state
The Twenty-First Amendment leaves the regulation of alcoholic
beverages largely to the states, and while home brewing is federally legal,
states must authorize it by statute in order for citizens to brew freely. 6' All
fifty states now authorize home brewing. 62 States typically legalize home

and world headquarters. Company History, NORTHERN BREWER HOMEBREW SUPPLY,
http://www.northembrewer.com/about/history/ (last visited May 23, 2014).. Local
brewery supply stores such as The Home Brewery in Fayetteville, Ark. offer online

products as well as a locally-owned and operated brewing supply store. About Us,
http://www.thehomebrewery.com/Merchant2/merchant.mv?
Screen=CTGY&StoreCode=THB&CategoryCode=aboutus (last visited May 23,
THEHOMEBREWERY.COM,

2014).
55. BYO, supra note 54. This figure was compiled by Brew Your Own Magazine's
survey of its 130,000 readers.
56. Terrah Baker, The Buzz On Home Brewing, FREE WKLY., Sept. 27, 2012,
http://www.freeweekly.com/2012/09/27/ the-buzz-on-home-brewing/.
57. An Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H.R. 1337, 95th Cong. §2
(lst Sess. 1978); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5053(e).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 5053(e); H.R. 1337, 95th Cong. §2(e)(2) (1978).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 5053(e); H.R. 1337, 95th Cong. §2(e) (1978).
60. This article's main focus is on potential changes in state law, although federal
law must also be considered in a bigger statutory scheme. However, the author has
chosen to focus mainly on local and state changes.
61.

Statutes, AM.

HOMEBREWERS

ASS'N, http://www.homebrewersassociation.org

homebrewing-rights/statutes/ (last visited May 23, 2014).
62. Id.
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brewing by mirroring the federal statute by placing a limit of 100 gallons of
beer per adult per year with a maximum of 200 gallons per household.63
While some apply a different cap on the legal amount, these statutes
generally expressly prohibit the sale of home brew. 64 Currently, seventeen
states restrict the transportation of home-brewed beer outside the home,
while others limit consumption to family 65members, guests, or specify that
consumption must take place in the home.
Some states take a more permissive approach, allowing transportation
outside the home. For example, California law provides that beer made for
personal or family use may be removed from the premises for "use,
including tasting by judges, in a bona fide competition or exhibition [or]
when donated to a nonprofit organization. '' 66 Wisconsin has a similar law,
allowing for transportation of home brew or wine outside the home without
a permit as long as the brewer is not compensated. 67 It further exempts
home brew and wine from69taxation.68 Currently, no state has legalized the
sale of home-brewed beer.
Only two states prohibited home brewing until recent legislation:
Mississippi and Alabama. 70 While Mississippi Code § 67-3-11 created the
right to make homemade wine for "domestic or household uses only,"
home-brewed beer is not included as an exception. 7' Harsh penalties result
for a violation of the statute, including fines of up to $500 and three months

63. You Can Create Your Own Homebrew, But Don't Try To Sell It, LAWYERS.COM,
Oct. 15, 2012, http://blogs.lawyers.com/2012/10/you-can-create-your-own-homebrewbut-dont-try-to-sell-it/ (last visited May 23, 2014) [hereinafter Create Your Own]; see
also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-210 (1987) (providing that that no permit is needed
for the home manufacture of beer that does not exceed 200 gallons per year); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-77 (West 2012) (providing that non-minors may produce homebrewed beer without a permit as long as production does not exceed 100 gallons per
year for household with two twenty-one-year-old persons or fifty gallons per year for a
household with one twenty-one-year-old resident. This statute also prohibits the sale of
home brew); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-1-2-3 (West 2012) (the Indiana statute does not
prohibit the manufacture of beer used for personal or family use, use in the residence of
the manufacturer, or use at exhibitions, competitions, etc. However, the statute
prohibits the sale of home brew or wine).
64. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-210 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-77
(West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-1-2-3 (West 2012).
65. Create Your Own, supra note 63.
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23356.2(c) (West 2012).
67. Engel, supra note 53.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. ALA. CODE § 28-1-1 (1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-1-9 (1972).
71. MISS.CODEANN. § 67-3-11 (1972).
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imprisonment in a county jail on the first infraction, with penalties
substantially increasing for multiple infractions.72
Luckily, Mississippi home brewers no longer have to fear the
possibility of such charges after a law permitting home brew was passed
and signed into law on July 1, 2013. 73 The new law provides for home
brewing and winemaking for domestic or household uses only by persons
over twenty-one years old, except in dry counties.74 It takes an approach
similar to that of sister states, by allowing for 100 or 200 gallons of home
brew per year, depending on household size, and permitting transportation
of home brew only to bona fide competitions or exhibitions, and
completely prohibiting its sale.75
Before legalizing home brewing in May of 2013, Alabama took an
even stricter approach to its ban on home brewing.7 6 The state prohibited
both home brewing and winemaking and made the possession of any home
brewing equipment illegal. 77 Section 28-1-1 of the Alabama Code, recently
amended by House Bill 9, prohibited the possession of any "apparatus to be
used for the manufacture of any alcoholic beverages of any kind., 78 The
statute also prohibited the manufacture, transportation, or importation of
any alcoholic beverage without a license. 79 According to Alabama's Right
to Brew, an advocacy group dedicated to legalizing home brewing in the
state and whose 6fforts were key in passing permissive legislation, the
current bill legalizing home brew was unexpectedly reintroduced and
passed during the 2013 legislative session with a vote of 18-7-1.8°
Alabama has continued its strict approach to home brew and
winemaking in the new statute. It provides for the production of beer,
mead, cider, and table wine by persons twenty-one years of age and older
for personal use. 8' However, the law limits production to an aggregate of
sixty gallons per year, with a limit of fifteen gallons allowed in a household

72. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-9 (2)(a)-(c).
73. Statues, supra note 61.
74. MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-3-1 1(2)(a); S.B. 2183, Reg. Session (Miss. 2013), § 2(a),
available at http://biIlstatus.Is.state.ms.us/documents/2013/pdf/SB/2 100-2199/SB2 183

SG.pdf.
75.
76.
77.

MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-9 (2)(a)-(c):
Statues, supra note 61.
ALA. CODE § 28-1-1 (West 2012) (amended).

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Brant Warren, Newsletter: Passed in the Senate, and On to the Governor!,
HOMEBREWING LEGALIZATION (Right to Brew, Ala.), May 7, 2013, available at
http://www.alahomebrewing.org/news/newsletterpassedthesenate andontothegovernor.
81. H.R. 9, Reg. Session (Ala. 2013), available at http://legiscan.com/AL/text/
HB9/id/841580/Alabama-2013-H B9-Enrolled.pdf.
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at one time,8 2 far below the 100-gallon limit per person other states allow.
Further, felons are barred from producing home brew, and transportation
outside the home is only permitted when removed for home brew events or
competitions approved by the state alcohol licensing board. 83 Even then,
transportation of home brew is limited to ten gallons or less. 84 Lastly, the
statute strictly prohibits the sale of home brew.85
Even when in force, the two state's laws prohibiting home brew did
not stop residents from brewing home brew. In 2013, the American
Homebrewers Association estimated that about 2000 home brewers in
Mississippi and 5000 home brewers in Alabama continued to brew beer
despite its prohibition.8 6 Though these figures are small in comparison to
the current one million United States home brewers, these numbers show
the dedication of home brewers to their craft despite contrary state
legislation.
V. ANALYSIS: IN A PERFECT WORLD

Two major issues confront home brewers looking to monetize their
hobby. The first is the absence of licensing for the sale of home brew due
to the lack of a state permit authorizing a middle ground between home
brewing and selling beer on the brewpub or microbrewery scale. The
second is that, as a result of the absence of a middle-ground permit, a home
brewer faces significant financial constraints in starting a full-on brewery
or microbrewery-restaurant from a simple home-brewing hobby.
This article briefly addresses these two issues. It then proposes a
permit that could be adopted by states to allow home brewers to sell and
brew beer from a small location, such as a garage or small shed, either to
local bars, at farmers markets, or directly to consumers. This proposal is
based largely on existing statutes in Arkansas and Maryland that have been
modified and applied to home brewing to create a smaller-scale alternative
for home brewers who wish to monetize the craft. As mentioned earlier,
this proposal assumes a loosening of federal statute to allow sale of home
brew in order to avoid preemption at the state level.

82. Id. at § I(a).
83. Id. at §§ (a), (c).
84. Id. at § 1(c).

85. Id. at § 1(b).
86. Bill Chappell, Yes Mississippi, You Can Home Brew (if Governor Signs New
Bill), NPR, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/03/06/17363
4009/yes-mississippi-you-can-homebrew-if-govemor-signs-new-bill.
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A. Licensing
In order to sell any beer, including any home-brewed beverage, the
brewer must retain a license from the jurisdiction in which he or she
brews. 87 In general, this process is complex, time-consuming, and
expensive. While most states put a cap on the number of gallons of home
brew allotted per household, production above that limit requires a special
license or permit.88 The process of getting such a license varies from stateto-state, and can last anywhere from a few months to half a year or more,
depending on the licensing laws of the state. 89 Costs vary as well - for
example, a brewery license in Pennsylvania costs $1500,9 0 but an annual
fee for operating a microbrewery costs only $200 in Arkansas. 9 1
The governing federal statute, H.R. 1337, provides only for home
brewing of beer for "personal or family use.",92 The United States Code
limits personal or family use to only use within the home, and specifically
bans the sale of home brew. 93 It is illegal to sell home brew partly because
the hobby of home brewing is exempt from taxes. 94 Even "a hint" of a
sales transaction could lead to civil and criminal penalties. 95 In tandem
96
with these federal regulations, all states prohibit the sale of home brew.
Consequently, in order to gain a permit to sell to friends or on a small
scale, a home brewer must wade through a considerable amount of red
tape.97 Possible requirements include paying a tax per bottle,9 8 taking an

87. Amanda Baltazar, Getting Legal, ALL ABOUT BEER, Jan. 1 2010, available at
http://allaboutbeer.com/live-beer/brewing/brewing-features/2010/01/getting-legal/.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 614-A (West 2012), available at http://www.legis.state.
pa.us/WUO1/LI/LIUS/PDF/ 1929/0/0175..PDF. Pennsylvania charges a total of $1425
for a licensing fee in addition to a $700 application fee.
91. ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-1205 (1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23320 (West
2013). Fees in California include a $73.00 annual fee for small beer manufacturers and
a $200 application fee, plus the $13,800 annual fee for brewpub owners brewing no
less than 100 barrels per year. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23396.3 (West 2013).
92. Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, H.R. 1337, 95th Cong. §2
(1st Sess. 1978).
93. 26 U.S.C. § 5053(e).
94. Create Your Own, supra note 63.
95. Pint of Reference: A Guide to the Federal Homebrewing Exemption Statute,
AM.
HOMEBREWERS
Ass'N,
https://www.homebrewersassociation.org/forum/
index.php?topic=8228.0 (last visited May 23, 2014).
96. Create Your Own, supra note 63.
97. Gareth Lewis, Robert Shields Red Tape Nightmare Over Selling Home Brewed
Beer, SOUTHERN DAILY ECHO, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.dailyecho.co.uk/news/
4688385.Redtape_headachefor homebrewer/.
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alcohol training course, 99 and consenting to a criminal background check °°
in order to be approved for a permit to sell.' 0' In other words, home
brewers who want to sell their product are limited to opening
microbreweries or brewpubs.
Starting a small brewpub or microbrewery can be challenging. For
example, in states like Colorado, a brewpub must operate a kitchen and
gain fifteen percent of its profits from food sales. 0 2 Additionally, the
applicant must provide fingerprints for background checks on managers,
complete more than a dozen detailed documents, be subjected to a public
hearing before opening the business, and pay about $1800 in application
10 3
fees.
Currently, no existing state permits or licenses allow a home brewer
to sell beer on a scale smaller than that of a brewpub or microbreweryrestaurant. In order to sell their craft beer in smaller amounts, a home
brewer must wade through the same bureaucratic process a larger brewery
undertakes.' °4 No "middle ground" exists on which a home brewer can try
to gain footing and a business audience in the local market before
launching a full-scale brewery business. The absence of a small-scale,
"middle ground" permit used to sell home brew - for example, at farmers'
markets or out of a garage - before investing substantial funds needed for
a brewery or brewpub leaves a large gap in home brewers' options for
monetizing their product. This lack of choice leads to substantial time
spent on a complex process meant to regulate larger breweries with more
resources and experience. This process includes the numerous forms and

98. N.C. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., NORTH CAROLINA TAX GUIDE 2010
11 (2010), availableat http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/files/pdf files/201OTaxGuide.pdf.
99. N.H. Liquor Comm'n: Div. of Enforcement & Licensing, Management Training
Seminar (MTS.) Events Schedule, NH.GOV, http://www.nh.gov/liquor/enforcement/
education/mts/index.htm (last visited May 23, 2014). This mandatory Management
Training Seminar includes training on alcohol sales practice and civil and criminal
liabilities. Id.

&

MICRO BREWER
available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/cis Icc brewdetail_57148_7.pdf (requiring that
100.

MICH. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM'N, MICHIGAN BREWER

LICENSING

REQUIREMENTS

&

GENERAL

INFORMATION

4,

all partnership and limited liability company members be fingerprinted).
101. Lewis, supra note 97.
102. Brew Pub License, DENVER BUS. LICENSING CTR, http://www.denvergov.org/
DenverBusinessLicensingCenter/LiquorLicenses/BrewPub/tabid/
businesslicensing/
441798/Default.aspx (last visited May 24, 2014).
103. New Liquor License, DENVER BUS. LICENSING CTR.., http://www.denver
gov.org/busisnesslicensing.DenverBusinessLicensingCenter/LiquorLecenses/New
LiquorLicense/tabid/441741/Default.aspx (last visited May 24, 2014).
104. See Lewis, supra note 97.
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documents that must be completed in order to sell only a small amount of
home brew, in addition to money spent on fees.' °5
A mid-level permit is clearly needed. This "middle ground" permit
would be designed to be as legally effective as existing permits but less
complex and strict, and therefore be a better fit for brewers looking to sell
only a small portion of beer in comparison to the amount sold by a
brewery, microbrewery, or brewpub. A "middle ground" permit would
allow home brewers to monetize their craft without the significant hassle
and financial commitment the current process creates.
B. FinancialIssues
In the absence of a "middle ground" permit for brewers wishing to
break into the industry, home brewers are therefore provided the sole
option of starting a microbrewery, brewpub, or other similar small
businesses. While the number of these businesses has grown in recent
years - reflecting increased demand for craft beer - starting a business
like this is no small task and involves significant financial risk. 10 6 Start-up
costs for a small brewery or microbrewery can range from $450,000 to
$800,000.'0° Additionally, start-up costs for a brewpub can average a few
million dollars, depending on its size. 10 8 Once started, brewers are then
faced with the problem of finding distributors, such as local bars, to sell
new product that is untested by consumer demand. 109
The most formidable financial challenge is acquiring capital. While a
small business loan may suffice, the economic downturn caused many
banks to create more stringent lending terms and they are now more
0
reluctant to provide loans due to the failures of similar small businesses."
This forces brewing entrepreneurs to seek financial backing from private

105. See generally, supra notes 86-87, 94-97; see also David Kesmodel, In Lean
Times, a Stout Dream, WALL STREET J., Mar. 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 123733628873664181 .html.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The brewpub and microbrewery are two different entities. A brewpub is
akin to a tavern and brews its own beer for on-premises consumption, while a
microbrewery is a free-standing brewery that sells to taverns or other restaurants and
essentially operates like a manufacturer. Mike Coulter, Building a Microbrewery, 4
NEW BREWER,

available at http://www.cemcorp.com/articlesibrewery2.htm.

These

costs include the price of the property, equipment, and other assets needed to
successfully start a small business. Kesmodel, supra note 105.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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investors or raise their own funds instead of seeking out small-business
loans. 1'1
A permit allowing home brewers to sell their home brew on a small
scale offers a solution to these financial roadblocks. First, any home
brewer who wishes to monetize their hobby will likely already have or can
acquire the equipment and experience needed to produce beer above the
legal home brewing amount. These brewers are those who maximize the
jurisdictional home brew cap each year and whose ultimate goal is to start a
microbrewery or brewpub but are unable to find the capital to do so.
Further, these home brewers are likely to know the risk associated with
starting a brewery business and will be hesitant to take that risk without
first investigating the success of such a project.
The proposed "middle ground" permit creates many benefits for home
brewers in adopting states. Firstly, it will enable home brewers in that state
to begin producing on a larger scale than allotted under the state's home
brewing law. Secondly, it will allow them to sell their beer to friends, at
farmers' markets, to local consumers directly, or even supply local
restaurants or bars. Lastly, the creation of such a permit will allow these
brewers to develop a local clientele, to have a real, consumer-tested product
to show investors, and to begin acquiring the funds necessary for starting a
larger establishment in the future. All these benefits eliminate some of the
financial burdens and reduce the risks associated with launching into the
craft brewing industry.
Further, if these small-scale sales were
unsuccessful, this permit would prevent brewers from investing substantial
funds and energy into a business that would ultimately fail. While this
proposed permit will not remove all issues facing home brewers, it will
decrease them significantly and foster the monetization of a popular hobby
as well as the creation of successful small businesses.
C. ProposedLicense - Model States

The type of permit this article seeks to propose does not currently
exist in any state. A few states, however, have passed statutes that are
lenient as far as the sale of homemade alcoholic beverages or are friendly
to home brewing." 12 Two states - Maryland and Arkansas - have laws
that provide the basis for a viable "middle ground" approach to licensing

111.
112.

Id.

ARK. CODE ANN.§ 3-5-1402 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178:13 (allowing
brew pub licensees to transport products to farmers markets and sell their product in the
original container).
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home brewers.'3 The following discussion explores existing legislation in
these states and proposes a new type of permit that states could adopt to
allow home brewers to monetize their craft on a small scale.
1. Arkansas
Arkansas took a permissive approach toward small breweries when it
passed the Arkansas Native Brewery Act (the Act) in 2003.114 The purpose
of the Act was to foster small Arkansas businesses in the form of
breweries, to create a new category of beer licenses, and to produce
"favorable conditions" for these businesses within the state." 5 The Act's
most pertinent provisions include:
1. The ability of the Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control
Division to issue licenses to small breweries for the
manufacture, sale, and storage of beer brewed on the
premises;116
2. The ability of these licensees to sell beer to both the
consumer or wholesaler for "consumption either on or off
the premises";" 7 and
3. The ability of these brewers to transport and sell their
product at festivals or at off-premises retail sites.' 8
While this license may seem lenient, the statutory cap on the amount
of beer allowed under the Act seems to promote brewers who plan to
produce large-scale and have the capacity to brew up to 60,000 barrels -- or
more than a million gallons - per year." 9 This large amount makes it
difficult for small home brewers to monetize their craft by testing the local
market without starting a full-scale business.

113.

ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 3-5-1402 (1987); MD. CODE ANN., ART. 2B § 2-101(x)(1)

(West 2012).
114. ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-1402 (1987).
115. Id.; Arkansas Native Brewery Act, H.R. 2290, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003).
116. ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-1405 (1987). The license is limited to 30,000 barrels of
beer per year, or about 930,000 gallons, to be sold in the state and may not exceed more
than 60,000 barrels in product that is purchased by the consumer. It also requires that
at least thirty-five percent of sales be in the state of Arkansas.
117. Id. at § 1405(B).
118. Id. at § 1405(E).
119. Id. at § 1405(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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However, the license created by the Act also allows for brewing on a
smaller scale through the microbrewery-restaurant provision. 20 The statute
provides that a microbrewery-restaurant may manufacture no more than
5000 barrels per year to be sold to wholesale retailers or consumers for offthe-premises consumption. 21 This allows licensing for production on a
smaller scale - roughly 155,000 gallons 122 - but still does not present an
economical alternative for a home brewer starting out in the market. It
further limits the brewer by tacking on the requirement that a restaurant be
operated in concurrence with the microbrewery. 123 Lastly, the Arkansas
Administrative Code provides specific labeling and logo requirements that
24
must be designed by the brewer in accordance with federal regulations.1
Despite the large production quantity allowed under the Arkansas Native
Brewers License, the $300-per-year licensing fee and $7.50-per barrel tax
rate for small breweries or microbrewery-restaurants present fair and
25
reasonable fees for a small home brewer. 1
2. Maryland
The Maryland Code provides for a permit for the sale of wine at
farmers' markets that presents a good alternative for home brewers who
desire to market their product in the locality without starting a full-scale
brewing business. 26 The permit allows Class 4 winemakers to sell wine

120. Id. at § 1405(a)(2).
121. Id. This 5000 barrel limitation also includes test runs for any beer brewed in the
microbrewery under Arkansas Regulations. ARK. ADMIN. CODE § 006.02.2-2.54 (West
2012).
122. Volume and Capacity Conversion, TRADITIONALOVEN.COM, http:/www.
traditionaloven.com/culinary-arts/volume/convert-barrel-beer-bl-us-to-galon-galus.html (last visited May 25, 2014). The traditional calculation is that there are thirtyone U.S. gallons to one U.S. barrel of beer. Id.
123. ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-1403(9) (1987). A "Native Brewery" under the license
must be operated under the guise of a small brewery or microbrewery-restaurant. Id. at
§ 1403(12). Under the statutory provision, a restaurant that is operated in congruence
with the microbrewery must meet the requisite restaurant health code, must serve at
least one meal per day, and must operate at a minimum of five days per week.
124. ARK. ADMIN. CODE § 006.02.2-2.60 (West 2012). The Arkansas regulation
allows the owner of a microbrewery-restaurant to submit a "trade name, logo,
trademark, symbol or label or other graphic representation" for approval. Id. It may
contain the brand name of the beer, the class of malt beverage, the alcohol content, and
the content of certain substances, such as Yellow No. 5 and saccharine, on the label in
concurrence with the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at §§ 006.02.2-2.60(l)-(4)
[hereinafter Arkansas Beer Regulations].
125. ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-1408 (1987).
126. MD. CODE ANN., ART. 2B § 2-101(b)(1)(i) (West 2012).
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for off-the-premises consumption in Maryland accredited farmers' markets
as well as offer two-ounce samplings to consumers. 27 While Class 4
Wineries are small, the cost of starting a 5000-gallon winery from scratch
has been estimated at about $71,000.128 However, this permit 29
allows small
wineries to occupy a stall at the market during business hours.
By allowing small wineries to garner "special event" permits to sell
wine at farmers' markets, this legislation provides for a potential increase
in state revenue by the collection of the $25-per permit fee collected from
the state's fifty-four Class 4 wineries.' 30 This permit, when approved in a
county, also allows wineries to expand their business throughout the state,
3
creating a "meaningful impact" for these small, local businesses. '
3. Proposed Permit
The permit proposed by this article would not fall under the guise of a
"brewery" or "brewpub" permit. Rather, it would best be labeled a "native
home brewer" permit granted by the alcohol control board of the applicable
jurisdiction. In order to overcome the potential difficulties for home
brewers seeking to monetize their craft, the proposed permit would contain
provisions limiting the production of home brew to fifty barrels - or 1550
gallons - per year, bottled and labeled according to standards similar or
analogous to those prescribed by the Arkansas statute licensing
microbrewery-restaurants.
Further, this "native home brewer" permit
would be similar to the existing Arkansas statutes in that it would allow
home brewers to manufacture, sell, or store their beer on an approved
premises. These locations would be approved by the control board of the
jurisdiction, but would not be restricted to full-scale facilities. Under this
proposal, the home brewer, with a few modifications, would be able to

127. Id. at §§ 2-205(b)(5)(i)-(ii). Class 4 wineries are known as the Maryland "farm
wineries" and require that the wine be fermented from Maryland-grown fruit. Part 2:
Starting a Winery, MARYLAND WINE, http://www.marylandwine.org/mwa/ startup/
startwinery.shtml (last visited May 25, 2014).
128. ALLAN DILLARD, COST ESTIMATE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIVE THOUSAND
GALLON WINERY 3 (2004), available at http://viticulture.hort.iastate.edu/ info/pdf/
wineryestcost.pdf.
129. MD. CODE ANN., ART. 2B § 2-205 (b)(1)(i)(7) (West 2012).
130. DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE:
ST. MARY'S COUNTY AND DORCHESTER COUNTY - WINERY SPECIAL EVENT PERMITS -

FARMERS' MARKETS 2 (2012), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/
fnotes/bil_0001/hb0171 .pdf.
131. Id.
132. See Arkansas Beer Regulations, supra note 124.
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manufacture the 1550 gallons per year out of an approved garage, barn, or
shed.
Also, by removing Arkansas' restaurant requirement from the permit,
any home brewer who meets the permit's standards to operate a small
business selling beer from a small, personal location could do so without
being forced to obtain a permit designed for larger producers. Under this
approach, the reasonable licensing fees established by the Arkansas Native
Brewers Act would remain the same for brewers who apply and are granted
the permit. 133
Under this permit, the initial customer base developed could then be
expanded to include local bars, established breweries, or the eventual
launch into full-scale brewery business. Further, the profit from these
"native home breweries" licensees could support fundraising and increase
investor interest if the brewer chose to expand the business into a formal
microbrewery or brewpub.
Lastly, the permit creates a group of small-scale, local brewers who
could then take advantage of an additional permit modeled after the
Maryland statute. 134 After a home brewer is licensed under the "native
home brewer" provision, qualified home brewers could then obtain "special
event" permits to operate a stall at approved farmers' markets and sell
sealed containers of beer to consumers for off-the-premises consumption.
Similar to the Maryland permit, the state could charge a minimal fee of
$25-to-$50 per permit, thus increasing statewide revenue while also
levying a reasonable fee on the brewer. This would allow brewers licensed
under the provision to sell their brews on a smaller scale at local farmers'
markets throughout the state and get their products and name into the local
craft beer market, eliminating some of the current financial and other
constraints.
Not only does this proposal simplify the process of breaking into the
craft beer industry, it also provides a less-risky alternative for home
brewers in the adopting state. Should a "native home brewer" then choose
to expand to a full-scale brewing operation through existing licensing
processes, this permit would increase the possibility that these ventures
would emerge as financially stable, successful, and well-planned small
businesses.

133.
134.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-5-1403 (1987).
MD. CODE ANN., ART. 2B § 2-101(x) (West 2012).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Home brewing's rise in popularity since its legalization illustrates that
it is clearly a hobby that is here to stay. However, the nationwide absence
of statutory provisions allowing home brewers to legally sell their brew
presents serious roadblocks, both financial and otherwise, for those who
want to take their craft to the next level. The proposed permit would allow
states to regulate the sale of home-brewed beer while removing the
limitation that forces brewers to wade through the complex processes
currently in place and to start out on a larger scale than financially
practical. With Prohibition long gone and the lenient view most states have
taken toward home brewing, it is time to give brewers an avenue for
monetization and the opportunity for eventual creation of successful small
businesses. It is time to let home brewers sell their brew.

